University governing boards and higher-education administrative bodies have a natural interest in avoiding litigation and minimizing administrative costs of alleged-wrongful-termination claims. As a result, universities and colleges often enter into specific collective-bargaining agreements providing for the opportunity to arbitrate such claims. One difficulty with such provisions, however, is that on occasion they may violate constitutional or statutory protections applicable to those claims. By way of illustration, some collective-bargaining agreements may attempt to require that all Title VII claims be submitted for binding arbitration. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,1 however, the United States Supreme Court held that collective-bargaining agreements (CBA) requiring arbitration of contractual rights cannot take away an employee's statutory civil right to judicial resolution of Title VII claims.2 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also held that in certain circumstances individual agreements may validly require arbitration of civil-rights claims.3 These different treatments of agreements to arbitrate *242 statutory rights indicate that the validity of challenged contractual provisions may depend not only upon the particular federal statute upon which an employee may base a claim, but also on whether that provision is part of a CBA or an individual agreement. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities4 (BOG II), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether a particular CBA provision agreed to by the Board of Governors and the faculty union facially violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Article 17.2 of the CBA provided that union-member employees would have a right to arbitration of their claims only so long as they refrained from simultaneously bringing those substantive claims before other administrative or judicial forums.5 In BOG II, the Seventh Circuit held this provision facially invalid and per se discriminatory under section 4(d) of the ADEA.6 This Comment discusses problematic aspects of the issue facing the Seventh Circuit in BOG II and presents rationales supporting a conclusion contrary to that reached by that court.7 Part I reviews the facts and holding of the Seventh Circuit decision in BOG II. Part II examines the conflicting judicial rationales applied in BOG I and BOG II to determine whether Article 17.2 was lawful. Part III examines additional arguments bearing on the validity of such provisions. Finally, Part IV proposes a practical solution for universities and colleges seeking to avoid the risk of duplicative procedures when faced with wrongful-termination claims based on the ADEA.