The author suggests that law professors assume a critical role in law students' decision to embrace or reject its pro bono ethical obligation. The author focuses on clinical faculty and suggests that its leadership within the academy will be crucial to bridge colleagues' world of theory and doctrine, and to connect with practicing lawyers. He illustrates clinical faculty's unique opportunity to incorporate the Model Rules of Professional Conduct by referring to the law reform and individual representation work that his clinical students perform. The author concludes by declaring clinical education presents an ideal opportunity for teaching students to appreciate their professional responsibility to promote access to justice and to embrace pro bono service as an integral element of a lawyer's professional life.

Tracing the century-old evolution of lawyers’ ethical codes, Professor Colbert reflects upon whether the legal profession takes seriously an attorney’s core value of public service. He challenges the bar to examine and to appreciate in a deeper way what the Model Rules’ Preamble declares in its’ opening sentence as the lawyer’s role “as a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.” Professor Colbert’s review of the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina and the September 11th attacks suggests that the “learned profession” has considerable distance to travel before it satisfies Model Rule’s 6.1, pro bono duty “to provide legal services to those unable to pay.” To cite just one example, he highlights the bar’s limited response to the Katrina crisis by noting that the sole criminal courthouse in New Orleans remained closed for ten months and thereby denied access to most incarcerated people awaiting trial.

Professor Colbert’s article poses the fundamental question that every bar association and legal educator must answer. Are we doing enough to instill public service as a core requirement of preparing people to practice law and to meet their professional responsibility when disaster overwhelms our very system of justice?

I contend that the Fenner ruling may transform the pretrial fact-gathering process by providing prosecutors with an additional source of evidence against indigent defendants, namely statements made at a judicial proceeding for the purpose of seeking pretrial release.

In my article, I explain the widespread state court practice of denying indigent defendants counsel at bail and suggest that other state courts may soon be faced with the same issue. I caution against judicial rulings of class-based, constitutional issues without full briefing and argument and guaranteeing the affected class of indigent defendants are given the opportunity to be heard. I also argue that the presence of counsel at the bail stage is critical toward protecting an accused’s right to a fair trial and argue that Gideon should extend to a defendant’s initial judicial appearance.