Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton Recent documents in Don Fullerton en-us Tue, 15 Sep 2009 15:57:14 PDT 3600 http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/53 http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/53 Thu, 10 Sep 2009 15:31:01 PDT Building on the existing literature that examines the extent of redistribution in the Social Security system as a whole, this paper focuses more specifically on how Social Security affects the poor. This question is important because a Social Security program that reduces overall inequality by redistributing from high income individuals to middle income individuals may do nothing to help the poor; conversely, a program that redistributes to the poor may nonetheless be regressive according to broader measures if it also redistributes from middle to upper income households. We have four major findings. First, as we expand the definition of income to use more comprehensive measures of well-being, we find that Social Security becomes less progressive. Indeed, when we use an "endowment" defined by potential labor earnings at the household level, rather than actual earnings at the individual level, we find that Social Security has virtually no effect on overall inequality. Second, we find that this result is driven largely by the lack of redistribution across the middle and upper part of the income distribution, so it masks some small positive net transfers to those at the bottom of the lifetime income distribution. Third, in cases where redistribution does occur, we find it is not efficiently targeted: many high income households receive positive net transfers, while many low income households pay net taxes. Finally, the redistributive effects of Social Security change over time, and these changes depend on the income concept used to classify someone as "poor". Jeffrey R. Brown Social Security http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/52 http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/52 Wed, 08 Jul 2009 13:55:56 PDT James Berkovec Taxation: Effects on Housing, Charity, Savings, Revenue http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/51 http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/51 Wed, 08 Jul 2009 13:26:06 PDT Tyler Fox Taxation: Models of Computable General Equilibrium http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/50 http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/50 Wed, 08 Jul 2009 13:23:07 PDT Don Fullerton Taxation: Deadweight Loss http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/49 http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/49 Wed, 08 Jul 2009 13:21:12 PDT Don Fullerton Taxation: Evaluation of Reforms http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/48 http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/48 Wed, 08 Jul 2009 13:17:40 PDT Don Fullerton Taxation: Models of Computable General Equilibrium http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/47 http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/47 Wed, 08 Jul 2009 13:13:00 PDT Don Fullerton Taxation: Models of Computable General Equilibrium http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/46 http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/46 Mon, 29 Jun 2009 13:01:09 PDT This paper presents estimates of static and dynamic general equilibrium resource allocation effects for four alternative plans for corporation and personal income tax integration in the United States. A medium-scale numerical general equilibrium model is used which integrates the U.S. tax system with consumer demand behavior by household and producer behavior by industry. Don Fullerton Taxation: Evaluation of Reforms http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/45 http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/45 Mon, 29 Jun 2009 12:53:44 PDT We use a tax policy example to show how debate on the value of an elasticity parameter translates into a debate about policy choices. To construct this example, suppose that the choice among four particular tax reform options is based on a single measure of efficiency gain. For each reform, we show how the size of this gain depends upon the elasticity of saving with respect to the net rate of return. Moreover, within quite narrow and reasonable bounds for the elasticity parameter, we find regions in which each of three different tax reforms turns out to dominate the others. Don Fullerton Taxation: Evaluation of Reforms http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/44 http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/44 Mon, 29 Jun 2009 12:50:34 PDT This paper examines the welfare consequences of changing the current U.S. income tax system to a progressive consumption tax. We compute a sequence of single period equilibria in which savings decisions depend on the expected future return to capital. In the presence of existing income taxes, the U.S. economy is assumed to lie on a balanced growth path. With the change to a consumption tax, individuals save more and initially consume less. As the capital stock grows, consumption eventually overtakes that of the original path, and the economy approaches the new balanced growth path with higher consumption and a greater capital stock. Both the transition and the balanced growth paths enter our welfare evaluations. We find the discounted present value of the stream of net gains is approximately $650 billion in 1973 dollars, just over 1 percent of the discounted present value of national income. Larger gains occur if further reform of capital income taxation accompanies the change. We examine the sensitivity of the results, both to the design of the consumption tax and to the values of elasticity and other parameters. The paper also contains estimates of the time required to adjust from one growth path to the other. Don Fullerton Taxation: Evaluation of Reforms