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<title>Diane L. Fahey</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2010  All rights reserved.</copyright>
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<title>Is The United States Tax Court Exempt from Administrative Law Jurisprudence When Acting as a Reviewing Court?</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/diane_fahey/3</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 16 Mar 2010 15:52:53 PDT</pubDate>
<description>To maintain legitimacy and stability, a government must have access to a reliable source of revenue.  Taxes are the lifeblood that sustains a government.  Therefore, as far back as 1931, the United States Supreme Court has enforced the principle that the executive branch of the federal government must be unimpaired in its ability to collect taxes owed; otherwise, the government could be undermined by citizens who attempt to delay or evade their obligation to pay taxes.Taxpayers have always been permitted to dispute the amount of their liability; however, until recently, taxpayers had little opportunity to dispute the method employed by the IRS to collect a tax.  In 1998, Congress enacted the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act which represents a dramatic departure from this principle.  The Act provides that taxpayers may demand a hearing before the IRS as to the proposed collection method.  A dissatisfied taxpayer can then appeal the IRS's determination to the U.S. Tax Court.  Unfortunately, the collection due process statute is short on details and the IRS and the court have struggled to create procedures that comport with the spirit of the law within the confines of their respective authorities. The Tax Court is an Article I court created by Congress to provide taxpayers with a forum to protest some tax deficiencies prior to their payment.  The Tax Court is not comfortable with its new appellate role and has tried to create a judicial review process by analogizing collection due process appeals to the Tax Court's deficiency procedures.  However, when the Tax Court hears deficiency cases it acts as a trial court and hears the matter de novo.  When the Tax Court hears collection due process appeals it acts as an appellate court reviewing agency action to determine its propriety, a different role and process from deficiency cases.Commentators have urged the Tax Court to fill in the gaps in its statutory authority by turning to traditional administrative law jurisprudence, including the Administrative Procedure Act.  In the absence of legislation specifying how a court is to review agency action, these bodies of law step into the breach and provide structure for the court's review process.  As a result, participants in the process are assured of consistency and predictability regarding the review process, thus rendering the process fairer.  However, the Tax Court insists that it has never been subject to administrative law jurisprudence or the APA, nor could it be.  The Tax Court thwarts participants' legitimate expectations when it creates its own rules of procedure and evidence when acting as a reviewing court.  An exploration of both the Tax Court's and the Administrative Procedures Act's history reveals that, in fact, the Tax Court is not exempt from traditional administrative law jurisprudence.</description>

<author>Diane L. Fahey</author>


<category>Administrative Law</category>

<category>Courts</category>

<category>Practice and Procedure</category>

<category>Taxation</category>

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<title>Can Tax Policy Stop Human Trafficking?</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/diane_fahey/2</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 27 Mar 2008 15:14:56 PDT</pubDate>
<description>ABSTRACT 
Can Tax Policy Stop Human Trafficking?The total number of victims who are held in captivity to perform forced labor at any one time is estimated to be as high as twenty-seven million.  That would be equivalent to every man, woman, and child in the states of New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New York being held in captivity and forced twelve to fourteen hours each day to labor in sweatshops, or toil as agricultural workers, or service sexually many customers every day with no hope that it will ever end except by death. They would live in crowded, dirty hovels, receive little food and no medical care, and live under the constant threat of beatings, rape, and other violence.  Every year, new victims will be added to their numbers. This is human trafficking.  The twenty-seven million victims include those who are trafficked within their own country and those who are trafficked across international borders.  Each year, as many as one to four million new victims are trafficked across international borders.  Despite strong denunciation by the U.N., the United States, and the European Union, this modern day slavery flourishes.Of all the factors that lead to human trafficking, government corruption is the most significant.  This article recommends an economic incentive that would recruit as allies in this war the wealthy residents of countries where the abuse is most rampant, and where the governments themselves, or government officials are complicit in trafficking.  The economic incentive that would be used is taxation.  This Article proposes that the governments of the world's major economies, where the wealthy invest the bulk of their money, re-impose the withholding tax on interest income from investments.  The governments of these major economies can then agree to reduce the withholding tax rates on residents of complicit countries if trafficking is reduced.  In addition, the governments of these major economies can promise to refund to the complicit governments a certain amount of the interest income withheld after the complicit governments achieve certain benchmarks.  Unlike foreign aid, the refund would depend on the complicit governments' prior demonstration that they have satisfied certain criteria, rather than relying on their commitments to comply in the future.  This economic solution applies pressure on those who are in positions of power to achieve change, and at the same time does not hurt those who are the most vulnerable to trafficking - the poor.</description>

<author>Diane L. Fahey</author>


<category>Taxation</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>&quot;Can Tax Policy Stop Human Trafficking?&quot;</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/diane_fahey/1</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/diane_fahey/1</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 04 Mar 2008 11:02:37 PST</pubDate>
<description>ABSTRACT Can Tax Policy Stop Human Trafficking?The total number of victims who are held in captivity to perform forced labor at any one time is estimated to be as high as twenty-seven million.  That would be equivalent to every man, woman, and child in the states of New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New York being held in captivity and forced twelve to fourteen hours each day to labor in sweatshops, or toil as agricultural workers, or service sexually many customers every day with no hope that it will ever end except by death. They would live in crowded, dirty hovels, receive little food and no medical care, and live under the constant threat of beatings, rape, and other violence.  Every year, new victims will be added to their numbers. This is human trafficking.  The twenty-seven million victims include those who are trafficked within their own country and those who are trafficked across international borders.  Each year, as many as one to four million new victims are trafficked across international borders.  Despite strong denunciation by the U.N., the United States, and the European Union, this modern day slavery flourishes.Of all the factors that lead to human trafficking, government corruption is the most significant.  This article recommends an economic incentive that would recruit as allies in this war the wealthy residents of countries where the abuse is most rampant, and where the governments themselves, or government officials are complicit in trafficking.  The economic incentive that would be used is taxation.  This Article proposes that the governments of the world's major economies, where the wealthy invest the bulk of their money, re-impose the withholding tax on interest income from investments.  The governments of these major economies can then agree to reduce the withholding tax rates on residents of complicit countries if trafficking is reduced.  In addition, the governments of these major economies can promise to refund to the complicit governments a certain amount of the interest income withheld after the complicit governments achieve certain benchmarks.  Unlike foreign aid, the refund would depend on the complicit governments' prior demonstration that they have satisfied certain criteria, rather than relying on their commitments to comply in the future.  This economic solution applies pressure on those who are in positions of power to achieve change, and at the same time does not hurt those who are the most vulnerable to trafficking - the poor.</description>

<author>Diane L. Fahey</author>


<category>Economics</category>

<category>Human Rights Law</category>

<category>Taxation</category>

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