David W. Hafemeister Copyright (c) 2012 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei Recent documents in David W. Hafemeister en-us Wed, 25 Jan 2012 01:45:18 PST 3600 Energy and Environment Chronology http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/70 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/70 Mon, 23 Jan 2012 14:36:30 PST David Hafemeister Articles Thermal Rise Time in Nuclear Reactors after Loss of Coolant or Loss of Power Accidents http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/69 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/69 Mon, 23 Jan 2012 14:36:26 PST David Hafemeister Articles Input to the NAS CTBT Study http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/68 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/68 Wed, 02 Feb 2011 15:47:38 PST David Hafemeister Reports Response Letter regarding: “A Secrecy Primer” (May/June 2005 Bulletin) http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/67 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/67 Wed, 02 Feb 2011 15:47:36 PST David W. Hafemeister Articles Advances in Verification Technology http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/66 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/66 Wed, 02 Feb 2011 15:47:34 PST The alleged limits of verification techniques have been used to justify lack of action at the negotiating table, but advances in computer science and optics should help dispel doubts about the verifiability of treaties

]]> David W. Hafemeister Articles A Secrecy Primer http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/65 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/65 Wed, 02 Feb 2011 15:47:31 PST As more countries acquire the scientific knowledge to build nuclear weapons, the U.S. response should not be heightened secrecy but a renewed commitment to strengthening political safeguards.

]]> David Hafemeister Articles Emerging Technologies for Verification of Arms Control Treaties http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/64 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/64 Tue, 25 Jan 2011 09:14:38 PST Progress in the technical means of monitoring to verify compliance to arms control treaties is discussed in the following areas: Real-time surveillance with charge-coupled devices in the visible and infrared; image enhancement with digital 1 image processing and with adaptive optics; imaging with radars based on satellites and on the ground; seismic monitoring with high frequency discrimination and with unattended in-country seismic stations; and nuclear weapons test monitoring with the global positioning satellite system.

]]> David W. Hafemeister Articles Testimony on the Verification and Compliance of Nuclear Testing Treaties http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/63 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/63 Tue, 25 Jan 2011 09:14:36 PST David W. Hafemeister Reports Nuclear Testing And Proliferation – An Inextricable Connection http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/62 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/62 Tue, 25 Jan 2011 09:14:35 PST Thomas Graham Jr. et al. Articles CTBT Space-Based Monitoring: Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar and National Technical Means http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/61 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/61 Tue, 25 Jan 2011 09:14:33 PST David W. Hafemeister Conference Proceedings CTBT Evasion Scenarios: Possible or Probable? http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/60 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/60 Tue, 25 Jan 2011 09:14:29 PST David W. Hafemeister Conference Proceedings Defining a Standard Metric for Electricity Savings http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/59 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/59 Tue, 25 Jan 2011 09:14:27 PST The growing investment by governments and electric utilities in energy efficiency programs highlights the need for simple tools to help assess and explain the size of the potential resource. One technique that is commonly used in this effort is to characterize electricity savings in terms of avoided power plants, because it is easier for people to visualize a power plant than it is to understand an abstraction such as billions of kilowatt-hours. Unfortunately, there is no standardization around the characteristics of such power plants.
In this letter we define parameters for a standard avoided power plant that have physical meaning and intuitive plausibility, for use in back-of-the-envelope calculations. For the prototypical plant this article settles on a 500 MW existing coal plant operating at a 70% capacity factor with 7% T&D losses. Displacing such a plant for one year would save 3 billion kWh/year at the meter and reduce emissions by 3 million metric tons of CO2 per year.
The proposed name for this metric is the Rosenfeld, in keeping with the tradition among scientists of naming units in honor of the person most responsible for the discovery and widespread adoption of the underlying scientific principle in question—Dr Arthur H Rosenfeld.

]]> Jonathan Koomey et al. Articles Review of the 2008 APS Energy Study, <em>Energy Future: Think Efficiency</em> http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/58 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/58 Tue, 25 Jan 2011 09:14:25 PST David W. Hafemeister Articles Capabilities of the IMS Seismic Auxiliary Network http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/57 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/57 Tue, 25 Jan 2011 09:14:23 PST David W. Hafemeister Conference Proceedings Review of <em>Sustainable Energy – Without the Hot Air </em>by David MacKay http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/56 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/56 Tue, 25 Jan 2011 09:14:22 PST David W. Hafemeister Articles US Nuclear Security Cooperation With Russia and Transparency http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/55 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/55 Tue, 25 Jan 2011 09:14:20 PST This chapter reviews the efforts of Russia and the United States to conclude agreements on the control or reduction of their inventories of nuclear warheads and military fissile materials. While some of the negotiations attempted to codify arms limitation and reduction measures, others were aimed at constraining the spread of fissile materials and technologies to the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). A number of the negotiations had elements of both arms control and non-proliferation.

Most of the monitoring provisions contained in nuclear agreements between Russia and the USA are in the category of transparency measures—those that give confidence that a state is fulfilling its obligations. Some transparency measures are unilateral and are intended to enhance confidence or goodwill. Verification measures, on the other hand, usually require more intrusive monitoring— enough to ensure a high likelihood that parties are in compliance with a treaty—and require formal, legally binding agreements. Taken together, these measures apply to parts of the parties’ nuclear weapon complexes, with the conspicuous exception of warhead facilities. Nonetheless, the joint efforts of the past decade have laid the technical groundwork for extending the scope of monitoring to warheads.

]]> David W. Hafemeister Contributions to Books The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Effectively Verifiable http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/54 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/54 Tue, 25 Jan 2011 09:14:19 PST David W. Hafemeister Articles Assessing the Merits of the CTBT http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/53 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/53 Thu, 08 Apr 2010 11:40:20 PDT The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the nonproliferation regime have been weakened; perhaps no other issue demonstrates this as dramatically as the status of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the ratification of which the U.S. Senate rejected in October 1999. Despite the U.S. rejection, the test ban has strong international support—the most recent vote to promote the CTBT in the UN General Assembly passed overwhelmingly, with 175 votes to 1 (the United States) and three abstentions. The Obama administration favors U.S. ratification of the CTBT, but this is no guarantee that Washington will ratify the test ban. Members of Congress must weigh the benefits and risks of signing the treaty; however, these calculations can sometimes be difficult to carry out. This article examines whether a return to nuclear testing would in fact benefit the United States, or if a test ban would be a greater contribution to U.S. national security.

]]> David W. Hafemeister Articles Review of Nigel Hey, <em>The Star Wars Enigma: Behind the Scenes of the Cold War Race for Missile Defense</em> http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/52 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/52 Wed, 24 Jun 2009 17:03:16 PDT David W. Hafemeister Articles Space Reactor Arms Control: Overview http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/51 http://works.bepress.com/dhafemei/51 Tue, 14 Apr 2009 11:20:23 PDT Unshielded nuclear reactors provide the lightest and most survivable long-lived sources of electric power available to support military satellites. Restricting their use now, before a new generation of larger space reactors is tested and deployed by the US and USSR, could help prevent an arms race in space.

Space nuclear power systems have been used by the United States and the Soviet Union since the 1960s. The Soviet Union has used orbiting nuclear reactors to power more than 30 radar ocean reconnaissance satellites (RORSATs). Two RORSATs have accidentally re-entered and released their radioactivity into the environment, and a third, Cosmos 1900, narrowly avoided a similar fate.

The United States is developing much more powerful space reactors, of which the SP-100 is farthest along, primarily to power satellite components of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). A working group associated with the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat (CSS) has been studying a proposed ban on orbiting reactors. A proposal by the FAS/CSS group that includes such a ban is attached in the appendix to the Overview.

The first five papers in this section, all by members of the working group, summarize the technological and historical background to nuclear power in space and show that restrictions on orbiting reactors are verifiable. The final paper, by Rosen and Schnyer of NASA, surveys the civilian uses of nuclear power in space.

The overview is a nontechnical introduction to the issues of space reactor arms control, including the proposed ban on orbiting reactors.

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