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<title>Dayna B. Royal</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2011  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/dayna_harmelin</link>
<description>Recent documents in Dayna B. Royal</description>
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<title>YOU CAN SAY THAT AGAIN!: A WAY OUT OF THE COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH CONUNDRUM</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/dayna_harmelin/5</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 31 Aug 2011 08:32:13 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>In the last decade the Supreme Court has modified the compelled-speech and commercial-speech doctrines by creating a hybrid of the two—compelled-commercial speech.  This nascent doctrine leaves unanswered serious questions about how it coexists with other doctrines in the First Amendment landscape.</p>
<p>This paper proposes a principled means to resolve these questions by drawing on an innovative behavioral-science theory called Cultural Cognition to provide a system for categorizing forced commercial-speech regulations.  By establishing which test applies to determine whether regulations violate the First Amendment, this framework should help bring consistency and predictability into a murky area of First Amendment law.</p>

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<author>Dayna B. Royal</author>


<category>Constitutional Law</category>

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<title>CULTURAL COGNITION AS A TOOL TO COMBAT THE COMPELLED-COMMERCIAL-SPEECH CONUNDRUM</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/dayna_harmelin/4</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 19 Aug 2011 11:32:25 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>In the last decade the Supreme Court has modified the compelled-speech and commercial-speech doctrines by creating a hybrid of the two—compelled-commercial speech.  This nascent doctrine leaves unanswered serious questions about how it coexists with other doctrines in the First Amendment landscape.    This paper proposes a principled means to resolve these questions by drawing on an innovative behavioral-science theory called Cultural Cognition to provide a system for categorizing forced commercial-speech regulations.  By establishing which test applies to determine whether regulations violate the First Amendment, this framework should help bring consistency and predictability into a murky area of First Amendment law.</p>

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</description>

<author>Dayna B. Royal</author>


<category>Constitutional Law</category>

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<title>THE SKINNY ON THE FEDERAL MENU-LABELING LAW &amp; WHY IT SHOULD SURVIVE A FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/dayna_harmelin/3</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2011 08:53:37 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>In America’s battle of the bulge, the bulge is winning.  Contributing to this obesity epidemic is Americans’ increasingly widespread practice of eating at restaurants where deceptively fattening food is served to patrons who grossly underestimate the calories in their meals.</p>
<p>To combat this problem and promote public health, Congress enacted a federal menu-labeling law, which requires that restaurants post calorie information next to menu offerings.  The constitutionality of this law has yet to be tested in court.  But New York City’s law, enacted prior, has survived First Amendment scrutiny.</p>
<p>Like New York’s menu-labeling law, the federal law should withstand a First Amendment challenge. Though the federal law affects commercial speech, it is a reasonable means for accomplishing a legitimate government interest—the reduction of consumer deception and the promotion of public health.  The skinny on the federal menu-labeling law is that it is an appropriate means to inform patrons’ menu choices at restaurants and help shrink America’s waistline.</p>

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</description>

<author>Dayna B. Royal</author>


<category>Constitutional Law</category>

<category>Consumer Protection Law</category>

<category>Food and Drug Law</category>

<category>General Law</category>

<category>Health Law and Policy</category>

<category>Law and Society</category>

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<title>Jon &amp; Kate Plus the State: Why Congress Should Protect Children in Reality Programming</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/dayna_harmelin/2</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 14 Aug 2009 13:28:29 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>As "reality" programming continues to increase in popularity, so too does the number of children living out their young lives in front of the camera. Yet the current legal regime is inadequate to protect these children, whose parents have betrayed their best interests for fame and fortune. This article argues that Congress should enact a statute providing a regulatory sliding scale based on age that would largely prohibit children from participating in reality programming. A federal statute would bring clarity to this unsettled area of the law while ensuring that parents and programming executives cannot skirt individual state laws and continue to exploit the nation’s children.</p>
<p>To this end, Part II identifies the various harms that reality programming causes and argues that participating in reality programming is detrimental both to the individual children and to society. Part III surveys the current legal landscape by examining the federal law on point--the Fair Labor Standards Act--and numerous state laws, focusing heavily on those states with historic ties to the entertainment industry. Part III concludes that the current legal regime is unable to remedy this emerging problem and argues that state law is not the best vehicle to do so. Part IV posits that a national solution is necessary, canvasses the options, and then argues in favor of a federal statute providing a sliding scale of prohibition for children in reality programming. Finally, Part V maintains that such a statute will not violate the Constitution because it is within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and violates neither parents’ due process rights nor the First Amendment.</p>
<p>Children deserve to experience the full richness of childhood and not to labor as spectacles for public amusement. A federal statute regulating employment in reality programming would prevent the sale of children’s privacy to the highest bidder.</p>

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</description>

<author>Dayna B. Royal</author>


<category>Employment Practice</category>

<category>Constitutional Law</category>

<category>Labor Law</category>

<category>Legislation</category>

<category>Juveniles</category>

<category>Law and Society</category>

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<title>Take Your Gun To Work and Leave it in the Parking Lot: Why the OSH Act does not Preempt State Guns-at-Work Laws</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/dayna_harmelin/1</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 02 Sep 2008 11:14:33 PDT</pubDate>
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	<![CDATA[
	<p>TAKE YOUR GUN TO WORK AND LEAVE IT IN THE PARKING LOT: WHY THE OSH ACT DOES NOT PREEMPT STATE GUNS-AT-WORK LAWS</p>
<p>Dayna B. Harmelin</p>
<p>Abstract</p>
<p>As the gun-control debate rages on, many states have begun enacting laws to protect individuals’ rights to store their guns in their vehicles while at work.  These “guns-at-work” laws limit employers’ ability to prevent employees from storing their guns in their vehicles on employer property.</p>
<p>At least two courts have considered the legitimacy of these laws.  One found the laws preempted by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (“Act”), which was enacted to promote worker safety.  The Northern District of Oklahoma held the laws create an obstacle to and conflict with the Act and cannot stand.  The Northern District of Florida disagreed, finding an express provision in the Act permits states to regulate in this area.</p>
<p>In the face of numerous states enacting these laws, this article explores whether they are preempted by the Act and concludes they are not.  Part I provides a preemption overview.  Part II analyzes the Act including the specific relevant provisions.  Part III surveys the various guns-at-work laws and provides a chart revealing noteworthy patterns.  Part IV argues these laws do not conflict with the Act.  Finally, Part V contends preemption requires promulgation of standards in accordance with the Act and maintains clear standards should be promulgated to address the issue.</p>
<p>The Occupational Safety and Health Administration may not continue to sit on the sidelines refusing to solidify its position on this contentious clash of workers’ safety and gun-owners’ rights.  This dispute should be resolved by OSHA in accordance with the Act and not by the courts through preemption.</p>

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</description>

<author>Dayna B. Royal</author>


<category>Employment Practice</category>

<category>Constitutional Law</category>

<category>Labor Law</category>

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