Settling for More than You Bargained for: The European Commission’s New Cartel Settlement Procedure

David M. Teslicko Jr., American University Washington College of Law

Abstract

This article examines the European Union’s (“EU”) new cartel settlement procedure, first used in May 2010 in a case against computer memory manufacturers. The procedure encourages faster adjudication of infringements of EU competition policy by offering a ten percent reduction in fines for companies which accept liability and certain fine levels. However, the procedure, as is, likely violates the legal principles of proportionality and defense, and may lead to increased appellate litigation in settlement cases. Additionally, the requirement of written disclosures by settling companies could increase susceptibility to private damages litigation in third-countries such as the United States. This article examines where changes could be made in the procedure to better obtain the envisioned administrative savings while respecting legal rights and not facilitating follow-on litigation.