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<title>David C. Parsley</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2008  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/david_parsley</link>
<description>Recent documents in David C. Parsley</description>
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<lastBuildDate>Fri, 18 Apr 2008 02:33:02 PDT</lastBuildDate>
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<title>Corporate Lobbying and Financial Performance</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/david_parsley/12</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 16 Apr 2008 06:31:47 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators and thus to further corporate goals by encouraging favorable policies and/or outcomes. Using data that became available after the passage of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, this study evaluates the effectiveness of corporate lobbying from a financial perspective. We find that a firm's lobbying expenses are positively correlated with its accounting-based financial performance. We also demonstrate that lobbying expenses are value-relevant to firms' market valuation. Finally, we use a portfolio approach to compare stock returns of lobbying firms with non-lobbying firms. We find that portfolios of firms with higher lobbying intensities significantly outperform their benchmarks as well as portfolios of firms with zero lobbying spending.</description>

<author>Hui Chen</author>


<category>Political Connections</category>

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