![](https://d3ilqtpdwi981i.cloudfront.net/AXoCHBshWBttx5vzeon8cZdjmgA=/425x550/smart/https://bepress-attached-resources.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/c3/20/e3/c320e384-c81c-4391-95cb-f1e659add9b4/thumbnail_1c47d76e-c82e-429d-ad7b-cc2f73624865.jpg)
Article
Jurisprudential Disagreements and Descriptivism
Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy
Research Paper Number
43/2013
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2013
Keywords
- descriptive jurisprudence,
- H.L.A. Hart,
- Jurisprudence,
- jurisprudential methodology,
- Legal Positivism
Abstract
Many contemporary legal philosophers argue that general jurisprudence is “descriptive.” I challenge this view in this essay by focusing on one familiar aspect of jurisprudence: persistent disagreements among legal philosophers. I argue that this fact is in tension with the claim that jurisprudence is descriptive. I consider several possible reconciliations of jurisprudential disagreements with descriptivism, but I argue that none of them succeeds. I then argue that persistent jurisprudential disagreements are easy to explain from within a normative framework. I conclude by suggesting that legal philosophers abandon descriptivism in favor of a view that more explicitly sees legal philosophy as part of normative political philosophy.
Citation Information
Dan Priel. "Jurisprudential Disagreements and Descriptivism" (2013) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/dan_priel/17/