Damian Cox

Modelling the moral dimension of decisions

Mark Colyvan et al. — Wed, 29 Sep 2010 22:50:07 PDT

In this paper we explore the connections between ethics and decision theory. In particular, we consider the question of whether decision theory carries with it a bias towards consequentialist ethical theories. We argue that there are plausible versions of the other ethical theories that can be accommodated by "standard" decision theory, but there are also variations of these ethical theories that are less easily accommodated. So while "standard" decision theory is not exclusively consequentialist, it is not necessarily ethically neutral. Moreover, even if our decision-theoretic models get the right answers vis-à-vis morally correct action, the question remains as to whether the motivation for the non-consequentialist theories and the psychological processes of the agents who subscribe to those ethical theories are lost or poorly represented in the resulting models.

Integrity

Damian Cox et al. — Wed, 29 Sep 2010 22:19:55 PDT

Extract:

Integrity is one of the most important and oft-cited of virtue terms. It is also perhaps the most puzzling. For example, while it is sometimes used virtually synonymously with ‘moral,’ we also at times distinguish acting morally from acting with integrity. Persons of integrity may in fact act immorally—though they would usually not know they are acting immorally. Thus one may acknowledge a person to have integrity even though that person may hold importantly mistaken moral views.

Politics most unusual: Violence, sovereignty and democracy in the 'war on terror'

Damian Cox et al. — Wed, 18 Aug 2010 23:47:06 PDT

How has September 11 and the declaration of the 'global war on terror' changed our conceptions of politics? How has it affected our understanding of democracy, human rights, personal freedom and government accountability? How should we respond in the face of growing violence and authoritarianism? In answering these questions, the authors engage in a comprehensive and critical analysis of politics in the age of terrorism. They explore different dimensions of a new political paradigm that has started to emerge in our societies, one characterized by an obsession with security, a loss of civil liberties and democratic transparency, government lies and cover-ups, the intrusion of religion into the public sphere, and an increasingly violent and militaristic foreign policy. In attempting to make sense of these developments, Politics Most Unusual examines a series of political, moral and psychological questions which are central to explaining politics in the age of terror.

Integrity and politics

Damian Cox — Thu, 10 Sep 2009 23:00:35 PDT

Extract:

Integrity is the virtue par excellence of the professional politician. It is the virtue a politician is apt to hold most precious; a virtue they are likely to defend above all others. To cast doubt upon the courage, foresight, knowledge, wisdom, compassion or good-sense of a contemporary politician is one thing, to cast doubt upon their integrity is quite another. Indeed, it seems that no professional politician working in a contemporary liberal democracy can afford to allow a credible slur on their integrity to go unanswered.

The concept of integrity is obviously central to our conception of a properly functioning political system and of the professionals that work within it. However, the precise nature of the integrity we demand and sometimes expect of professional politicians is difficult to characterise. The term is more readily put about than understood. This paper is an attempt to characterise the concept in both its complexity and specificity.

© Copyright Professional Ethics, 2001.

The trouble with truthmakers

Damian Cox — Thu, 10 Sep 2009 22:54:10 PDT

This paper argues that theories of truth which seek to specify the ontological ground of true statements by appealing to an ontology of truth-makers face a severe and possibly insurmountable obstacle in the form of logically complex statements. I argue that there is no apparent way to develop an account of logically complex truth within the confines of a modest and plausible ontology of truth-makers and to this end criticize independent attempts by Armstrong and Pendlebury to develop such an account.

Should we strive for integrity?

Damian Cox et al. — Thu, 10 Sep 2009 22:46:54 PDT

Even by people whose moral views diverge widely, integrity is commonly thought of as something worthwhile, a valuable personal characteristic. It is, consequently, something we commonly suppose worth striving to cultivate both in ourselves and in those under our care. Nancy Schauber (1996) offers a provocative challenge to this conventional wisdom - arguing (in all seriousness) that integrity is either something we possess simply in virtue of being persons or else it is not something worth having. An analysis of her truncated accounts of integrity and commitment will show why her argument fails. That is does fail is a victory for common-sense and for those people (good and bad) who strive for integrity.

Scepticism and the interpreter

Damian Cox — Thu, 10 Sep 2009 22:40:36 PDT

This paper defends an argument from interpretation against the possibility of massive error. The argument shares many important features with Donald Davidson’s famous argument, but also key differences. I defend the argument against claims that it begs the question against scepticism and that it leaves the sceptic with an obvious means of escape.

© Copyright Philosophical Papers, 2000.

Putnam, equivalence, realism

Damian Cox — Thu, 10 Sep 2009 22:37:14 PDT

Extract:

Hilary Putnam has advanced an argument against metaphysical realism which takes its cue from a phenomenon he calls “conceptual relativity”. The argument is both simple and perplexing. My first aim in this paper is to understand the argument. My second aim is to show that it does not work.

© Copyright Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1997.

On the value of natural relations

Damian Cox — Thu, 10 Sep 2009 22:31:06 PDT

In "A Refutation of Environmental Ethics" Janna Thompson argues that by assigning intrinsic value to nonhuman elements of nature either our evaluations become (1) arbitrary, and therefore unjustified, or (2) impractical, or (3) justified and practical, but only by reflecting human interest, thus failing to be truly intrinsic to nonhuman nature. There are a number of possible responses to her argument, some of which have been made explicitly in reply to Thompson and others which are implicit in the literature. In this discussion I describe still another response, one which takes Thompson's concerns about value seriously, but does not assign nature intrinsic or nonanthropocentric value. I suggest a relational environmental ethic as the basis for a genuinely ethical stance toward nature in which our relations to nature are a principal object of ethical concern.

© Copyright Environmental Ethics, 1997.

Metaphysical realism and idealisation

Damian Cox — Thu, 10 Sep 2009 22:23:26 PDT

In this paper I propose a version of metaphysical realism which I believe to be resistent to a number of antirealist attacks - in particular the attacks of Hilary Putnam. In the first part of the paper I outline the position and describe a number of responses to obvious objections. In the second part I demonstrate how this version avoids the charges of incoherence laid against the realist by Putnam.

War and violence: The problem of teaching the like-minded

Damian Cox et al. — Thu, 19 Feb 2009 10:34:05 PST

The article discusses objections regarding the inclusion of Peace Studies in the university curriculum. The earliest objection contested that there was no need for Peace Studies to be introduced because the supposed coverage of the subject could be better accomplished within the well-established humanities disciplines. The second objection was aimed at the nature of the field itself. The concept of objectivity and like-mindedness is also discussed.

Agent-based Theories of Right Action

Damian Cox — Thu, 19 Feb 2009 10:34:04 PST

In this paper, I develop an objection to agent-based accounts of right action. Agent-based accounts of right action attempt to derive moral judgment of actions from judgment of the inner quality of virtuous agents and virtuous agency. A moral theory ought to be something that moral agents can permissibly use in moral deliberation. I argue for a principle that captures this intuition and show that, for a broad range of other-directed virtues and motives, agent-based accounts of right action fail to satisfy this principle.

Integrity, Commitment, and Consequentialism

Damian Cox — Thu, 19 Feb 2009 10:34:04 PST

Extract:
Concerning ethics, we have two intuitions that might seem to conflict. On the one hand, we want to have respect for different moral views. On the other hand, the essence of morality is that we should be able to criticize each other. Today, many Westerners are anxious not to be ethnocentric and no longer want to claim that our norms and values should be universally accepted, as this might indicate disrespect for other cultures. At the same time, this might lead to a form of moral skepticism that does more harm than good. If there are no universal norms and values, the idea of universal human rights becomes void, and constructive criticism of other cultures impossible. Our respect for a certain culture might imply that we have to tolerate that the rights, or at least our conceptions of what rights are, of individuals in the culture are violated. This indicates that a reasonable position about human rights should avoid relativism and dogmatism. The apparent tension between tolerance and criticism can be resolved by taking certain moral rules that hold for everybody as objective truths, whereas we can be more liberal about others. Ethical intuitionism provides for a theoretical framework for this view.

Truth, Value, and Consolation

Damian Cox — Thu, 19 Feb 2009 10:34:04 PST

Extract:
The distinction between intrinsic value on the one hand and instrumental and contributory value on the other is a distinction between values that provide us with inextinguishable reasons for acting and values that do not. If integrity, for instance, demands that we act in a certain way, then we have reason to act in this way. Plausibly, unless we find ourselves to have simply mistaken the demands of integrity, this reason cannot be extinguished by further reflection on the consequences or nature of what we do. It may be outweighed by other reasons, but it would continue to have weight come what may. Integrity is very plausibly considered intrinsically valuable.

Believing badly

Damian Cox et al. — Thu, 19 Feb 2009 10:34:03 PST

This paper explores the grounds upon which moral judgment of a person’s beliefs is properly made. The beliefs in question are non-moral beliefs and the objects of moral judgment are individual instances of believing. We argue that instances of believing may be morally wrong on any of three distinct grounds: (i) by constituting a moral hazard, (ii) by being the result of immoral inquiry, or (iii) by arising from vicious inner processes of belief formation. On this way of articulating the basis of moral judgment of belief it becomes clear that rational and epistemic norms do not exhaust the kinds of normative judgment properly made of a person’s state of believing. We argue that there are instances of believing that are both rational and true and yet morally wrong.

Goodman and Putnam on the Making of Worlds

Damian Cox — Thu, 19 Feb 2009 10:34:03 PST

Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman are two of the twentieth century's most persuasive critics of metaphysical realism, however they disagree about the consequences of rejecting metaphysical realism. Goodman defended a view he called irrealism in which minds literally make worlds, and Putnam has sought to find a middle path between metaphysical realism and irrealism. I argue that Putnam's middle path turns out to be very elusive and defend a dichotomy between metaphysical realism and irrealism.

Realizm i wytwarzanie świata

Damian Cox — Thu, 19 Feb 2009 10:34:03 PST

Violinists run amuck in South Dakota: Screen doors down in the badlands

Damian Cox et al. — Thu, 19 Feb 2009 10:34:02 PST

Judith Jarvis Thomson's 'A Defense of Abortion' was published in the first ever issue of "Philosophy and Public Affairs". It is quite likely that, not only is it the most widely reprinted and cited essay ever to appear in that journal, it is also one of the most influential academic essays ever to appear on the topic of abortion. Almost every serious discussion of abortion in Anglo-American philosophy has made some reference to the essay, and to Thomson's central argument in it, since the essay was first published. Perhaps more students have read, and so to some degree have been influenced by, Thomson's essay than any other on this topic. It was welcomed by some pro-choice advocates as an original and sound defense of the morality of at least many, though by no means all, cases of abortion. There was, however, something in it for anti-abortionists too. For, given its starting point (the assumption that a fetus is a human person), Thomson argues that many cases-perhaps most-are, in varying degrees, immoral. It is in view of recent legislation passed in South Dakota, along with the religious and political right's clamour for a near total ban on abortion that we wish to reread Thomson's essay.

Integrity and the fragile self

Damian Cox et al. — Thu, 19 Feb 2009 10:34:02 PST

What does it take to be a person of integrity? Could those who commit morally horrendous acts be persons of integrity? Is personal integrity compatible with the kinds of ambivalence and self-doubt characteristic of fragile selves and ordinary lives?

This book examines the centrality of integrity in relation to a variety of philosophical and psychological concerns that impinge upon the ethical life. Relating integrity to many standard issues in philosophical and moral psychology - such as self-deception, weakness of will, hypocrisy and relationships - the authors present a comprehensive and accessible study of integrity and its types. Drawing on contemporary work in moral and philosophical psychology, ethics, theories of the self and feminist thought, this book develops an account of integrity as a fundamental virtue - as something that is central to all our lives.

Realism and epistemic theories of truth

Damian Cox — Thu, 19 Feb 2009 10:34:02 PST

Extract
Conventional wisdom has it that epistemic conceptions of truth are versions of antirealism. I have argued that conventional wisdom is right. Uncompromisingly antirealist epistemic theories – those tying truth to presently available warrant – entail uncompromisingly antirealist conceptions of reality. One may compromise one’s antirealist theory of truth, introducing various concessions to realist intuition, but one cannot compromise away all of one’s antirealism and remain in the orbit of a genuinely epistemic conception of truth. Push an epistemic conception of truth too far in the direction of realism and it turns into a correspondence theory. Epistemic conceptions of truth, therefore, are essentially antirealist.