Peter Cramton is Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland. Since 1983,
he has conducted research on auction theory and practice. This research appears in the
leading economics journals. The main focus is the design of auctions for many related
items. Applications include spectrum auctions, electricity auctions, and treasury
auctions. On the practical side, he is Chairman of Market Design Inc., an economics
consultancy founded in 1995, focusing on the design of auction markets. Since 2001, he
has played a lead role in the design and implementation of electricity auctions in France
and Belgium, gas auctions in Germany, and the world’s first auction for greenhouse gas
emissions held in the UK in 2002. He has advised numerous governments on market design
and has advised dozens of bidders in high-stake auction markets. Since 1997, he has
advised ISO New England on electricity market design and was a lead designer of New
England’s forward capacity auction. He led the design of electricity and gas markets in
Colombia, including the Firm Energy Market, the Forward Energy Market, and the Long-term
Gas Market. Since June 2006, he played a leading role in the design and development of
Ofcom’s spectrum auctions in the UK. He has advised the UK, the US, and Australia on
greenhouse gas auction design. He led the development of the FAA’s airport slot auctions
for the New York City airports. He received his B.S. in Engineering from Cornell
University and his Ph.D. in Business from Stanford University.

SelectedWorks of Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

University of Maryland at College Park

Market Design Inc.

Expertise

Courses/Seminars

Links

Finance

A Two-Sided Auction for Legacy Loans (2009)

Making Sense of the Aggregator Bank (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), The Economists' Voice (2009)

No Substitute for the "P" Word in Financial Rescue (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), The Economists' Voice (2009)

Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction (with Lawrence M. Ausubel, Emel Feliz-Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking), Working Paper, University of Maryland (2008)

Auctions for Injecting Bank Capital (Addendum to 'A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction') (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Working Paper, University of Maryland. (2008)

Auctions

Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (with Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston, and Andrzej Skrzypacz1), Journal of Law and Economics (2011)

Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction (with Pacharasut Sujarittanonta), Decision Analysis (2010)

Global Carbon Pricing: Essential, Inexpensive, and Feasible (with Steven Stoft), Research Paper, Global Energy Policy Center (2009)

Using Forward Markets to Improve Electricity Market Design (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Working Paper, University of Maryland (2009)

Virtual Power Plant Auctions (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Working Paper, University of Maryland (2009)

Telecommunications

Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (with Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston, and Andrzej Skrzypacz1), Journal of Law and Economics (2011)

Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction (with Pacharasut Sujarittanonta), Decision Analysis (2010)

Fear of Losing in Dynamic Auctions: An Experimental Study (with Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Erkut Ozbay, and Pacharasut Sujarittanonta), Working Paper, University of Maryland (2009)

Spectrum Auction Design, Working Paper, University of Maryland (2009)

Auctioning the Digital Dividend, Communications Regulation in the Age of Digital Convergence: Legal and Economic Perspectives (2009)

Collusion

Using Forward Markets to Improve Electricity Market Design (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Working Paper, University of Maryland (2009)

Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less Market Power, More Efficiency (with Steven Stoft), Utilities Policy (2008)

The Effect of Incumbent Bidding in Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis of Prices in the Closed and Open Segments of FCC Auction 35 (with Allan T. Ingraham and Hal J. Singer), Telecommunications Policy (2008)

An Overview of Combinatorial Auctions (with Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg), ACM SIGecom Exchanges (2007)

The 700 MHz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity to Protect Competition In a Consolidating Industry (with Andrzej Skrzypacz and Robert Wilson), Report for Frontline Wireless (2007)

Market Design

Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (with Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston, and Andrzej Skrzypacz1), Journal of Law and Economics (2011)

Market Design: Harnessing Market Methods to Improve Resource Allocation, White Paper, University of Maryland (2010)

Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton’s Ekati Diamonds (with Samuel Dinkin and Robert Wilson), Working Paper, University of Maryland (2010)

Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction (with Pacharasut Sujarittanonta), Decision Analysis (2010)

Global Carbon Pricing: Essential, Inexpensive, and Feasible (with Steven Stoft), Research Paper, Global Energy Policy Center (2009)

Electricity and Gas

Wind Energy in Colombia: A Framework for Market Entry (with Walter Vergara, Alejandro Deeb, Natsuko Toba, and Irene Leino), The World Bank, Washington, DC (2010)

Using Forward Markets to Improve Electricity Market Design (with Lawrence Ausubel), Utilities Policy (2010)

Virtual power plant auctions (with Lawrence Ausubel), Utilities Policy (2010)

Using Forward Markets to Improve Electricity Market Design (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Working Paper, University of Maryland (2009)

Virtual Power Plant Auctions (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Working Paper, University of Maryland (2009)

Natural Resources

How Best to Auction Natural Resources, Handbook of Oil, Gas And Mineral Taxation (2009)

Report on Key Design Elements of Auctions Under Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Tradeslot Report to Australian Department of Climate Change, [Ch. 9 Auction Design, Australian White Paper] (2008)

Auctioning Long-term Gas Contracts in Colombia, Report for Colombia’s Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas (2008)

Innovation and Market Design, Innovation Policy and the Economy (2008)

An Overview of Combinatorial Auctions (with Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg), ACM SIGecom Exchanges (2007)

Environmental Markets

Kyoto’s Climate Game and How to Fix It (with Steven Stoft), Issue Brief, Global Policy Center (2010)

International Climate Games: From Caps to Cooperation (with Steven Stoft), Research Paper, Global Energy Policy Center (2010)

Price Is a Better Climate Commitment (with Steven Stoft), The Economists' Voice (2010)

Global Carbon Pricing: Essential, Inexpensive, and Feasible (with Steven Stoft), Research Paper, Global Energy Policy Center (2009)

Report on Key Design Elements of Auctions Under Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Tradeslot Report to Australian Department of Climate Change, [Ch. 9 Auction Design, Australian White Paper] (2008)

Experimental Economics

Fear of Losing in Dynamic Auctions: An Experimental Study (with Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Erkut Ozbay, and Pacharasut Sujarittanonta), Working Paper, University of Maryland (2009)

Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction (with Lawrence M. Ausubel, Emel Feliz-Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking), Working Paper, University of Maryland (2008)

A Review of the 10-40 GHz Auction, Report for UK Office of Communications (2008)

A Review of the L-Band Auction, Report for UK Office of Communications (2008)

An Overview of Combinatorial Auctions (with Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg), ACM SIGecom Exchanges (2007)

Bargaining

Bargaining with a Shared Interest: The Impact of Employee Stock Ownership Plans on Labor Disputes (with Hamid Mehran and Joseph Tracy), Working Paper, University of Maryland (2010)

ESOP Fables: The Impact of Employee Stock Ownership Plans on Labor Disputes (with Hamid Mehran and Joseph Tracy), Working Paper, University of Maryland (2008)

Unions, Bargaining and Strikes (with Joseph Tracy), International Handbook of Trade Unions (2002)

Introduction to Chapter, Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson (2002)

Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining (with Joseph S. Tracy), Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson (2002)

Labor

ESOP Fables: The Impact of Employee Stock Ownership Plans on Labor Disputes (with Hamid Mehran and Joseph Tracy), Working Paper, University of Maryland (2008)

Unions, Bargaining and Strikes (with Joseph Tracy), International Handbook of Trade Unions (2002)

Introduction to Chapter, Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson (2002)

Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining (with Joseph S. Tracy), Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson (2002)

Impacts of Strike Replacement Banks in Canada (with Morley Gunderson and Joseph Tracy), Labor Law Journal (1999)

Epidemiology

Nonrandom Mixing Models of HIV Transmission (with Edward H. Kaplan and A. David Paltiel), Mathematical and Statistical Approaches to AIDS Epidemiology (1989)

Matching

Market Design: Auctions and Matching, Better Living Through Economics (2008)

Combinatorial Auctions (with Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg) (2006)

Industrial Organization

Essential Entry: Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction, White Paper, University of Maryland (2007)