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Article
Voter Approval of Bond Referendums: The Role of Bond Amount and Ballot Characteristics
State Politics & Policy Quarterly
  • Andrew Bechard, University of Rhode Island
  • Corey Lang, University of Rhode Island
  • Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz
Document Type
Article
Date of Original Version
1-1-2024
Department
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
Abstract

Municipal and state governments are often constitutionally bound to ask voters to approve new government debt through voting on bond referendums. Generally, politicians expect voters to balk at higher-cost bonds and be more willing to approve lower-cost bonds. However, there is minimal research on how the amount of a bond affects voter support. We implement a survey experiment that presents respondents with hypothetical ballots, in which the cost of proposed bonds, the number of bonds on the ballot, and the order in which they are presented, are all randomized. Our results suggest that support is not responsive to the amount of the bond, even when the cost is well outside what is typical and within the bounds of what the government can afford. In contrast, we find other aspects of the ballot matter significantly more for bond referendum approval. The more bonds on the ballot and being placed lower on the ballot both reduce support significantly.

Creative Commons License
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
Citation Information
Bechard, A., Lang, C., & Pearson-Merkowitz, S. (2024). Voter Approval of Bond Referendums: The Role of Bond Amount and Ballot Characteristics. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 24(1), 53–76. doi:10.1017/spq.2023.26 Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2023.26