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<title>Clifford Chad Henson</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2011  All rights reserved.</copyright>
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<description>Recent documents in Clifford Chad Henson</description>
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<lastBuildDate>Sat, 09 Jul 2011 01:50:37 PDT</lastBuildDate>
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<title>An Empirical Analysis of Judging Bias by Sex, Region &amp; Side</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/clifford_henson/7</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jul 2011 17:55:55 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>Conventional wisdom among those involved in competitive academic debate holds that, despite an emphasis on objective decision-making, factors other than skill affect the outcomes of rounds. This study examines all debate rounds at the Lincoln Douglas Debate Tournament of Champions from 2004-2009.  We estimate predictions of round outcomes based on transitivity and the outcomes of other rounds observed in the tournament in order to evaluate the potential for bias and control for the relative skill of debaters. We develop a binomial choice model to estimate the marginal effects of various biases.  In particular, we find statistical evidence of bias related to regional affiliation and topic side.  These factors may explain the significant number of non-transitive outcomes in the data.    Finally, we suggest some policy remedies to mitigate the impact of biases and further applications of our methodology.</p>

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<author>Clifford Chad Henson et al.</author>


<category>Economics</category>

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<title>An Overview of Caribbean Securities Exchanges</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/clifford_henson/6</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 05 Jan 2011 08:00:57 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>Caribbean securities exchanges have existed since the 1969 creation of the Jamaican Stock Exchange; in the last 15 years those exchanges have increased in number and signiicance. From the creation of the Bermuda Stock Exchange in 1971 to the creation of the Trinidad & Tobago Stock Exchange in 1981, no new exchanges with staying power were added. Beginning with the Barbados Stock Exchange in 1987 and followed by the Bolsa de Valores de la Republica Dominicana in 1991, the Cayman Islands Stock Exchange in 1997, the Bahamas International Securities Exchange and the International Finance Center and Exchange in 1999, and the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange in 2001, the region’s inancial infrastructure expanded.</p>

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</description>

<author>Clifford Chad Henson</author>


<category>Finance</category>

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<title>Judging CERCLA: an Empirical Analysis of Circuit Court Decision-Making</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/clifford_henson/5</link>
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<pubDate>Sat, 13 Mar 2010 06:50:02 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>Abstract: Political scientists, and increasingly legal scholars, have become skeptical of judges’ attempts to explain decisions based exclusively on applying fact to law, and have attempted to identify factors that influence judicial decision-making. This study isolates a set of cases dealing with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 and identifies variable sets corresponding to factors one would expect to be significant under competing models of judicial decision-making. While both the legal and extra-legal model independently explain some judicial decision-making, the legal model has more explanatory power and adds significantly to the explanatory power of the extra-legal model, while the extra-legal model does not add significantly to the explanatory power of the legal model. Further, some significant factors in judicial decisions may be open to manipulation by litigants.</p>

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<author>Clifford Chad Henson</author>


<category>Economics</category>

<category>Law (Empirical)</category>

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<title>On Time: An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Law School Admissions Deadlines</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/clifford_henson/3</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2009 09:39:43 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>Setting an application deadline is an important decision for a law school admissions committee because the deadline partly determines the quantity and quality of applications that a law school receives.  As such, information that would help an admissions committee set its deadline appropriately and strategically is valuable.  The intention of this essay is to provide such information.  To do so, we treat law school admissions as a market and set up an econometric model, which provides information on how various types of schools set their deadlines.  From this, we interpret a number of strategies in which law schools seem to engage.  We find that better law schools tend to set earlier deadlines, generally.  However, we also find that the most elite schools tend to set later deadlines than the general model would predict while medium-quality law schools tend to set deadlines earlier than the general model would predict.  We use economic theory to interpret these deviations from the general model as strategic signaling of quality to potential applicants.  Furthermore, we find that some in-state tuition reciprocity agreements may significantly affect deadlines.</p>

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<author>Clifford Chad Henson et al.</author>


<category>Economics</category>

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