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<title>Claire R. Kelly</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2009  All rights reserved.</copyright>
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<description>Recent documents in Claire R. Kelly</description>
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<title>The Politics of International Economic Law: Legitimacy and the UNCITRAL Working Methods.</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/claire_kelly/15</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 10:05:19 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Abstract The process of international lawmaking is, in part, a function of both politics and the attempt to engage in legitimate norms generation. States seek power through process in the international sphere. But States also use process enable representative, transparent, and effective rules. This paper considers how we might begin to deconstruct procedural proposals involving international norm generation by taking a look at a recent controversy over the methods of work at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). It will consider various paradigms to assess the legitimacy claims of international norms as applied to one particular controversy and consider specifically whether proposals to regulate decision-making as well as the participation of nonmembers serve legitimacy or politics or both.</description>

<author>Claire R. Kelly</author>


<category>International Law</category>

<category>International Trade</category>

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<title>Institutional Alliances and Derivative Legitimacy</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/claire_kelly/14</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 13 Feb 2009 13:21:52 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Claire R. Kelly</author>


<category>International Law</category>

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<title>Legitimacy and Law-Making Alliances</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/claire_kelly/13</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 19 Feb 2008 09:14:05 PST</pubDate>
<description>Abstract
Law-making institutions seek legitimacy to secure compliance with the norms that they generate.  In the international setting this quest is made more difficult by the lack of both an identifiable public that international organizations represent and competing normative prescriptions for international law-making.  In light of these obstacles, various legitimacy theories attempt to evaluate the law-generating efforts of international organizations.  These theories consider whether the organizations are representative, inclusive, procedurally fair, or effective.  Law-making organizations that satisfy the legitimacy criteria articulated in these theories can claim legitimacy and expect greater compliance as a result.Although these theories are helpful, a powerful new phenomenon forces us to reassess international law-making legitimacy and how we evaluate it.  International organizations now form law-making alliances with each other in order to tackle complex problems.  These alliances claim, and sometimes are credited with, legitimacy derived from the very relationship between the organizations.  Any framework that assesses the legitimacy of these alliances needs to approach "derivative legitimacy" by examining that relationship.  A framework must also address the particular concerns raised by these alliances, including marginalization, entrenchment, false legitimacy claims and abuse.This article suggests that derivative legitimacy should be evaluated by examining whether the international law-making alliances employ good procedures.  Although process is not a perfect assessment tool, it is best suited to ensure that the relationship between law-making alliances fosters inclusion and effectiveness.  Good procedures also ward against the negative consequences these alliances generate.  Although the necessary procedures will depend upon the particular organizations involved and their goals, the available procedures include: participatory mechanisms (such as notice and comment procedures), transparency procedures, rules against corruption, and rules requiring explanation.</description>

<author>Claire R. Kelly</author>


<category>International Law</category>

<category>International Trade</category>

<category>Organizations</category>

<category>Politics</category>

<category>Public Law and Legal Theory</category>

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<title>Book Review (reviewing P. Reed, The Role of Federal Courts in U.S. Customs and International Trade Law (1997))</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/claire_kelly/12</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 07 Nov 2007 13:34:21 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Claire R. Kelly</author>


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<title>Does the Commerce Clause Eclipse the Export Clause</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/claire_kelly/11</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 07 Nov 2007 13:25:15 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Claire R. Kelly</author>


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<title>Once More unto the Breach: Reconciling Chevron Analysis and De Novo Judicial Review after United States v. Haggar Apparel Company</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/claire_kelly/10</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 07 Nov 2007 13:24:08 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Claire R. Kelly</author>


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<title>The Value Vacuum: Self-enforcing Regimes and the Dilution of the Normative Feedback Loop</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/claire_kelly/9</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 07 Nov 2007 13:20:34 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Claire R. Kelly</author>


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<title>Commentary, Remnants of Customs Litigation in the Supreme Court [Symposium: United States Court of International Trade, 11th Judicial Conference]</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/claire_kelly/8</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 07 Nov 2007 13:19:18 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Claire R. Kelly</author>


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<title>The War on Jurisdiction: Troubling Questions About Executive Order 13303</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/claire_kelly/7</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 07 Nov 2007 13:17:43 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Claire R. Kelly</author>


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<title>Realist Theory and Real Constraints</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/claire_kelly/6</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 07 Nov 2007 13:16:25 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Claire R. Kelly</author>


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