Although I agree with Goldberg & Zipursky that wrongs are an essential component of tort law, their exclusion of instrumentalist concerns, such as deterrence, loss spreading, and administrative efficiency, is overly broad.

Using tort reform as a perspective by which to examine torts, I chronicle the growth of instrumentalism in tort law. All of the major tort reforms over the last century were based in instrumentalism. Moreover, when the reforms are viewed chronologically, a pattern develops: In each successive reform, instrumentalism made increasing inroads into tort.

Thus, as a positive account of tort law, civil recourse is incomplete. Tort law, as a positive matter, is about wrongs, but not exclusively wrongs. It is pluralist, including elements of instrumentalism as well.

Because Prosser's papers likely have been destroyed, Merrifield's notebook offers a unique "behind the scenes" look at Prosser during a very significant period in his professional development. During 1938-39, Prosser was finishing a draft of the first edition of Prosser on Torts, the most influential treatise ever published on tort law. Furthermore, Prosser's article legitimizing intentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort appeared in the spring of 1939. In addition to insights into these particular projects, the notebook allows a better understanding of Prosser's place in the intellectual history of twentieth century legal theory. Prosser's 1938-39 Torts class took place at the height of the realist influence in the academy. The notebook demonstrates Prosser's realism in the classroom, as well as his connection to the two major consequentialist torts rationales of the twentieth century: compensation and deterrence. In short, the notebook sheds light on both the origins and the content of one of the law's most influential thinkers.

This Article accomplishes three things. First, with no biography available on Prosser, the Article provides an account of his life, drawn heavily from archival research. Second, the Article presents new details of several of Prosser's seminal accomplishments. Third, the Article helps situate Prosser in the jurisprudential development of law in the twentieth century

Within this broad category of corrective justice this article focuses on two major schools of thought. The first, the annulment theory, proposed by legal philosopher Jules Coleman, emphasized a distinction between liability and recovery. Under this theory, public policy is best served by eradicating or "annulling" wrongful gains and losses. Accordingly, a tort-feasor is only directly liable to her victim if she receives a wrongful gain and the victim suffers a wrongful loss, as with the typical fraud case. In all other circumstances, the tort-feasor's liability and the victim's recovery are not necessarily connected, and corrective justice is served so long as the victim recovers from some source.

The annulment theory has been criticized roundly by Stephen Perry, among others, who has faulted it for a lack of positive logical support. In its place, Perry argues that there is a correlativity requirement to corrective justice. In contrast to the annulment theory, Perry's theory requires a bond or correlation between the tortfeasor and her victim because of the relationship of each one to a common tortious outcome. Each actor has the innate capacity for self-evaluation (or self-reflection) that ties the actor to the results other actions. This self-evaluation is central to the concept of personhood and justifies the correlativity requirement of corrective justice.

Concluding the theoretical analysis, the authors concede that the annulment theory can be seen as disproved by an argument supporting the correlativity requirement. Turning to a concrete situation, the authors compare the current third-party tort liability for automobile accidents with a new Personal Injury Protection (PIP) "choice" auto insurance plan. The PIP plan allows motorists to choose whether to cover themselves by insurance payable with or without fault. Finally, the authors address the central question whether the PIP plan fulfills the correlativity requirement-and decide that it does because it still calls for the necessary self-evaluation essential to Perry's conception of corrective justice.