Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn Recent documents in Christiaan Hogendorn en-us Fri, 10 Jul 2009 10:51:42 PDT 3600 http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/8 http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/8 Thu, 09 Jul 2009 08:49:45 PDT Christiaan Hogendorn http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/7 http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/7 Thu, 09 Jul 2009 08:34:11 PDT Christiaan Hogendorn http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/6 http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/6 Thu, 09 Jul 2009 08:32:38 PDT Christiaan Hogendorn http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/5 http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/5 Thu, 09 Jul 2009 08:28:35 PDT Christiaan Hogendorn http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/4 http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/4 Thu, 09 Jul 2009 08:25:22 PDT Christiaan Hogendorn http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/3 http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/3 Wed, 17 Jun 2009 10:40:31 PDT We document entry and capacity expansion in US long-distance fiber-optic networks before and during the "telecom boom." We disentangle the many swaps and leases between networks in order to measure owned route miles versus route miles shared with other carriers. Entry appears much more moderate when these shared miles are not counted. Strategic behavior can lead to excessive entry, and we find evidence of such behavior regarding total miles (including swaps and leases) but not regarding owned miles. We conclude that entry was excessive only with regard to swaps and leases, but not with regard to the physical building of the networks. Christiaan Hogendorn http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/2 http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/2 Wed, 17 Jun 2009 10:32:48 PDT We formalize and extend George Stigler's famous article "The division of labor is limited by the extent of the market." We emphasize economies of scale in intermediate goods production as a determinant of firm boundaries and vertical control. We show that there are potential coordination failures which may prevent efficient vertical disintegration, and we discuss how these might be either overcome or used to the advantage of incumbent firms. Christiaan Hogendorn http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/1 http://works.bepress.com/christiaan_hogendorn/1 Tue, 16 Jun 2009 07:14:36 PDT In many capacity-intensive industries (e.g. electricity, bandwidth), exchanges allow firms, including competitors, to buy and sell wholesale capacity before selling on the retail market. Capacity exchanges allow firms to smooth demand shocks, but do they also facilitate tacit collusion to limit capacity investment? This paper models investment and exchange in a one-shot game and in a repeated game with tacit collusion. It finds that the presence of the exchange does not reduce total capacity investment, and thus does not raise consumer prices. In fact, the exchange may make it more difficult to sustain tacit collusion. Christian Hogendorn L13 L41 D43