Lemons on the web: A signalling approach to the problem of trust in Internet commerce
Article comments
Interim status: Citation only.
Lee, B-C., Ang, L. & Dubelaar, C. (2005). Lemons on the web: A signalling approach to the problem of trust in Internet commerce. Journal of economic psychology, 26(5), 607-623.
Access the publisher's website.
© Copyright Elsevier B.V., 2005.
Abstract
Asymmetric information is at the heart of situations involving trust. In the case of B2C Internet commerce, the information asymmetry typically relates to the difficulty that consumers have of distinguishing between “trustworthy” and “untrustworthy” Web merchants. The impasse can be resolved by the use of signals by trustworthy Web merchants to differentiate themselves from untrustworthy ones. Using an experimental design where subjects are exposed to a series of purchase choices, we investigate three possible signals, an unconditional money-back guarantee, branding, and privacy statement, and test their efficacy. Our empirical results confirm the predictions suggested by signalling theory.
Suggested Citation
Boon-Chye Lee, Lawrence Ang, and Chris Dubelaar. "Lemons on the web: A signalling approach to the problem of trust in Internet commerce" Business papers (2005).
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/chris_dubelaar/13
This document is currently not available here.