Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer Recent documents in Charles Boehmer en-us Sun, 31 May 2009 04:17:38 PDT 3600 http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/8 http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/8 Tue, 20 Jan 2009 11:25:43 PST Studies of diversionary conflict typically claim that lower rates of economic growth and domestic unrest increase the risk of militarized interstate conflict. However, extant research shows that these factors are also related to regime changes. Lower rates of economic growth and domestic conflict should increase the risk that governments are overthrown. This paper investigates the comparative risk of economic growth and domestic turmoil on militarized interstate conflict and regime changes on a sample of over a hundred countries from 1920-1992. I find that higher rates of economic growth are related to violent militarized interstate conflicts and reduce the risk of regime changes, although higher levels of internal political unrest do in fact increase the risk of militarized interstate conflict. Democracy and economic development likewise provide internal stability and interstate peace. Yet, the risk of regime change increases rapidly relative to involvement in an interstate conflict for states affected by high levels of domestic conflict, which is evidence suggestive that any diversionary strategies are indeed a risky gambit that have a high chance of failure. Charles R. Boehmer Publications http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/7 http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/7 Tue, 20 Jan 2009 11:22:27 PST Are democracies are generally peaceful? The literature was in the past contradictory, although now there appears increasing evidence that democracies are more pacifistic than other regimes. This research note explores why the literature has often been mischaracterized or misunderstood in our field. This is followed with an analysis of democracy and conflict at the state level of analysis from 1884-1999 using a broad sample of states and appropriate statistical estimators. The results comport with past studies that democracies are less likely to initiate militarized conflicts. The study also shows that even when democracies do militarize a dispute, these are less likely to escalate to uses of military force or war. Charles R. Boehmer Publications http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/6 http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/6 Tue, 20 Jan 2009 11:12:33 PST Why are states jointly members in certain intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) but not others? Despite the proliferation of IGOs and renewed interest in this topic, we lack systematic research to answer this question. Our theory of political community explains why dyads of states are likely to be common members in particular types of IGOs. We analyze and compare functionalist and Deutschian communitarian perspectives about IGO memberships. We test our theory using newly available data on IGO mandates and institutional structure, which allows us to make specific predictions about the types of IGO to which dyads become members. We show that dyads that are economically dependent and/or democratic and enjoying enduring peace are more likely join those IGOs that possess high levels of institutional structure. Militarized interstate conflicts reduce the likelihood of states sharing membership in common IGO, but not substantially, whereas development and alliances also increase IGO memberships between states. Trade ties, however, are the most important determinant of joint membership between states in the most institutionalized IGOs, which is congruent with security communities. Charles R. Boehmer Publications http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/5 http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/5 Wed, 10 Oct 2007 11:19:33 PDT Charles Boehmer Publications http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/4 http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/4 Wed, 10 Oct 2007 11:19:32 PDT Poor states are more likely to experience civil conflict, but what about poverty places their states in such risk? We argue that it is not the lack of money that guides citizens to rebellion; rather, it us the lack of adequate supplies of food. Food is a basic human need that when in short supply undermines the legitimacy of governments. Our study builds on existing data and we examine the effect of food supply on civil war onset. Our results show that states lacking adequate supplies of food are at risk for civil war, even if they have relatively high levels of wealth. In addition, food deprivation exacerbates the risk of civil war in states that export large amounts of lootable resources. David Sobek Current and Recent Submissions http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/3 http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/3 Wed, 10 Oct 2007 11:19:32 PDT Erik Gartzke http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/2 http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/2 Wed, 10 Oct 2007 11:19:31 PDT This paper examines how economic development affects interstate conflict. We hypothesize a non-linear relationship between development and interstate conflict, where extreme poverty and prosperity reduce the risk of militarized conflict. This occurs because states at an intermediate level of development have both the opportunity and willingness to pursue territorial claims, which makes them prone to militarized interstate conflicts. Our empirical analyses confirm this non-linear relationship. Developed states, more reliant on services and international commerce and less on natural resources for their economic growth, are less likely to push territorial claims, decreasing their involvement in interstate conflict. High development also mitigates the combined effects of population growth and military power that serve to increase the risk of interstate violence. Additionally, we show that population growth, but not population density, contributes to the occurrence of militarized disputes. Charles Boehmer http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/1 http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/1 Wed, 10 Oct 2007 11:19:31 PDT Charles Boehmer Publications