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6 Contextualism in Epistemology and the Context-Sensitivity of 'Knows'

Robert J. Stainton

The central issue of this essay is whether contextualism in epistemology is genuinely in conflict with recent claims that 'know' is not in fact a context-sensitive word. To address this question, I will first rehearse three key aims of contextualists and the broad strategy they adopt for achieving them. I then introduce two linguistic arguments to the effect that the lexical item 'know' is not context sensitive, one from Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore, one from Jason Stanley. I find these and related arguments quite compelling. In particular, I think Cappelen and Lepore (2003, 2005a) show pretty definitively that 'know' is not like 'I'/'here'/'now', and Stanley (2004) shows that 'know' is not like 'tall'/'rich'.[1] One could try to find another model for 'know'. Instead, I consider whether one can rescue ''the spirit of contextualism in epistemology''—that is, achieve its aims by deploying a strategy of appealing to speaker context—even while granting that 'know' isn't a context-sensitive word at all. My conclusion, in a nutshell, is this: *If* there are pragmatic determinants of what is asserted/stated, *and* contextualism can overcome independent problems not having to do specifically with the context-sensitivity of the word 'know', *then* the spirit of contextualism can be salvaged. Even though, for reasons sketched by the aforementioned authors, 'know' doesn't actually belong in the class of context-sensitive words.

The Spirit of Contextualism

At a minimum, contextualists have three multifaceted aims. First, they wish to respond to skepticism by ''splitting the difference'' between (apparently true) knowledge claims made in ordinary contexts, and (apparently false) knowledge claims, about the same topic, made in the face of skeptical arguments. The idea is that two such claims aren't actually in conflict, despite the same words being used about the same knower, because the

speakings implicitly state different things—and this because the shift in context has changed the standards for knowledge, and standards are implicitly part of any claim to know. This allows ordinary speakers to make true knowledge attributions, while also explaining the genuine pull of skepticism. (And let me stress: The aim is to secure *true* assertions of knowledge, not just ones which, though strictly speaking false, are reasonable or practical, or which merely convey something true, etc. See DeRose 1999, 187–188.) Gail Stine (1976, 254) puts the general desideratum nicely:

> It is an essential characteristic of our concept of knowledge that tighter criteria are appropriate in different contexts. It is one thing in a street encounter, another in a classroom, another in a law court—and who is to say it cannot be another in a philosophical discussion? . . . We can point out that some philosophers are very perverse in their standards (by *some* extreme standard, there is some reason to think there is an evil genius, after all)—but we cannot legitimately go so far as to say that their perversity has stretched the concept of knowledge out of all recognition—in fact they have played on an essential feature of the concept. On the other hand, a skeptical philosopher is wrong if he holds that *others* are wrong in any way—i.e., are sloppy, speaking only loosely, or whatever—when they say we know a great deal.

Yet, in letting in contextual standards, we do not want to say that 'know' is ambiguous, between a ''high-standard'' and a ''low-standard'' sense. First, this postulates ambiguities without adequate warrant. Second, there don't seem to be just two standards, there seem to be many. And they seem to vary along many different dimensions—how strongly the proposition must be believed, what degree of felt certainty is required, how well the proposition must be justified and by what means, how important for successful action the truth of the believed proposition is, and so forth. (For a taste of the complexities here, see Unger 1986.)

Second, contemporary contextualists want the *attributor's* standards to play a part in what is asserted, when we make knowledge claims. It isn't just the standards of the person who is said to know, but also the standards of the person attributing knowledge that can make two assertions of the same form—for instance, 'Keith knows that the bank is open'—said about the same knower who is in exactly the same circumstances, express different propositions. Thus, for example, Keith's spouse can utter these words, when the issue is whether to bother making a trip to the bank, and speak truly; but the philosopher facing up to skepticism, in uttering these very words, and without Keith's own standards changing, can speak falsely. (This point is stressed by, among others, DeRose 1992, 113; see also his 1999.)

Finally, contextualism aims to save the epistemic deductive closure principle (Stine 1976, 249). It says:

(1) The Principle of Deductive Epistemic Closure: For any agent *S*, if *S* knows that *p*, and *S* knows that if *p* then *q*, then *S* knows that *q*.

This principle seems to be in trouble insofar as one wants to have it be the case that an agent can know that the bank is open, know that if the bank is open then there is an external world, yet not know that there is an external world.

There are other theorists who share these three aims. What distinguishes contextualism, as I understand it, is a distinctive *strategy* that contextualists adopt for achieving them. They take knowledge claims to be context sensitive. And sensitive not just to the context of the person spoken about (the putative knower), but also to the context of the person speaking. This idea is captured nicely by the following quotations:

A. "…the sentence '*S* knows *p*' will have different truth conditions in different contexts of attribution" (Cohen 1991, 23).
B. "[Contextualism is] a theory according to which the truth conditions of sentences of the form '*S* knows that *p*' or '*S* does not know that *p*' vary in certain ways according to the context in which the sentences are uttered" (DeRose 1992, 110).
C. "Contextualism is the view that…the truth-values of sentences containing 'know', and its cognates depend on contextually determined standards. Because of this, sentences of the form '*S* knows *P*' can, at one time, have different truth-values in different contexts. Now when I say 'contexts', I mean 'contexts of ascription'. So the truth value of a sentence containing the knowledge predicate can vary depending on things like purposes, intentions, expectations, presuppositions, etc., of the speakers who utter these sentences" (Cohen 1999, 57).
D. "Suppose one speaker says about a subject *S* and a proposition *P*, '*S* knows *P*.' At the very same time, another speaker says of the very same subject and proposition, '*S* does not know *P*.' Must one of the two be speaking falsely? According to the view I will call 'contextualism', both speakers can be speaking the truth" (Cohen 1999, 57).
E. "…the truth value of an attribution of knowledge is determined relative to the context *of attribution*, i.e., relative to the speaker or the conversational context" (Cohen 1991, 22).

Linguistic Arguments against Contextualism

Cappelen and Lepore

I have rehearsed both the core aims of contextualism and its distinctive strategy for meeting them. The aims and the strategy taken together I call

''the spirit of contextualism.'' I now turn to syntactic and semantics arguments to the effect that 'know' is not a context-sensitive word. The arguments are by now fairly familiar. What's more, my central point will be that even if they work, the spirit of contextualism may be salvaged anyway. I will thus restrict myself to two illustrative linguistic arguments.

I begin with Cappelen and Lepore. They argue that we have been given no good reason to think that 'know' is a context-sensitive expression. Since the burden of proof is surely on those who take 'know' to be a context-sensitive word, Cappelen and Lepore conclude that 'know' is not context sensitive. They further point out that 'know' fails certain diagnostic tests for indexicality.

To illustrate, consider what I'll here call the *Can't Infer from Direct to Indirect Speech-Report* test. It has to do with indirect speech-reports of the form '*A* said that *p*'. When the complement of 'that' contains a paradigm indexical—such as 'I' or 'now' or 'here'—the whole sentence can easily be false even though speaker *A* really did token the sentence '*p*'. Put otherwise, when '*p*' contains an indexical, you cannot reliably go from the direct speech-report ''*A* said '*p*'" to the indirect speech-report ''*A* said that *p*,'' i.e., merely by disquoting.[2] To give an example, suppose Carlos once uttered 'I was born in Spain'. Hence, the reporting sentence (2) is true.

(2) Carlos said, ''I was born in Spain.''

Suppose further that Carlos has never claimed, of anyone else, that they were born in Spain. In particular, he's never claimed of Daniela that she was born in Spain. If Daniela now indirectly reports Carlos' statement, by disquoting, saying:

(3) Carlos said that I was born in Spain.

Daniela's report is false. (It's false precisely because 'I' is a speaker-world magnet. That is, it's a word that always ''magnets back'' to the speaker's context—here, to Daniela.) Say Cappelen and Lepore: If you *can* go from the direct-quotation version to the indirect-quotation version by disquoting, then the sentence in question is likely not context sensitive.

It's a related feature of speaker-world magnets that, no matter how deeply they are linguistically embedded, they take widest scope. That is, not only *can* they take widest scope, they *must* take widest scope. In particular, speaker-world magnets must take wide scope over temporal operators and modal operators. To use David Kaplan's examples, in (4), 'now' cannot refer to a proximal future time, but instead must refer to the time of utterance; and 'here' cannot refer to a non-actual Pakistan in (5), but instead must refer to the Pakistan of the context of utterance (Kaplan 1989, 498–499).

(4) It will soon be the case that all that is now beautiful is faded.

(5) It is possible that in Pakistan, in five years, only those who are actually here now are envied.

More to the point for present purposes, speaker-world magnets must also take scope over propositional attitude verbs and indirect speech reports. But one thing speaker-world magnets cannot scope out of is *direct* quotation. Even speaker-world magnets must take narrow scope, with respect to quotation marks. Applied to our example, this means that 'I' univocally takes wide scope with respect to 'Carlos' in the indirect speech report (3), with 'I' picking out Daniela. Contrast the direct speech report (2): in (2), 'I' may co-refer with 'Carlos'. Given their contrasting behavior vis-à-vis scope, it's no surprise that (2) does not entail (3). (This difference is what underlies the test, although talk of ''scope'' is a bit misplaced in examples in which there is no linguistic embedding.)

Contrast 'know'. Suppose Carlos says 'Keith knows that the bank is open'. Not only is sentence (6) true, but sentence (7) is true as well:

(6) Carlos said 'Keith knows that the bank is open'.

(7) Carlos said that Keith knows that the bank is open.

Indeed, ignoring tense and other context-sensitive elements, and the complexities about force and content described in note 2, (6) entails (7). Hence 'know' is unlike 'I', 'here', and 'now'. Thus 'I' passes the *Can't Infer from Direct to Indirect Speech-Report* test, but 'know' does not.

Cappelen and Lepore (2005a and elsewhere) offer further linguistic tests that all strongly suggest the same thing: As a matter of its standing semantics, 'know' does not behave like a speaker-world magnet. Since my central point will be that this may not matter to the spirit of contextualism, however, I rest content with this one test from them.

Stanley

Cappelen and Lepore take their arguments to show that 'know' isn't a context-sensitive term *at all*. Speaking for myself, I think that's somewhat hasty, since there is room to doubt whether their tests work for all subvarieties of context-sensitive terms. In particular, one might think that there are context-sensitive expressions that nevertheless are not ''speaker-world magnets.'' What their various tests do establish, I think, is that 'know' isn't like 'I', 'here' or 'now'; if 'know' is context sensitive, it isn't context sensitive in that way.

But some contextualists will want to shrug this off as irrelevant. In particular, contextualists who are wont to insist that their model for 'know' is

'tall', 'flat', or 'rich' may be unimpressed. (See, e.g., Cohen 1999; Lewis 1996; Unger 1975.) This is where Jason Stanley's 2004 paper ''On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism'' comes in. (See also his 2005 book.) Stanley has cogently argued that 'know' isn't like 'tall', 'flat', or 'rich' either—because whereas these words are gradable, 'know' is not.[3]

The basic point was stressed early on by Dretske. He writes:

> Knowing that something is so, unlike being wealthy or reasonable, is not a matter of degree. Two people can both be wealthy, yet one be wealthier than the other; both be reasonable, yet one be more reasonable than the other. When talking about people, places, or topics (*things* rather than *facts*), it also makes sense to say that one person knows something *better* than another . . . But *factual* knowledge, the knowledge *that s* is *F*, does not admit of such comparisons. If we both know that the ball is red, it makes no sense to say that you know this better than I. (Dretske 1981a, 107; see also Dretske 1981b, 363)

Stanley, building on these remarks, provides two linguistic tests for gradability. First, gradable expressions permit degree modifiers like 'really' and 'very':

(8) Gradable Adjectives with Degree Modifiers
(a) That is flat, though not very flat.
(b) That is flat, though not really flat.
(c) That is tall, though not very tall.
(d) That is tall, though not really tall.

(That 'really' is a degree modifier here, and not merely a way of stressing that *in fact* the thing is tall/flat, is evidenced by (8b) and (8d) not being contradictions.)

Notice, however, that (9) and (10) are decidedly odd:

(9) ?It is known, but it isn't very known.

(10) ?It is known, but it isn't really known.

The only way to read (9) is not as a statement about the degree to which the proposition in question—say, that the bank is open—is known by a given person, but (at best) as a statement about how many people the proposition is known by (i.e., about how widely known it is). In particular, (9) doesn't speak to how high a standard is met. Similarly for (10). (The same holds for the more idiomatic, ''It isn't very *well* known.'') The problem is, it's a mystery why (9) and (10) do *not* have this reading, if 'know' is gradable. Nor should we be fooled by expressions like 'I know perfectly well that Felicidad didn't do her homework'. Granted, this *looks* like a statement of degree-of-knowledge. But it likely is not. For, as Stanley notes, if it were a

statement of degree, we would expect the interrogative and negative form of the sentence to be fine as well. And they are quite odd:

(11) ??Do you know perfectly well that Felicidad didn't do her homework?

(12) ??I don't know perfectly well that Felicidad didn't do her homework.

Second, gradable expressions admit of comparative constructions: 'flatter than', 'taller than', 'richer than'. But there is no natural comparative for 'know'. Thus consider Stanley's examples:

(13) ??John knows that Bush is president more than Sally knows it.

(14) ??Hannah knows that Bush is president more than she knows that Clinton was president.

Both are peculiar. The closest we can come are things like (15):

(15) John knows better than anyone how much tax cuts hurt public education.

But, as Stanley also notes, it's doubtful that this is a genuine comparative—since 'John knows better than most politicians how much tax cuts hurt public education' is odd in a way that it should not be, if 'knows better than' really were a comparative in (15). Instead, 'knows better than anyone' seems to be an idiom.

It seems, on linguistic grounds, that 'know' is not gradable.[4] So 'know' isn't like 'tall', 'rich', or 'flat' after all. Stanley sums up as follows:

> Natural language expressions that are semantically linked to degrees on scales exploit this link in a variety of recognizable ways—by allowing for comparisons between degrees on the scale, and by allowing modifications of the contextually salient degree on the scale. If the semantic content of ''know'' were sensitive to contextually salient standards, and hence linked to a scale of epistemic strength (as ''tall'' is linked to a scale of height), then we should expect this link to be exploited in a host of different constructions, such as natural comparatives. The fact that we do not see such behavior should make us at the least very suspicious of the claim of such a semantic link. (2004, 130)

Three Cautions about Appeals to Context-Sensitivity

I have now presented two syntactico-semantic arguments against taking 'know' to be a context-sensitive word.[5] Before moving on to the main event—namely, of saving the spirit of contextualism, notwithstanding these and other quite compelling linguistic arguments—I want to raise three issues. They stand as cautions to anyone who wants to pursue the

idea that, in spite of Cappelen and Lepore and Stanley's arguments, 'know' is nevertheless a context-sensitive word.

First, one might hope that there is some other kind of context-sensitive word—neither of the 'I'/'here'/'now' variety, nor of the 'tall'/'rich' variety—which might serve as a better model for 'know'. In particular, there are words like 'foreigner', 'local', 'enemy', and 'home' whose referents seem to shift depending on who the speaker is, but which don't have to magnet out to the speaker's context of use. So, they are unlike 'I'/'now'/'here', yet they seem to be context-sensitive nonetheless. (To see how unlike 'I' they are, witness 'Every child went home early', or 'We are all foreigners when we travel'.) And some words of this kind aren't gradable. Truth be told, I think one could pursue this comparison, so that 'know' is likened to 'home'/'foreigner'. It's far from incoherent. But I also think that it's a risky choice to stake contextualism in epistemology on this or any other such comparison. For there exists the real threat that linguistic differences of the kind noted above will emerge, *mutatis mutandis*, for any model one picks. So rather than pursuing that path, I think it wiser to stress, as I will, that 'know' does not need to be *in any way* a context-sensitive word, in order to rescue contextualism.

A second caution. Having presented these tests, it might be asked why we need them at all. Can't we just tell, by consulting our intuitions, whether a word is context sensitive? Can't we tell, in particular, that 'know' is context sensitive just by considering contrasting situations in which a given sentence seems first true, and then false—though said of the very same situation, with only standards shifting? The answer is that we cannot, because such intuitions of shifting do not in general distinguish features of usage that come from the semantics of the type, from features which are pragmatic. (In fact, that is a central point of Cappelen and Lepore's recent work.) And for a word to be context sensitive is a semantic feature of the type *par excellence*. Put another way, such intuitions of truth-value shifting are patently an interaction effect, in just the way that a sentence ''sounding bad'' is an interaction effect. It is, therefore, a mistake to move quickly from intuitions about utterance-truth or falsehood, to conclusions about the nature of *one* of the contributing factors (namely, type semantics), unreflectively tracing the observed effects to that ''cause.'' In sum, expression types can seem to be context sensitive to us, even though they are not actually context sensitive, because of pragmatic interference. So one should not assume, just because of our intuitions of context-shifting, that there *must* be some context-sensitive linguistic item that will provide our model for 'know'. Those intuitions could be misleading. (I here echo points made forcefully in Bach 2002.)

One last caution, about what might motivate one to pursue this route. Once the various tests are on the table, and we've noted that pragmatics can interfere with intuitions, one can *still* feel tempted to say that 'know' must be context sensitive. Why so? I wonder if we don't have an instance of what one might call ''a perversion of the linguistic turn.'' There was this idea, muddy but deep, that answers to philosophical problems were somehow and to some extent encoded in our public languages. Let's not pause to decide whether this was a good idea; what matters is that embracing the linguistic turn in philosophy motivates, when doing epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, or what-have-you, very careful scrutiny of language and speech. What this methodology should not motivate, however, is deciding independently what the right answer to a philosophical problem is, and then insisting—since language reflects ''philosophical reality''—that human tongues *must* have feature such-and-such. In particular, even granting the attractiveness of contextualism in epistemology, we should resist thinking that there simply *must* be a kind of context-sensitive word—whether 'I'/'now'/'here', or 'tall'/'rich', or 'enemy'/'home', or something else yet again—which can serve as a model for the context-sensitivity of 'know'. Even if you take the linguistic turn, this seems clearly the wrong direction to take it—not least because what features natural-language words have is, surely, very much a matter for empirical investigation.

Saving the Spirit of Contextualism

My main thesis, recall, is this: *If* there are pragmatic determinants of what is asserted/stated, *and* contextualism can overcome independent problems not having to do specifically with the context-sensitivity of the word 'know', *then* the spirit of contextualism can be salvaged. Even if 'know' isn't a context-sensitive word.

To give this a first-pass unpacking, I need to contrast two ''tactics,'' each consistent with the broad contextualist strategy:

(16) Two Versions of the Contextualist Strategy
(a) *Type-semantics version*: The word 'know' is context sensitive. As a result, sentences containing 'know' have different truth conditions, depending on the context of utterance.
(b) *Speech-act version*: Knowledge attributions are context sensitive. As a result, assertions made using 'know' have different truth conditions, depending on the context of utterance.

Proponents of contextualism typically run the two theses together. Recall, for instance, the quotations with which I began. Quotations (A)–(C)

endorse the type semantics tactic. Quotations (D)–(E) endorse the speech act tactic. So far as I can see, the authors quoted don't distinguish between these: they write as if (A)–(C) and (D)–(E) are merely different ways of making the same point.[6] However, as will emerge in detail below, while both pursue the same basic strategy (which is what renders them contextualist in the first place), they employ quite different tools. One makes a claim about sentences, the other only makes claims about statements.

Notice too that the linguistic critiques given above are really directed at (16a): they all raise linguistic-style doubts about whether the word 'know' behaves syntactically and semantically the way some supposed model ('I' or 'tall') does. Thus, and this is the key idea, Cappelen and Lepore and Stanley's critical points *may well be consistent with (16b)*. And (16b) is all you need to save the spirit of contextualism in epistemology. (Assuming, to repeat, that there aren't reasons independent of the context-sensitivity of 'know' for rejecting contextualism in epistemology.[7]) Anyway, that's what I'll now try to argue.

There are two issues to deal with. First, how can the speech act version of contextualism be true, if the type semantics version is false? Second, does the speech act version on its own really save the spirit of contextualism (in the sense both of rescuing its three aims—splitting the difference between the skeptic and the ordinary attributor of knowledge without ambiguity, having attributor standards be sufficient for this, and saving deductive epistemic closure—and rescuing its distinctive strategy of appealing to sensitivity to the speaker's context)? I will take the two issues in turn.

To see how (16a) and (16b) can come apart, we need some terminology. There are at least three things that can help determine the content *conveyed*, literally or otherwise, by an utterance in context. Most obviously, what the (disambiguated) expression means in the shared language typically helps establish what an in-context utterance conveys. Call this first determinant of content the *disambiguated expression-meaning*. Another usual determinant is reference assignment, i.e., which non-linguistic objects are assigned, in context, to special context-sensitive items: at a minimum, to pronouns ('I', 'she', 'you'); to special time/place words like 'now', 'here', and 'today'; to tense markers ('liv*es*' versus 'liv*ed*'), etc. These special context-sensitive ''slots'' must typically be filled in, from non-linguistic context, to arrive at what the utterance conveys. Call this second determinant of conveyed content *slot-filling*. It is widely, although not universally, agreed that pragmatics plays a part in helping to fix these first two determinants. But pragmatics can contribute to conveyed content in another way as well. This third determinant of conveyed content is more holistic, and is

far less constrained by the syntactic form and conventional content of the sound-pattern uttered. It turns especially on things like what it would be reasonable and cooperative for the speaker to have intended to convey, in the situation. This third determinant is thought by many to play a large role in irony, sarcasm, conversational implicature, metaphor, and such. Call this third factor *free pragmatic enrichment*.

With that as background, I can now introduce three further bits of terminology. *Saturated expression meaning* is, by stipulative definition, the result of the first two determinants. That is, as I will use the term, saturated expression meaning just is what you get when you disambiguate, and fill in all resulting "slots." What is *asserted/stated/claimed*, in contrast, is what the speaker is strictly and literally committed to. It is, if you will, the literal truth conditions of the speech act. One way to get a grip on this latter notion is to think about the practical implications involved. Assertions/statements, unlike merely conveyed thoughts, are lie-prone. And in contrast with merely misleading, a false assertion can (justly and correctly) get you convicted of perjury. Moreover assertions/statements are more easily subject to strict contractual obligations. (This isn't to say that merely conveyed propositions have no practical implications, of course; it's just to say that they seem to have different ones.) Or again, while conversational implicatures can easily be cancelled, asserted content is typically harder to cancel. (See the examples below for more on what the contrast comes to.)

Crucially for what's to come, it's not at all obvious that saturated expression meaning is the same thing as what is stated/asserted/claimed. Indeed, numerous authors have recently argued that free pragmatic enrichment plays a part in determining what is asserted/stated/claimed, i.e., the literal truth-conditional content of speech acts, though by definition they don't play a part in saturated expression meaning. Say these authors, not only does free pragmatic enrichment determine conversationally implicated propositions and the like ("non-literal truth conditions," if you will), it also determines which propositions are asserted/stated. Thus there are (and here is the final bit of terminology we'll need) *pragmatic determinants of what is asserted/stated/claimed*. (See, e.g., Carston 1988, 2002; Perry 1986; Récanati 2001, 2002; Searle 1978, 1980; Sperber and Wilson 1986. I return to this issue at length below.) So we have:

(17) Some Terminology
(a) Disambiguated expression meaning
(b) Slot filling
(c) Saturated expression meaning

(d) Free pragmatic enrichment
(e) What is asserted/stated/claimed
(f) Pragmatic determinant of what is asserted/stated/claimed[8]

At last we can see how all of this relates to the two versions of the broad contextualist strategy. If there *aren't* pragmatic determinants of what is asserted/stated/claimed, then what is strictly and literally attributed would be the saturated expression meaning: the truth conditions of a knowledge attribution will be exhausted by the contributions of disambiguated expression meaning and slot filling. Since it's granted on all sides that 'know' isn't ambiguous, that would make (16a) and (16b) collapse into each other—because assertions made using 'know' would only vary according to context if 'know' were itself a context-sensitive word.

(16) Two Versions of the Contextualist Strategy
(a) *Type semantics version*: The word 'know' is context sensitive. As a result, utterances of sentences containing 'know' have different truth conditions, depending upon the context of utterance.
(b) *Speech act version*: Knowledge attributions are context sensitive. As a result, assertions made using 'know' have different truth conditions, depending upon the context of utterance.

Thus, if there aren't pragmatic determinants of what is asserted/stated/claimed, then (16b) can only be true if (16a) is, because for saturated expression meaning to vary, 'know' must introduce a slot to be filled—that is, 'know' must be a context-sensitive word.

On the other hand, if there are pragmatic determinants of what is asserted/stated/claimed—if what is asserted/stated/claimed can exhibit more content than saturated expression meaning—then different assertions made using 'know' might well have different truth conditions even if 'know' isn't a context-sensitive word. This remains an open option. So (16b) could still be true even if, as Cappelen and Lepore and Stanley argue, (16a) is false on linguistic grounds.

Well but, are there pragmatic determinants of what is asserted/stated/claimed? I think so. Now, it would take me too far a field to mount a compelling defense, and my conclusion is conditional in any case. But let me rehearse some of the arguments in favor of pragmatic determinants. First, one can appeal to our intuitions about what is asserted. Here are a few examples. If I am at a party, and say of my friend, 'He can stick out his tongue and touch his nose' it's very tempting to think that what I asserted, of my friend, is that he can touch his nose *with his tongue*. And yet the saturated expression meaning, given the context, will contain no reference to

this latter ''means condition.'' It will have 'he' filled by my friend, and the time filled by when I spoke, with the rest of the saturated expression meaning coming directly from the type—which type makes no reference to what device he can touch his nose with. Thus in the case of this utterance of (18), saturated expression meaning is intuitively not the same as what is asserted/stated/claimed.

(18) He can stick out his tongue and touch his nose.

Similarly, if I say in October 'I turned 21 in September', it does seem that I have asserted that I am now 21 years of age. But, in fact, the expression type doesn't contain any reference to which September it was that I turned 21 in, nor even to which calendar unit is such that I turned 21 of it. (21 years? 21 months? 21 days?) Here again, then, what is asserted/stated/claimed intuitively goes beyond what is linguistically encoded, even after reference assignment to indexicals and such.

A second argument is a bit more theoretical, though it too relies on intuitions. There are many cases in which we identify something that is asserted, yet the saturated expression meaning is sub-propositional. Since nothing sub-propositional can be the thing asserted—an assertion is always of a proposition—what is asserted must be something more than saturated expression meaning. There are two kinds of examples. First, there are sentential cases where the complete sentence, even once all slots are filled, does not seem to express something that can be true or false *tout court*. Consider: 'I am ready' [for what?], 'It is raining' [where?], 'Jane can't continue' [what thing?], 'Aspirin is better' [than what?] or 'She will' [do what?]. In using these sentences, one can easily assert that one is ready for the race, that it's raining here, etc. But what is asserted goes beyond saturated expression meaning. Second, there are sub-sentential cases, in which an assertion is made with something whose semantics is patently sub-propositional. For instance, the prepositional phrase 'From Spain' expresses a property, not a proposition; yet one can use this very phrase to assert, of a demonstrated object, that it is from Spain. (The only sense in which this is ''ellipsis'' is that the speaker asserts more than what her words mean; and being ''ellipsis'' in that sense doesn't eliminate pragmatic determinants of what is asserted/stated/claimed. See Stainton 2005, 2006 for extended discussion. Notice, by the way, how hard it would be to cancel the inclusion of the demonstrated object within the proposition-meant. That said, cancellation certainly can take place in assertion: consider the 'He can stick out his tongue' case, where cancellation is relatively easy. Given present purposes, the details needn't detain us.)

A third argument goes like this. The standard view is that conversational implicatures are calculated on the basis of what is stated. But then where there is a conversational implicature calculated on the basis of content *X*, that content is stated. Now consider the following case, adapted from François Récanati. Jane asks Lewis, 'Are you hungry'. Lewis replies 'I've had breakfast'. Lewis thereby conversationally implicates that he isn't hungry. But to conversationally implicate *that*, Lewis must have stated that he has had breakfast today. The proposition that there exists some time prior to the present at which Lewis has had breakfast does not support the inference that he's not hungry. So, the latter is not what Lewis stated. However, that he's had breakfast today is not the saturated expression meaning of 'I've had breakfast': when he had breakfast is determined not by a slot, but by what I've called free pragmatic enrichment.

Finally, note how flexible we are in reporting what a person stated. Suppose Stephanie is on trial for embezzling. On May 22, I hear Stephanie say 'I bought an SUV and a Harley yesterday'. In July I can report this, in court, as follows: 'Stephanie claimed that she had purchased both an automobile and a motorcycle on the same day in May'. (Ignoring worries about hearsay being admissible, my report might support the prosecution's contention that Stephanie was spending a lot of money right about then.) Patently, the complement of my report is not semantically equivalent to the saturated expression meaning of Stephanie's 'I bought an SUV and a Harley yesterday'. We thus face a choice. Either my report is false, since what she claimed what that she bought an SUV and a Harley on May 21, or my report is true, and she stated something which goes well beyond the saturated expression meaning of her words.

There is much more to be said on this topic. (See Bach 1994a,b; Carston 1988, 2002; Perry 1986; Récanati 2001, 2002; Searle 1978, 1980; Sperber and Wilson 1986; Stainton 2006; and Travis 1985, 1991 for more.) In particular, it's clear that there are possible rejoinders. One might hold that, intuitions notwithstanding, what is asserted with 'I turned 21 in September' makes no reference to which year; and that 'I am ready' can be true without a specification of what one is ready for. See Borg 2004, 2005 and Cappelen and Lepore 2005a,b for such moves. One could also insist that there are more slots in the cases in play than what meets the eye. Stanley 2000 pursues this idea. Rather than trying to address all such replies, I rest content with the conditional claim: if there are pragmatic determinants of what is asserted, then one might well be able to save the spirit of contextualism, even if 'know' isn't a context-sensitive word.

Having drawn this contrast between two contextualist tactics (one pressing a claim about the semantics of types containing 'know', the other merely making a claim about variability in speech acts made using 'know'), and having provided a general motivation for believing in pragmatic determinants of what is asserted, let's consider a bit more at length how one tactic might be retained and deployed to good effect, even while the other is given up. The general point is clear enough: the truth-value of the sentence 'Keith knows that the bank is open', assuming its saturated expression meaning in a context *has* a truth value, does not vary according to context of use; but, given how ubiquitous pragmatic determinants are, what is stated/asserted/claimed using (19) can be expected to have different truth conditions, on different occasions, even though 'know' is no more a context-sensitive word than 'dog' is:

(19) Keith knows that the bank is open.

The phenomenon occurs with clearly context insensitive words: what is asserted with 'There are no dogs in this building' can be falsified by wolves, or taxidermied poodles, or not . . . as the interests of the speaker and hearer vary. Given this, it would be surprising if 'know' were somehow exceptional.

So, it should be clear in broad outlines how to retain tactic (16b) in the face of syntactic and semantic results about 'know'. Still, it's worth revisiting the particular linguistic critiques of contextualism rehearsed above. Let's start with Cappelen and Lepore. Surprisingly, it turns out that they endorse pragmatic determinants of what is asserted/stated/claimed! More than that, the fourth argument for their existence, sketched above, was lifted more or less directly from them. What they maintain elsewhere (1997, 1998), put crudely, is that one cannot read off the type-semantics of an expression directly from perfectly correct reports of what the speaker asserted/stated/claimed. Put otherwise, Cappelen and Lepore agree that the correct description of assertion-content for an utterance—like the correct description of conversational implicature, metaphor, indirect speech act, and sarcastic content—draws on many interacting factors, hence assertion-content is not an especially safe guide to the contribution of type-semantics. Thus, despite the fact that Cappelen and Lepore describe their *opponents* as suggesting that different "judgments," "claims," "knowledge attributions," and "speaker's attributions of knowledge" are made with 'know', I think their own take on pragmatic determinants of speech act content provides no grounds for disagreeing with *any of those suggestions*.

For all that is said in their "context-shifting arguments," for instance, they can agree to all of that, and still insist—like me—that 'know' is not a context-sensitive word.

As for Stanley's point that 'know' isn't gradable, if there are pragmatic determinants of what is asserted/stated/claimed then that's a bit of a red herring too, as far as the speech-act version of contextualism is concerned. For one can make *claims* that are subject to degrees using words that are not, in their syntactic and semantic behavior, themselves gradable. Take 'weighs 80 kg'. This patently isn't gradable. Sentences like (20a–c) are awful:

(20a) Her weight is very 80 kg.

(20b) Her weight is 80 kg, though her weight isn't really 80 kg.

(20c) Hank's weight is more 80 kg than Ina's.

Still, what is required for the truth of an assertion, statement or claim of weighing 80 kg can vary, as was noted above. Or again, 'is vegetarian' isn't gradable either. ('John is very vegetarian' and 'John is more vegetarian than I am' can be used sensibly, but they are like 'Joan is very pregnant' and 'Joan is more pregnant than I am'.) Yet what degree of meat-abstinence a subject is claimed to be committed to can vary according to the situation, even though 'is vegetarian' is not like 'tall' or 'rich'. Thus 'John is a vegetarian' can be employed so as to require that John won't eat anything handled by someone who is also cooking meat; eschews all animal products, including eggs and milk; won't eat any animal products, but will wear leather; will not eat vegetables fried in animal fat; will eat eggs and milk, though not cheese having rennet in it; will eat insects, but not animal products. And, of course, we use 'vegetarian' to assert that someone will eat fish, but not red meat; etc. Similarly, then, there's no reason presented in Stanley's "On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism" for denying that one can make knowledge-*claims* that are subject to degrees, even though 'know' isn't gradable.

Having seen how to save (16b) while rejecting (16a), the outstanding issue is whether (16b) alone is sufficient to rescue the spirit of contextualism in epistemology.[9] To see that it *ought* to be sufficient for what contextualists have always wanted, recall first of all that contextualists often enough state their view in terms of attributions, claims, and such. For instance, DeRose moves easily, in the pages immediately following those in which he talks of the variable truth conditions of sentences, to suggestions about "what I say in claiming," "my assertion," and "what I would be saying."

He rightly notes that ordinary instances of *these* must be true, if contextualism is to be interesting. Or again, he says: "One might think that requirements for making a knowledge *attribution* true go up as the stakes go up" (1992, 110; my emphasis). Just to rub my interpretive point in, DeRose himself describes the aim of contextualism as follows:

> Contextualist theories of knowledge *attributions* have almost invariably been developed with an eye towards providing some kind of answer to philosophical scepticism. For some sceptical arguments threaten to show, not only that we fail to meet very high requirements for knowledge of interest to philosophers seeking absolute certainty, but also that we don't meet the truth conditions of ordinary, out-on-the-street *claims to know*. They thus threaten to establish the startling result that we never, or almost never, *truly ascribe* knowledge to ourselves or to other human beings. According to contextual analysis, when the sceptic presents her arguments, she manipulates various conversational mechanisms that raise the semantic standards for knowledge, and thereby creates a context in which she can *truly say* that we know nothing or very little. But the fact that the sceptic can thus install very high standards which we don't live up to has no tendency to show that we don't satisfy the more relaxed standards that are in place in ordinary conversation. Thus, it is hoped, our *ordinary claims* to know will be safeguarded from the apparently powerful attacks of the sceptic, while, at the same time, the persuasiveness of the sceptical arguments is explained. (1992, 112; my emphases)

This passage illustrates, I think, that even DeRose implicitly realizes that what he really needs, in order successfully to split the difference with the skeptic, is that knowledge attributions, ascriptions, sayings, and claims—all of which are speech-acts, notice—are affected by context. Which, if there are pragmatic determinants of what is asserted/stated/claimed, does not at all require that the truth conditions of sentences containing 'know' be context sensitive.

That contextualists write this way highlights that they themselves recognize, at bottom, that all they really need is (16b), the thesis about speech-acts, to pursue their strategy and achieve their aims. This is all to the good. Still, it's worth the effort to see *precisely* how (16b), as opposed to (16a), can save the spirit of contextualism. So, let's recall contextualism's three aims:

- to allow ordinary knowledge attributions to be literally true (and unambiguous), while also explaining the genuine pull of skeptical arguments, by splitting the difference;
- to let attributor standards partly determine what is attributed;
- to save the principle of deductive epistemic closure.

It should be obvious how the first two aims can be achieved—and by appeal to context shifting. The former is put in terms of attributions, that

is, assertions/statements of knowledge. But if pragmatic determinants of asserted content are ubiquitous, then of course they will show up in assertions/statements/claims about what is known. And, of course, this is done without positing ambiguity, and without resorting to making the anti-skeptic ''merely convey a truth,'' or ''assert something reasonable, though false.'' Turning to the second aim, the attributor's standards (e.g., the spouse's versus the skeptic's, both talking about Keith in the same ''evaluation world'') can alter what is stated/asserted/claimed—as could, of course, the attributee's standards, or even some third party's standards. Free pragmatic enrichment being abductive and holistic, a whole host of things could bear on what is asserted—so it's unsurprising, wholly expected in fact, that the attributor's standards could also impact on this. The issue of closure is more complicated.

The principle of epistemic closure can seem to be threatened by the following sort of *reductio*:

Assume: For any agent *S*, if *S* knows that *p*, and *S* knows that if *p* then *q*, then *S* knows that *q*. (Deductive epistemic closure principle)

(P1) Keith knows that the bank is open.

(P2) Since it's obvious that banks are objects in an external world, Keith knows that if the bank is open, then there exists an external world.

(C1) Keith knows that the bank is open, and Keith knows that if the bank is open, then there exists an external world. (By conjunction of P1 and P2.)

(P3) If Keith knows that the bank is open and Keith knows that if the bank is open, then there exists an external world, then Keith knows that there is an external world. (Instance of the deductive epistemic closure principle, assumed for *reductio*.)

(C2) Keith knows that there is an external world. (By *modus ponens* on C1 and P3.)

(P4) Because [FILL IN YOUR FAVORITE SKEPTICAL ARGUMENT], Keith does not know that there is an external world.

(C3) The Assumption leads to a contradiction, hence it must be rejected.

Contextualists can resist this argument on many fronts, without taking 'know' to be a context-sensitive word. The key move is to reflect on the *claims/statements* made in producing the sentences above, and what they entail—rather than focusing on what the *sentences* entail. To give but a few examples:

▪ Contextualists can maintain that the claims made with C2 and P4 needn't actually contradict one another, since the standards that determine what one thereby states can surely be different in the two situations. In which case, there can be no *reductio*, there being no contradiction, when standards vary—which, adds the contextualist, they surely do.
▪ The contextualist can insist that as soon as talk of "knowing that there exists an external world" comes into it, at P2, the standards are pretty much bound to go up. Arguably this puts what one claims with C2 and P4 in conflict, since in uttering C2 what one states will now presumably exhibit the higher standard. But this move ends up blocking the argument *for C2*, as follows: Given the shift in standards at P2, what one asserts by P1 and what one asserts by P2 don't actually entail by conjunction what is claimed in C1, because there isn't a univocal knowledge claim in the two conjuncts.
▪ The contextualist may let the conjunctive assertion made with C1 exhibit different standards, between its two halves, so that the claims made with P1 and P2, even given different standards, still do support this conjunctive assertion; but she may then go on to deny that what one asserts with P3 is actually a (worrisome) instance of the Assumption at all, because the standards invoked must now vary, if the claims C1 and P3 are to entail the conclusion C2. So the argument as a whole cannot be a *reductio* of deductive epistemic closure, since that principle is never actually invoked in the argument.

One could go on. (See Stine 1976, 256ff., for related reflections.) What is clear is that a contextualist can hold onto the general principle of epistemic closure *where the standards relevant to knowledge attributions are held constant*. What the contextualist rescues is this: If *S* knows by standard$_1$ that *p*, and *S* knows by standard$_1$ that *p* entails *q*, then S knows by standard$_1$ that *q*. Crucially, that principle isn't at all threatened by the attempted *reductio* above.

Objections and Replies

I will end with three objections to my foregoing attempt to save the spirit of contextualism. First, even agreeing that there are pragmatic determinants of what is asserted/stated/claimed, and even agreeing that uses of 'know' could be subject to them, there remains a problem: How *exactly* do standards, including especially the attributor's standards, manage to have an impact on what is asserted/stated/claimed in attributions using 'know'? It's all well and good to say that this is possible in principle, on the grounds

that it occurs with other words. But how *precisely* does it occur with 'know'? What are the specific mechanisms whereby standards manage to get in? This is a very good question. And it can indeed seem that until an answer is given, we cannot really feel sure that the spirit of contextualism can be saved. The question is also, however, one that I won't even attempt to address here. For it seems to me that this is a challenge that doesn't have anything specific to do with whether 'know' is a context-sensitive word: The problem of how exactly standards are set is just as hard for someone who thinks that 'know' affords a contextual slot to fill as it is for someone who thinks that standards get in directly via pragmatic determinants of what is asserted. For if you think there is a slot on 'know', you still need a story about what fixes its referent. And, I hazard, that story will be just as hard to tell. Put otherwise, I will treat this issue as falling under the conjunct, ''contextualism can overcome independent problems not having to do specifically with the context-sensitivity of the word 'know'.'' *If* a plausible story can be told, then (16b) is adequately supported, and the spirit of contextualism might be salvaged.

Here is a second objection, and one that I won't just shunt aside. It might be suggested that I am merely making the familiar point that a person can convey different things with 'know' in different circumstances, even though the word isn't context sensitive. That is, what I'm proposing is just a ''warranted assertibility maneuver'' under a misleading name. I reject this accusation. Granted, this novel kind of shifting derives from pragmatics. But the ordinary knowledge attribution is not, for all that, merely a matter of saying something false, though reasonable, nor merely a matter of conveying a truth. What I'm suggesting, to repeat, is that if there are pragmatic determinants *of what is asserted/stated/claimed*, then knowledge attributors will make statements whose literal truth conditions vary, even though 'know' isn't context sensitive. And, unlike merely conveyed information, this content won't be easily cancelable, and it will be lie-prone, and so on.

One last worry. If 'know' is not a context-sensitive word, then saturated expression-meaning will be the same for the spouse's utterance of (19) and the skeptic's utterance of it.

(19) Keith knows that the bank is open.

The slot for tense is filled in, and in just the same way for both utterances—and there is no other slot to fill, if 'know' isn't marked as context sensitive in the lexicon. This may seem to pose a problem for saving the spirit of contextualism in epistemology, since this means that there is *something* that the ordinary person and skeptic can't both be right about. In particu-

lar, they can't both be right about whether the saturated expression-meaning of (19) is true, since *it* does not vary with attributor standards. Only what is asserted does. Goes the objection: Either Keith's wife, who assigns TRUE to the saturated expression-meaning, is correct, or the skeptic, who assigns FALSE to the saturated expression-meaning, is correct. They can't both be right about *this*. So we haven't successfully split the difference after all; the disagreement returns with full force.

Here is my reply. First, it's a bit fast to assume that the saturated expression-meaning of (19) in the skeptic's mouth and in the spouse's mouth really does get assigned different truth-values, not least because one might think that this sentence type does not yield something true/false even after disambiguation and slot-filling.[10] It's equally a bit fast to assume that both parties grasp the saturated expression-meaning, and assign a truth-value to it. But let's put those points aside, and suppose that either the saturated expression-meaning is true (and Keith's wife is right about it), or the saturated expression-meaning is false (and the skeptic is right about it). Even so, I don't think this would actually be worrisome, because the dispute between ordinary knowledge claims and what the skeptic maintains was never about some technical notion of theoretical semantics—which is what saturated expression-meaning patently is. Certain contextualists in epistemology, ill-advisedly in my view, managed to shift the emphasis onto this latter notion by comparing 'know' to indexical expressions like 'I' and 'now'. This has naturally led to linguistic objections like those canvassed above. But, their word-specific formulations of contextualism in epistemology notwithstanding, the original dispute was about, for instance, whether Joe Sixpack's statements/assertions about knowledge were true, whether Joe Sixpack's knowledge attributions were correct, etc.[11] And, regardless of whether 'know' is a context-sensitive word, if there exist pragmatic determinants of what is asserted/stated/claimed, then it might still turn out, just as the contextualist wishes, that *both* Joe's and the skeptic's assertions/statements are true. Because they are stating—not just non-literally conveying, but stating—different things, using the same words.

To sum up, there are two ways to spell out contextualism in epistemology. One tactic requires 'know' to be a context-sensitive word, as a matter of the semantics of the type. It is open to empirical objections of the kind raised by Cappelen and Lepore and by Stanley. Surprisingly, however, I have gone on to suggest that the falsehood of such semantic claims about the type 'know' may not matter with respect to rescuing the spirit of contextualism in epistemology—assuming any other problems with contextualism can be overcome. (See note 7.) That's because there is another way

to spell out contextualism, such that all that's required is that there be pragmatic determinants of what is stated/claimed using 'know'—which do not occur via slot-filling or disambiguation. If there are such determinants, then it doesn't matter whether our intuitions of shifting-assertions-given-shifting-standards actually trace back to something semantic or not—that is, to something about the type 'know'.

To put the central result a bit polemically, suppose that linguistic considerations show that 'know' simply means know. (And note: 'I' does *not* simply mean I.) Suppose, indeed, that 'know' is no more context sensitive than 'dog' or 'weighs 80 kg'. The contextualist reaction can be "So what?"—if what is *stated* using the word 'know' can still vary in tune with the standards in place in the speaking context. For all Cappelen and Lepore and Stanley have shown, this option remains open to the contextualist.

My own view, for what it's worth, is that there *are* pragmatic determinants of what is asserted/stated/claimed. And I hazard to say that standards can pragmatically determine *what is asserted with 'know'*—though don't ask me just how. I also think, in light of this, that 'know' not being a context-sensitive word is not *per se* a worry. I remain agnostic, however, about whether the aims and strategy of contextualism can be rescued, since I recognize that contextualism in epistemology faces problems that do not have to do specifically with the syntax/semantics of the lexical item 'know'.

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Notes

1. A word about notation. I employ single quotes for mention. I employ double quotes for shudder quotes, to cite material from other sources, and also in place of corner quotes.

2. There are some familiar reasons why "*A* said '*p*'" doesn't entail "*A* said that *p*" that have to do not with context-sensitivity, but rather with indirect quotation track-

ing force and content. For instance, *A* might have uttered the sentence 'Romeo must die' while practicing his lines for a performance; because the utterance lacked the right force, this act would not entail that *A* said that Romeo must die. Or *A*, a unilingual Swahili speaker, might have uttered a string of sounds which happen to mean, in English, that Romeo must die. But, though *A* arguably said 'Romeo must die', even so it would nevertheless not be true that *A* said that Romeo must die, because *A* did not intend his utterance to exhibit that content. In light of such complexities, in the text it is assumed that *these* kinds of obstacles to the entailment do not hold. Yet, as will emerge, the entailment still sometimes won't go through.

3. Since the point is easy to miss, let me stress that Stanley thinks that being gradable is a necessary condition for being context sensitive in the way that 'tall' supposedly is. He does not think it sufficient.

4. Or more precisely, 'know' *in its propositional uses* is not gradable. One might, for all that has been said here, think that 'knows how' is gradable. Similarly, as Dretske points out, for 'knowing her/him'. That, however, is not obviously relevant to contextualism in epistemology.

5. I should mention that John Hawthorne (2003, 2004) has recently offered linguistically based arguments against contextualism as well. Since I'm granting the conclusion of such arguments, I won't discuss Hawthorne's points here. See also Douven 2004.

6. The same shift appears in contextualists about 'good'. At the beginning of ''Contextual Analysis in Ethics,'' Peter Unger talks about contextual variability in *judgments* about whether something is permissible: ''In many cases, the truth-value (or the acceptability) of a judgment about whether a person's behavior is morally permissible depends on the context in which the judgment is made'' (1995, 2). Similarly, James Dreier (1990, 7) says that moral *claims* shift relative to context, and that people using ''*x* is good'' and ''*x* is not good'' may both *speak truly*. All of this is consistent with 'good', 'right', etc., *not* being context-sensitive words, if pragmatics can directly affect what is asserted. But a few pages later, Unger makes explicitly type-semantical claims to the effect that moral *terms* are indexical: ''Because these terms are thus indexical, they can be sensitive to the contexts in which they are used or understood'' (1995, 13). And Dreier also says that ''the content of (what is expressed by) a sentence containing a moral term varies with (is a function of) the context in which it is used'' (1990, 6). This, I think, is a rather different kettle of fish, and is subject to the kinds of linguistic criticism that Cappelen and Lepore provide.

7. It would take me too far a field to discuss these other problems in any detail. Simplifying greatly to give the flavor of the thing, however:

- in addition to assertions, there are skeptical-standard thoughts and ordinary-standard thoughts, and it's quite unclear how pragmatic determinants of *speech-act* content will split the difference between these (DeRose 1995);

- if I assert truly that *S* knows that *p* at t_1, it doesn't follow that I may assert truly at t_{1+n} that *S* knew at t_1 that *p*, which seems bizarre (Lewis 1996);
- if standards really are shifting, and especially if they are shifting because of varying speaker intentions, it's peculiar that people don't recognize that they are simply talking past one another (Schiffer 1996);
- genuine skepticism holds that by *ordinary* standards we do not know—skeptics don't grant that we have such-and-such evidence, and merely question whether that amount of evidence meets the standard for knowledge, they also question whether we have the evidence in question at all (Feldman 2001).

See Bach 2005 for discussion.

8. Just one more word about terminology; a word, in fact, about terminology that I *won't* employ. I here eschew use of the phrase 'what is said' for the following reason. Some people use 'what is said' as a synonym for (17e). Sperber and Wilson (1986) seemingly do, which is precisely why they have urged that there are ''pragmatic determinants of what is said.'' Cappelen and Lepore in their various works on this topic also use it in this way. But others mean something more narrow by 'what is said'. Thus Bach distinguishes (17e) from his ''what is said.'' (Indeed, he even denies that (17d), saturated expression-meaning, is what is said, since the latter includes reference assignment to expressions whose referent depends upon speakers' intentions. See Bach 1994a, 2001, and also Récanati 2001, 2002.) Given the variation in usage, it's best to just avoid the phrase.

9. Patrick Rysiew (2001) makes a related point about appealing to pragmatics to save the spirit of contextualism in epistemology, without granting that 'know' is indexical—though he does not think of pragmatics as affecting what is literally asserted. He writes: ''There is no denying that epistemologists ought to 'take context into account'. Nor should we dispute the context-sensitivity of knowledge *attributions*. As for the idea that context plays an interesting role in determining the truth conditions of knowledge-attributing *sentences*, however, *that* is something which we need hardly accept'' (Rysiew 2001, 507; only the last emphasis is original). What I would want to add is that the ordinary speaker does not assert falsely, though for an acceptable reason, in saying ''Keith knows that the bank is open''; nor does she merely convey something true; rather, she makes a statement that is strictly and literally true.

10. Charles Travis (1991), noting in effect that there are pragmatic determinants of what is asserted/stated/claimed, argues that Grice does not—simply by showing that Moore's utterance of 'I know I have hands' has (in my terms) a saturated expression-meaning—thereby win the day against Malcolm. For, the issue is surely whether Moore asserted truly in so speaking, and this requires something more than the existence of a saturated expression-meaning. See also Travis 1985.

11. My thanks to David Hunter for raising this point, and to Jonathan Schaffer and Robert Stalnaker for very useful discussion of it.

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