University of Georgia

From the SelectedWorks of Cas Mudde

April, 1996

The War of Words: Defining the Extreme Right Party Family

Cas Mudde, *DePauw University*

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/cas_mudde/48/

linear equation: $y_i = a + bx_i$. Johnston *et al.* discuss an index based on the principle of correlation between elections and develop it within the frame of the analysis of principal components. This technique is based of the building of a correlation matrix in which n elections are correlated (n x n). Extracting the principal components they obtain a series of values (the eigenvalues) which give the percentage of the entire variance to be attributed to the first eigenvalue. If this 'explains' the totality (100 per cent) of the variance, then the configuration appears completely stable. For further details see R.J. Johnston, A.B. O'Neill, and P.J. Taylor, 'The Geography of Party Support: Comparative Studies in Electoral Stability', in M.J. Holler (ed.) *The Logic Of Multiparty Systems* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 1987) esp. pp.269–72.

34. Schattschneider, *Semisovereign People* (note 1) p.93.
35. Ibid.
36. Butler and Stokes (note 11) pp.303–12. The uniformity of response is not considered here as uniformity of the direction but rather as uniformity of the amount.
37. Let us suppose, as Butler and Stokes suggest, that all over the country, uniformly, party A loses one elector out of five (20 per cent) from one election to the other and that these votes go to party B's advantage. This proportion would be different in the various districts according to the distribution of forces amongst the parties. If, in an electoral district, party A gets 80 per cent of the votes, one elector out of five corresponds to 16 per cent. If in another district, the percentage is 30 per cent, one elector out of five means six per cent.
38. See Stokes, 'A Variance Components Model of Political Effects' and 'Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces'. In the first of these two articles, Stokes presents the detail of his methodology and the statistical solutions he adopted. In the second article, on the contrary, he presents an application of the methodology. This is employed in order to illustrate the difference of nationalisation levels between the United States and the United Kingdom.
39. In Stokes's model, the total variance of the vote is computed for all the constituencies of a certain number of elections. This total variance is given by the addition of the squared deviations of each constituency (for every year) from the general mean of all constituencies for all years. This variance can be decomposed into three components: a national component, a state component, and a district component. This gives the following expression: $\mathrm{Var}\,(Y_{ij}) = \mathrm{Var}\,(a) + \mathrm{Var}\,(b_i) + \mathrm{Var}\,(c_{ij})$ to which Stokes adds three covariance terms which are of little interest insofar as they are often near zero, and where $\mathrm{Var}\,(Y_{ij})$ is the total variance, Var (a) is the sum of the squared deviations of the annual means from the general mean, $\mathrm{Var}\,(b_i)$ is the sum of the squared deviations of the annual state means (i) from the state mean for all years, and $\mathrm{Var}\,(c_{ij})$ is the sum of the squared deviations of the vote percentages in each constituency (j) in the various states (i) from the mean of these values for all elections. The whole variance of the national component may be imputed to national factors, since, given the large number of states and districts, it is unlikely that the national mean may be influenced by constituency variations, insofar as they cancel out. In the same way, the variance of the state component can be entirely attributed to state factors since: (a) the considerable number of districts included in every state permits their variations to be cancelled out, though not influencing state means; and (b) national effects are eliminated by subtraction.
40. See Claggett *et al.* (note 1) and Katz (note 14).
41. In other words, this method does not distinguish case c from case f (see table 1).
42. Stokes, 'Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral forces' (note 1) p.185.
43. In an analogous way, therefore, the model does not distinguish cases a,b from case d (see note 40).
44. See e.g. Agnew, 'Better Thieves than Reds?' (note 20).

The War of Words Defining the Extreme Right Party Family

CAS MUDDE

This article presents an overview of the writings on the extreme right party family of the third wave (1980–95). First, the prime criterion for the classification of the party family is discussed. Second, the main critiques of, and alternatives to, the term right-wing extremism are evaluated. Third, the political parties that are generally considered to be members of the party family are identified. Fourth, subgroups within the larger party family are examined. In the conclusion, the various writings are structured on the basis of four theoretical schools within the broader study of right-wing extremism.

The rise of right-wing extremist parties comes (and goes) in waves, as authors have observed for several Western European countries.[1] According to some authors, these waves are similar in all, or at least most of the countries,[2] whereas others believe that they are for the most part country-specific. Buijs and Van Donselaar, for instance, argue that what seems to be a European development might be no more than a 'temporary and accidental coming together of the national development of a number of countries'.[3] As they themselves state, at the moment there is insufficient empirical evidence to support this view. When the rise of right-wing extremist parties is seen in terms of electoral success, there has been without a doubt a fairly strong wave of right-wing extremism washing the shores of most western European countries since the mid-1980s.

Not only do right-wing extremist parties come in waves, but studies on the subject follow these same waves with only a slight delay. This conjunctural development of scientific studies on right-wing extremism has been noted and warned against by Backes, who writes:

> When the process of scientific catch-up is linked too much to the political conditions, and the topicality of the definition of the problem becomes the main criterion for its relevance, the acute danger of trivial, breathless, non-historical reflection exists. Political

West European Politics, Vol.19, No.2 (April 1996), pp.225–248
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

purposiveness dominates or at least harms the level of knowledge of empirically crashed analyses.[4]

The recent 'high' in the literature on right-wing extremist parties reflects this development. As right-wing extremist parties either obtain or maintain their position in the various western European party systems, the number of writings on the phenomenon is exploding. Not all countries and/or parties are studied equally extensively, but at the moment there are very few right-wing extremist parties of some electoral relevance that have not been studied by someone. However, the serious scientific study of right-wing extremism is still in its infancy at best: one scholar even speaks of the 'non-existence of a right-wing extremism research'.[5]

The situation is even worse for comparative studies. This has often been explained by the specifity of the subject: right-wing extremist parties, as the fascist parties before the War, are all (alleged) nationalist movements, which would make them particularly country-specific and thus incomparable. Even while it might be true that these parties are more difficult to compare than parties of other families, this should not be seen as a reason to ignore our collective 'hunch' that there is something common about these parties.[6] Recently, some initial, genuine comparative studies have been undertaken in the field of party ideology,[7] and on the explanation of the recent rise of right-wing extremist parties.[8] The most comprehensive comparative study to date is by Pfahl-Traughber, who compared five parties on the basis of their origin, history, ideology and organisation.[9] Even though all these studies struggle with the problem of comparability of the parties, and at best give partial answers to the questions posed, they also prove that comparative studies of right-wing extremism are both possible and interesting.

The study of right-wing extremism has usually been the domain of avowed opponents, and has led largely to opinionated, speculative, emotional and highly politicised studies in the field.[10] In these studies the emphasis is on the danger of the phenomenon; whether the danger is actually there, and whether it is there in the assumed amount, seems to be above discussion. Both methodologically and analytically weak, these studies do not so much add new knowledge of and/or insights into the phenomenon, but rather offer emotional and normative viewpoints on it. They are to be considered more as political contributions to the public debate, than serious contributions to the scientific debate. Contributions intended to gain insight into a firstly unknown and secondly negative and (possibly) dangerous phenomenon, though increasing in number, still form a minority of the existing literature.

The fact that the subject is generally regarded as dangerous, or at least as troublesome by the authors involved has also led to a disproportionate

interest in the most extreme side of the phenomenon, such as small and politically insignificant but ideologically extreme parties (for example, the NPD after the late-1960s), neo-Nazi *groupuscules* (especially German groups like the *Aktionsfront Nationaler Sozialisten*), and violent youth groups like skinheads and (soccer) hooligans.[11] Another point of disproportionate interest are the international contacts of right-wing extremist organisations. During the whole post-war period, these contacts have given food to conspiracy theories on a 'brown international'.[12]

In this article, an overview of the scientific studies of right-wing extremist parties of the 'third wave',[13] that is, since the early-1980s, is presented. As it is impossible to study all of the literature on the topic, studies that are either comparative in scope or in possible application will be discussed primarily. The prime interest will be on the way the right-wing extremist party family has been defined in the literature. First, the prime criterion for the classification of the party family, that is the (usage of the) term right-wing extremism, will be studied. Second, the main criticism of, and alternatives to, the term right-wing extremism will be discussed. Third, the Western European political parties that are generally considered to be part of this extreme right party family will be identified. Fourth, the identification of various subgroups within the larger extreme right party family will be examined. The article will end with a conclusion in which various studies will be structured on the basis of four theoretical schools within the broader study of right-wing extremist parties.

THE EXTREME RIGHT PARTY FAMILY OF THE THIRD WAVE

The 1980s saw an upsurge of (alleged) right-wing extremist parties in almost the whole of Western Europe. This third wave of right-wing extremism has been the most successful post-war period, in both an electoral and ideological sense, for right-wing extremist parties almost everywhere. Even though they are still regarded as pariahs in most countries, some of them have established themselves at least as politically important pariahs (for instance the *Front National* and *Vlaams Blok*). In Italy the *Alleanza Nazionale* and *Lega Nord* have been the first Western European right-wing extremist parties of the post-war period that have made it into government. All in all, right-wing extremism has become a factor of importance both within the party system and outside of it (as, for example, the right-wing extremist-linked violence in Germany, Austria and elsewhere).

What Right-Wing Extremism?

Almost every scholar that works in the field of right-wing extremism points

to the lack of a generally accepted definition. Even though the term right-wing extremism is accepted by a large number of scholars, there is no consensus on the exact definition of the term. Authors have defined it in a variety of ways. This has been partly caused by the fact that the term is not only used for scientific purposes but also for political purposes. Several authors define right-wing extremism as a sort of antithesis to their own beliefs and/or as (closely) linked to their 'democratic' political opponent. However, this is only in part the reason for the lack of consensus. Even scholars with purely scientific goals cannot agree on a shared (minimum) definition.

Notwithstanding this, there is a broad consensus in the field that the term right-wing extremism describes primarily an ideology in one form or another.[14] On top of this, some authors add another dimension to the definition, as, for instance, the use of violence,[15] and/or a particular party strategy.[16] Even so, that the term right-wing extremism is primarily or even exclusively reserved for some form of ideology is widely accepted within the field. What this ideology holds, on the other hand, is the point of extensive scientific 'debate'.

There are some scholars who define right-wing extremism on the basis of only one single feature. Hartmann *et al.*, for example, use right-wing extremism as a collective term for all 'progress-hostile forces'.[17] There are some major objections to be made to this restricted usage. The most important are, first, the term right-wing extremism describes something already described by another more suitable term (like progress-hostility), and, second, it describes right-wing extremist parties falsely as single-issue movements, thereby obscuring other (sometimes more) important features of the phenomenon.[18]

Most of the authors involved define right-wing extremism as a political ideology that constitutes a combination of several different features.[19] This, unfortunately, does not bring us any nearer to a consensus on the meaning of the term, as two questions remain to be answered: what *features* are part of the term; and, what *combination* of features leads to the constitution of right-wing extremism? The number of features mentioned in the various definitions varies from one or two to more then ten. Examples of short definitions are Macridis, who defines right-wing extremism as an 'ideology [that] revolves around the same old staples: racism, xenophobia, and nationalism', and Backes and Jesse, who define it as 'a collective term for anti-democratic dispositions and attempts, that are traditionally positioned at the extreme 'right' of the left-right spectre'.[20]

Some definitions take the size of shopping-lists, containing eight to ten different features. A good example is the definition of Falter and Schumann, who list no less then ten features as the core (!) of right-extremist thinking:

> Extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism, anti-communism, anti-parliamentarianism, anti-pluralism, militarism, law-and-order thinking, a demand for a strong political leader and/or executive, anti-Americanism and cultural pessimism.[21]

What is obvious from the examples listed above, is that many definitions mention a lot of negatively formulated features. This has a lot to do with the position of the researcher *vis-à-vis* the object of study: most authors explicitly state their rejection of right-wing extremism, defining it as a negative phenomenon. Moreover, several of them consider right-wing extremism to be either an anti-ideology or a non-ideology.[22] Even though most right-wing extremist parties, like most new parties, enter the political stage on the basis of a negative self-identification *vis-à-vis* the established parties, this is more a matter of strategy, to ensure their right of existence, than of ideology.

In 26 definitions of right-wing extremism that are used in the literature, no less then 58 different features are mentioned at least once. Only five features are mentioned, in one form or another, by at least half of the authors: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong state.[23] As is clear from the numerous features mentioned in the different definitions, the question of how many features together constitute right-wing extremism, or what the minimal combination of features is that define right-wing extremism, needs some clarification.

There are only a few authors who explicitly state how many features constitute right-wing extremism. Common sense would lead us to expect that the more features are mentioned in the definition, the less the statement that all features have to be present will be made. However, there are authors who list a large number of features and still require all features to be present. Pennings and Brants, for example, speak of a 'minimum repertoire' of no less than six features.[24] Even more extreme is the extensive list of Falter and Schumann, mentioned above, who require all ten features to form the core of right-extremist thinking.

These authors are an exception, however, not only in their extreme demands, but also in the explicitness of their demands. Most of the authors involved either mention only vaguely, or not at all, the combination of features necessary to constitute right-wing extremism. To summarise, three different approaches to the answering of this question are possible: the quantitative, the qualitative and the mixed approach.[25] In the first approach all features are considered equally important and only one criterion is used: the number of features. In the second approach one (or more) feature(s) are 'more equal' than the others: for instance, the case in the extremism-theoretical tradition (see below) where at least anti-democracy must be part

of the combination to speak of some sort of extremism. The third approach combines these two approaches: for example, the requirement of at least one 'exclusionist' feature (nationalism, racism or xenophobia) and one 'strong state' feature (law-and-order or militarism).

Beyond Right-Wing Extremism?

Even though the term right-wing extremism is still the most common used for the parties under study here, the term has been increasingly challenged in recent years. In this section a short overview of these recent challengers and their origins will be presented, as well as an overview of the most important alternative terms that have survived (within certain circles) the challenge of the term right-wing extremism. The prime focus of this section is to highlight the similarities and differences between the various terms.

The origin of the concept and study of right-wing extremism is found in the study of (historical) fascism.[26] Some terms that were used to describe (historical) fascism are still used in the literature on right-wing extremism of today. Generally speaking, the term neo-nazism and, to a lesser extent, neo-fascism are now used exclusively for parties and groups that explicitly want to restore the Third Reich (in the case of neo-fascism, the Italian Social Republic) or that quote historical National Socialism (fascism) as their ideological influence. Examples of neo-Nazi parties in the 1980s are rare, most notably the German *Freiheitliche Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (FAP), whereas there exist a wide variety of neo-Nazi *groupuscules* in western Europe. The best (and only) example of a neo-fascist party is, of course, the Italian MSI, which, until its abolition and re-entrance as AN, officially claimed to be a fascist party. Nevertheless, (neo-)Marxist authors, especially, kept using the terms, either with or without the prefix 'neo', as they consider the parties of the third wave as no more than recent examples of the same phenomenon as the 1930s. Working within the classical Marxist theory of fascism (see below), most of these authors try to 'prove' the historical continuity and co-operation of the traditional and extreme right.[27]

Another term that surfaces in the literature now and again is right-wing radicalism or radical right (*Rechtsradikalismus*). This term is the predecessor of the term right-wing extremism, and is in fact most often used interchangeably.[28] Most of the authors who define the term right-wing radicalism in a different manner than the term right-wing extremism are part of one of the following two traditions: the German or the American.

In the German tradition the terms radicalism and extremism are both used to describe a certain view *vis-à-vis* democracy, both containing a left-wing and right-wing variant. This tradition is strongly based on the official definition of the German state as published in the annual *Verfassungsschutzberichte* (the annual reports of the Federal Office for the

Protection of the Constitution), which explicitly define the 'fundamental principles of the free democratic order' and, since 1973, the distinction between radicalism and extremism:

> The term 'radicalism' resp. 'radical' has consequently undergone a change of meaning. What we characterise as 'extremist' today, used to be characterised as 'radical'. Nowadays, attempts that are characterised as 'radical', are those aimed at one-sided solutions that go 'down to the root' of certain problems, without (yet) aiming at the full or partial elimination of the free democratic order.[29]

In short, the difference between radicalism and extremism is that the former is 'only' *verfassungsfeindlich* (in opposition to the principles of the constitution), whereas the latter is *verfassungswidrig* (unconstitutional). This difference is of the utmost practical importance for the parties themselves, as extremist parties are extensively watched by the (federal and state) *Verfassungsschutz* and can even be banned, whereas radical parties are free from this burden.

In the American tradition the term right-wing radicalism is still commonly used, yet has a broader and even somewhat different meaning than in the European literature. Authors working within this tradition use the term 'radical right'

> to denote a wide variety of groups and small political parties that rekindled a special American tradition of right-wing radicalism. This old school of nativism, populism, and hostility to central government was said to have developed into the post-World War II combination of ultranationalism and anti-communism, Christian fundamentalism, militaristic orientation, and anti-alien sentiment.[30]

In the 1990s, a wide variety of labels including the term populism have made their way into the field: national-populism, right-wing populism, radical right-wing populism, new populism, neo-populism, etc. The usages of the terms not only differ in name but also in their relationship towards the term right-wing extremism. What most definitions have in common though, is that populism is primarily used to describe a specific political form or style instead of a specific ideology.[31] On top of that, most authors argue that populism distinguishes the modern parties of the far right from the traditional. In most cases the difference between political style and ideological feature is not really clear, since various authors relate the political style at least indirectly to a specific view on the people. This problem with defining the term populism is not typical for the field of right-wing extremist parties. Populism has always been a widely applied and abused term in political and scientific debate.[32]

Generally, two different uses of the term populism in relationship to the term extremism can be distinguished in the literature. In the first, the authors clearly distinguish between the two, where the former is used primarily to differentiate the more moderate parties of the far right from the more extreme.[33] In the second, the term populism is used exclusively to describe a political form used by right-wing extremist parties.[34] All in all, most definitions of (whatever) populism used in the field do not differ that much from the definitions of right-wing extremism. They are often slightly more focused on the political style and less on the anti-democratic feature(s). They are also often used by authors who stress the newness of the parties in question.

One of the few substantial critiques of the term right-wing extremism as a common denominator of these parties has been put forward by Elbers and Fennema. They have five objections to the term.[35] First, not all the parties in question use violence or consider themselves to be anti-democratic. Second, there are other parties at the extreme right of the political space that are not explicitly anti-immigrant. Third, not all political representatives and party officials of the parties consider themselves to be right-wing. Fourth, their voters have only to a limited extent a 'right-wing profile'. Fifth, and last, people that do not support these parties do not always agree on the placement of these parties on the traditional left–right scale. This brings them to the conclusion that the term right-wing extremism should be abandoned and be replaced by the term racist.[36] As this term is also not without problems, they define it clearly, though very broadly.

There are some problems with this argument. The first point they make is certainly true, but it is too much focused on the extremism–theoretical definition, as not every definition requires violence or anti-democracy as a necessary condition for right-wing extremism. The second point is also true, but shows that the authors have already selected their main feature of these parties, that is, an anti-immigrant stand. The other three points are again true, but can also be put forward to the term they propose themselves. Most political representatives and party officials of these parties will not consider themselves to be racists, and, as various electoral studies have shown, most voters do not fit a 'racist profile'.[37] Probably most damaging, however, is the fact that the two authors themselves conclude after the study of nine alleged racist parties, that in four cases racism is low or absent.[38]

What Parties?

> Though formal definitions or derivations based on the history of ideas largely failed to provide a convincing concept for 'right-wing extremism', research work on political parties of the right has not had serious problems in selecting appropriate cases.[39]

At first glance, this quote from von Beyme does not sound that strange, as it is true for most other party families: we know *who* they are, even though we do not know exactly *what* they are. However, there are some special circumstances for this particular family, that make the implications of the remark more serious. First, most other parties have (part) of the party family name in their own party name; this is especially true for the left-wing (social-democratic, communist and green) parties. This is not the case for the right-wing extremist parties; they not only all reject the term extremism, some even object to the term right-wing,[40] as is evident in the case of the two Dutch *Centre* parties.

Second, most other party families have some sort of transnational federation in which the various national parties co-operate, whereas this is missing for the right-wing extremist parties. Admittedly, there have been fractions of extreme right parties in the European Parliament (EP), but they can hardly be called the transnational federation of the extreme right party family.[41] This is not even possible, as most extreme right parties do not make it into the EP. Some parties also openly distance themselves from 'other' right-wing extremist parties. It is thus clear that the grouping of these parties is almost totally based on the notions of scientists and not on the self-identification of right-wing extremist parties.[42]

The 'appropriate cases' that are selected without serious problems by the various researchers involved in the field are listed in Table 1. The political parties listed are those generally considered 'right-wing extremist' in the literature, that contested national elections at least once in the 1980–95 period. Clearly, not every Western European country is mentioned, as no right-wing extremist parties in, for example, Iceland and Ireland meet the elections requirement.

It is also clear that not every party mentioned is studied with equal care and attention by the scholars inside (and outside) of the field. Parties like the FN and the REP belong to the most well-known and well-studied political parties in Western Europe, whereas parties such as the CP'86 and the SD are almost unknown beyond (and even within) their own national boundaries. The reasons for this difference in scholarly attention are often more of a practical than of a scientific or societal nature. Some of the reasons are not even typical for the field of right-wing extremism, as, for instance, phenomena in large countries like France, Germany and the United Kingdom are always studied more intensively then in small countries such as Belgium or Iceland.

The fact that the German parties, and not only the REP, are most often the objects of serious (and less serious) studies, clearly shows that electoral significance is not the only (or even main) reason for scholarly attention. Even though they have had some remarkable electoral results at the *Land-*

level, and once at the European level, the parties are of mediocre size on the national level in comparison to their European counterparts. Still, the REP has been studied by both German and non-German scholars significantly more than, for instance, the almost equally successful CD. The prime reason for this is, of course, the particular situation of Germany and the legacy of the past. Even though the Bonn Republic has proven to be stronger than the Weimar Republic in several instances, right-wing extremism in Germany is watched with a specially vigilant eye. On top of that, and also because of this legacy, there are more scholars from Germany working in the field of right-wing extremism than from other countries.

TABLE 1
LIST OF POLITICAL PARTIES THAT ARE GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE PART OF THE EXTREME RIGHT PARTY FAMILY OF WESTERN EUROPE (1980–95)

Country	*Extreme right parties*
Austria	- Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ)
Belgium	- AGIR
	- Front National Belge (FNB)
	- Parti des Forces Nouvelles (PFNb)
	- Vlaams Blok (VB)
Denmark	- Fremskridtspartiet (FPD)
France	- Alliance Populaire (AP)
	- Front National (FN)
	- Parti des Forces Nouvelles (PFN)
Germany	- Deutsche Volksunion (DVU)
	- Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)
	- Republikaner (REP)
Greece	- Ethniki Politiki Enosis (EPEN)
	- Enomeno Ethniko Kinema (ENEK)
Italy	- Alleanza Nazionale (AN)
	- Lega Lombarda (LL)
	- Lega Nord (LN)
	- Lega Veneto (LV)
	- Movimento Sociale Italiano-Destra Nazionale (MSI-DN)
Luxembourg	- Nationalbewegong (NB)
Netherlands	- Centrumpartij (CP)
	- Centrumdemocraten (CD)
	- Centrumpartij'86/Nationale Volkspartij (CP'86)
	- Nederlandse Volksunie (NVU)
Norway	- Fremskrittspartiet (FPN)
Portugal	- Força Nacional-Nova Monarquia (FN-NM)
	- Partido da Democracia Crista (PDC)
	- Partido de Solidariadade Nacional (PSN)
Spain	- Falange Española de las JONS (FE)
	- Fuerza Nueva/Frente Nacional (FN/FN)
	- Union Nacional (UN)
Sweden	- Ny Demokrati (ND)
	- Sverigedemokraterna (Sd)
Switzerland	- Lega dei Ticinesi (LT)
	- Nationale Aktion für Volk und Heimat (NA)
	- Schweizer Autopartei/Parti Suisse des automobilistes (AP)
	- Schweizer Demokraten/Démocrates suisses (SD)
	- Schweizerische Republikaner Bewegung/Mouvement républicaine Suisse (SRB)
	- Vigilance
United Kingdom	- British National Party (BNP)
	- National Front (NF)

A more practical reason for the difference in scholarly attention is language. As Müller-Rommel has noted, this is a restraining factor in the study of all small parties, especially when primary sources are involved:

> Studying small parties obviously encounters some unique problems especially when it comes to gathering information for a cross-national analysis. In most cases there are clearly language problems. Although it is relatively easy to collect information on party programmes, manifestos and party statutes, it is notably more difficult to read these brochures since (in most cases) they have not been translated into English or another international language.[43]

Language is the main reason why the scholarly (English-language) community can get more information on, for instance, the British right-wing extremist parties (BNP and NF), which are electorally irrelevant, than on a party like the Belgian VB, one of the most successful, yet unknown right-wing extremist parties. It might also be one of the main reasons that the 'grandfather' of right-wing extremism, the Italian MSI, has been largely ignored by the international scholarly community. However, language does not explain everything, since the MSI has only recently been discovered as a scientific topic by the Italians themselves. Moreover, the new *Legas* have been the subject of intensive study both from Italian and non-Italian scholars, making the LN a subject of more (inter)national scholarly attention than the almost five times older (and still more successful) MSI (now AN).

Having pointed to the different levels of attention given to the parties involved, as well as some of the reasons for this variety, a few of the borderline cases of the party family will now be discussed briefly. For there are some parties, whose right-wing extremist status is disputed by some of the leading scholars in the field. This should come as no surprise after the discussion of the wide variety of definitions and terms that are used in the literature. A large part of the debate on whether a party is or is not part of the extreme right party family is, indeed, more a result of a difference of opinion on the definition of right-wing extremism.

One of the parties whose right-wing extremist status is debated is the LN (and its main predecessor the LL), which some authors leave out of their listing of right-wing extremist parties, or define as part of the regionalist or sub-nationalist party family.[44] This may, except for the obvious regionalist platform and support, partly be the result of the fact that the LL itself chose to be part of the regionalist Rainbow-coalition in the European Parliament instead of the Technical Fraction of the Euro-right (in 1994 the LN joined the faction of the Euro-liberals).

A party whose ideological status has been the subject of fierce scientific,

public and political debate, is the German REP. Whereas most scholars have defined the party as right-wing extremist, there are a few who have rejected this labelling. They argue that the REP is fundamentally different from the traditional German right-wing extremist parties (NPD and DVU, among others) because the REP originated as a splinter from a democratic party (the Bavarian Christian-democrat CSU), and should not be called right-wing extremist.[45] These scholars, working within the extremism–theoretical tradition (see below), have long been supported by the German state, which, in its influential *Verfassungsschutzberichten*, did not list the REP among the right-wing extremist groups. However, in December 1992 the German state changed its view, and the REP is now officially considered to be right-wing extremist. Even though this decision has been criticised, from both inside and outside the REP, as being primarily politically and electorally motivated, it has certainly weakened the argument advanced by the 'dissidents'.[46]

There are some similarities with the discussion on the Austrian FPÖ. As in the case of the REP, the FPÖ did not originate from an (exclusively) right-wing extremist environment. The party was the successor of the *Verband der Unabhängigen* (VdU), a meeting-place for German-nationalists, national-liberals and former Nazis. After a clearly nationalist beginning, the FPÖ developed more and more into a (national)-liberal party, thereby losing some right-wing extremists to the *Nationaldemokratische Partei* (NDP) in the 1966 split. It was eventually even accepted as coalition partner of the social-democratic SPÖ in 1983. With the 1986 succession of Jörg Haider as *Bundesparteiobmann* (national party chairman), a young and energetic populist who had made his party career in the right-wing extremist Carinthian branch, more and more authors came to define the party as right-wing extremist. This has been strengthened by the increasing grip of Haider (and his clique) over the party, by the defection of prominent liberals in the spring of 1993, who formed the *Liberales Forum*, and by the expulsion[47] of the party from the Liberal International later that year. However, there are still authors that dispute the right-wing extremist character of the party and/or that consider the party as part of the liberal party family.[48]

In conclusion, the Scandinavian Progress Parties (the FPD and FPN), which are seen by some as the first of the most recent (third) wave of right-wing extremism, and by others as the last of the (second) wave of poujadist-like parties.[49] The main question here is certainly not whether the parties are right-wing, but whether they are extremist. The second group sees them as either classical right-wing libertarian parties, admittedly primarily 'anti' but certainly not extremist, or as part of the secular conservative party family.[50]

Subgroups Within the Larger Party Family

It has been noted above that some of the alternatives to the term right-wing

extremism are also used to describe particular brands of right-wing extremism. Neo-nazism is often seen as a specific form of right-wing extremism that is aimed at the revitalisation of the German Third Reich, which shared all the features of right-wing extremism plus some special characteristics. Hence, neo-nazism is considered to be a special, more extreme, form of right-wing extremism. More simply stated: whereas every neo-Nazi is a right-wing extremist, not every right-wing extremist is a neo-Nazi.

Recently, there have been a few studies in which various subgroups within the broader extreme right party family were distinguished on the basis of party ideology. These studies, sometimes implicitly, acknowledge the similarity of all parties in some features of right-wing extremism, but also see differences between them in respect to other features or in respect to the intensity or importance of the feature(s) for the party ideology. In this section some of these classifications will be introduced and their empirical and theoretical relevance will be discussed.

One of the first classifications in the literature is the one constructed by Stöss, who distinguishes, on the basis of a party's stand on the German question, four different types of right-wing extremism in Germany.[51] Only two of the four groups have any significance: the 'Old Nationalism' or the 'Old Right-Wing' and the 'New Nationalism' or the 'New Right-Wing'. The main difference between the two has to do with their ideological basis, whether it is 'Old', that is, based on the ideas of the German Nationalists and the Nazis, or 'New', that is, seeking modern paths adapted to changing national and international post-war conditions. The former are further characterised by 'a leaning towards statist and militarist thinking and a foreign policy preference for pro-Western or European-neutralist approaches' and a fierce anti-Bolshevism.[52] The parties of the New Nationalism want to find a 'new political credo' and look for a Third Way; a concept that has always remained rather vague and is mostly used to indicate an economic system different from both capitalism and communism and a foreign policy of a neutral Europe, free of both the East and West, that is, of the United States.

There are a few problems with this distinction. First, it is developed for the German context, which is in this respect a rather typical and specific case. Even if the concept of 'Old Nationalism' is extended to right-wing extremist thinking of the Interbellum in general, the possibility of applying the classification outside Germany (and possibly Austria) remains difficult. Second, the classification has limited value when applied strictly to political parties of some electoral relevance.

These problems are for a large part overcome by the fairly similar classification of the Italian, Ignazi, who has distinguished between 'old' and

'new' extreme-right parties. The whole family of right-wing extremist parties is classified according to three criteria: (1) placement at the most far right of the national political spectrum (spatial criterion); (2) fascist features in the party ideology (historic–ideological criterion); and (3) negative attitude toward the political system (attitudinal–systemic criterion).[53] The new extreme right parties are selected on the basis of the first and third criterion, and are essentially right-wing anti-system parties. The old extreme right parties combine all three criteria. This still left him with a few borderline cases that might be part of the extreme right family.[54]

In more recent work Ignazi has renamed the 'old', the 'traditional', and the 'new', the 'post-industrial' extreme right parties.[55] Even though the basis for classification remains the same, there are some changes in the actual classification of the parties. Former borderline cases such as the FPÖ, FPD and FPN are now included in the group of post-industrial extreme right parties. The VB is 'for certain aspects' included in the traditional group, but also in the post-industrial group, albeit with a question mark.[56] This problem of classification is by no means limited to the VB, but in a sense is applicable to all parties involved. It stems from the vagueness of the historic–ideological criterion. Ignazi states that:

> The heritage of fascism can be seen in terms of references to myths, symbols, slogans of the interwar fascist experience, often veiled as nostalgia, or in terms of a more explicit reference to at least part of the ideological corpus of fascism.[57]

As he has listed a rather broad and varied corpus, including features like 'limitations on personal and collective freedoms' and 'acceptance of hierarchical criteria for social organisation',[58] not many of the new or post-industrial extreme right parties will defy this criterion when applied rigorously. Nevertheless, Ignazi has taken the theoretically and empirically relevant distinction between 'new' and 'old' form(s) of right-wing extremism a step further, by making it less German (thereby, unfortunately, making it a bit too Italian) and making it applicable to a wider range of electorally relevant political parties.

An alternative classification is constructed by Betz, who distinguishes two 'faces of radical right-wing populism': 'neo-liberal' or 'libertarian' populism on the one hand, and 'authoritarian' or 'national' populism on the other.[59] The main difference between these two 'ideal types' is defined in relative terms:

> What ultimately determines whether a party should be characterized as a neoliberal populist party or a national populist party is the relative weight it attributes to the respective elements in its program.[60]

The distinction is far from static, as parties can (and have) develop(ed) from one type into the other, partly as a result of the changing social base of their electorate. However, Betz notes that, since the late 1980s, there are clear signs of an increasing importance of national populist elements in the programmes of all the parties. The one exception to this development is the Italian LN.

Betz' classification has certainly both theoretical and empirical relevance, yet it struggles with the obvious problem of determining the relative weight of the two elements. How do you weigh the neo-liberal substance of a programme? Even though the author claims to provide 'a comprehensive analysis of the basic elements of the radical right-wing populist program and the shifts in emphasis of its two main components',[61] the analysis he provides is based primarily on the 'good reading' of some election programmes and pamphlets of the various parties. While this might suffice to notice a shift in emphasis, it is hardly a solid basis for constructing a meaningful classification. Nevertheless, the idea is certainly interesting and should be taken into account in any comparative study of right-wing extremist party ideology.

While an antagonist of the term right-wing extremism, Husbands none the less recently used the term in an introductory article of a special issue of *Parliamentary Affairs* as the collective noun of a group of (already known) parties that share a 'particular commitment to some sort of ethnic exclusionism – a hostility to foreigners, immigrants, Third World asylum-seekers, and similar outgroups – as well as aggressive nationalism or localism'.[62] It is, however, not their exclusionism that distinguishes them from other (notably right-wing) parties, but their commitment to it, as they have made it 'a large part of all of their *raison d'être*'.[63]

Husbands distinguishes four 'distinct models' of right-wing extremism: populist national parties, neo-fascist parties, nationalist extreme-right parties and traditional xenophobic parties. While the first two models contain five and eight parties respectively, the latter two contain one party each, respectively the VB and the NA/SD. Unfortunately, Husbands does not mention what the basis of classification is for the various models. This makes it even more difficult to rationalise the last two models. When the latter two models are ignored, the distinction of Husbands has almost the same result as the one proposed by Betz, although the latter has the advantage of making explicit the basis for distinction. Hence, the classification of Husbands needs, first, further elaboration and specification, and, second, good theoretical grounds to distinguish the two models of only one party, before it can deliver a true contribution to the knowledge of the phenomenon at hand.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: FOUR THEORETICAL SCHOOLS

So far, an overview of the defining of the extreme right party family of the third wave has been presented, in which three fundamental questions have been addressed in detail: What is the criterion on which the family is constituted? What are the main similarities and differences with alternative terms? And what parties are part of the family? On all questions a variety of different answers are given in the literature, but some consensus of opinion nevertheless exists. Instead of summarising the overview presented above, this section will discuss the writings on a sort of a meta-level.

A majority of the scholars working in the field of right-wing extremist parties can be classified in four broad, and admittedly fairly general, groups. These groups are distinguished on the basis of a common 'theoretical' notion of right-wing extremist parties of this period, and because of this give relatively similar answers to the three questions posed above. Even though this distinction is neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, it brings at least some structure to the, at first glance, desultory collection of definitions mentioned in the literature, and mitigates the impression one might get that every author is doing his or her own thing. Admittedly, the distinction is partly created from the outside and only a minority of the scholars identify themselves explicitly with one of the four 'theories'. This notwithstanding, there are only a few scholars working in the field that cannot be classified on the basis of their own writing.

As discussed above, the study of right-wing extremism is strongly influenced by the study of historical fascism. In more than one way, it would even be correct to speak of a modern variant of fascism studies. It is thus not surprising that this classification is also much influenced by the classifications used in the study of historical fascism.[64] Within the broader study of right-wing extremist parties of the third wave, four different theoretical schools can be distinguished, conveniently named: (1) the Marxist school; (2) the extremism–theoretical school; (3) the modernisation school; and the (4) 'new politics' school. The authors working in these traditions stress the (1) right-wing, (2) extremist, (3) reactionary, or (4) modern aspect of the parties in question.

The first group of scholars works within the classical Marxist theory of fascism, as described by the Third International of 1929. In this theory, fascism is described as 'a violent, dictatorial agent of bourgeois capitalism'.[65] Authors working within this tradition stress the ideological similarities and strategical alliances of the extreme right and the traditional right. Most of them use the term 'neo-fascism' or just 'fascism', as they consider the post-war phenomenon to be identical to the historical form. Some authors have taken a more 'modern' approach, by accepting the

extreme right as an intermediate form between the traditional right and fascism.[66] In short, the difference between the three is not in the content but in the intensity of their ideology: the extreme right is an extreme form of the right, and (neo-)fascism is an extreme form of the extreme right.

It comes as no surprise that the definitions used by this group stress right-wing features such as capitalism, conservative moral values, and anti-communism. In addition, they stress the importance of violence on both the ideological and strategical level. As they believe that the difference between the traditional and the extreme right is relative and not absolute, they often study the most wide variety of parties of all the four schools, including factions of traditional right-wing parties.

Not only Marxist authors work within this tradition, but more moderate left-wing scholars are also influenced by it. They are generally more shaded in the ideological and strategical relationship between the traditional and extreme right, often stressing the differences between the two. Some right-wing extremists even have accepted the core of this theory, especially groups that consider themselves to be national-revolutionary and who distinguish themselves sharply from the traditional 'bourgeois' right-wing extremist parties.[67]

The Marxist theory of fascism has been criticised extensively by scholars of the traditional liberal and conservative right, who countered the allegations of similarity of the traditional and the extreme right by pointing to the – in their eyes more striking – similarity between the extreme left and the extreme right, in contrast to all democratic forces. This so-called totalitarianism school originated within the study of historical fascism, and went through several different phases.[68] The extremism–theoretical school is in many ways its modern variant.

Authors that work within the extremism–theoretical tradition define extremism as the antithesis of democracy, which contains a right-wing and a left-wing variant.[69] This holds true for both the *definitio ex negativo* and the (more recent) *definitio ex positivo*. The school has many protagonists in the (right-wing) scientific community in Germany, who follow the legal negative definition of extremism.[70] There are also some influential non-German scholars who work within this tradition, such as Sartori, who has based his party system model of polarised pluralism on this notion.[71]

The extremism–theoretical school has in its turn been sharply criticised, too, mainly on three grounds: (1) the relativity of the term, which makes it a possible battle cry (*Kampfbegriff*); (2) the equalisation of different political forms (i.e., the left and right); and (3) its limited scope.[72] The second form of criticism has the least consequences for the definition of right-wing extremism, as the criticism is primarily directed at the alleged false equalisation of the left-wing variant with the rightly defined right-

wing variant. It has primarily been voiced by left-wing authors, probably beginning with Grebing's 1971 book, *Linksradikalismus gleich Rechtsradikalismus. Eine falsche Gleichung*. A more recent protagonist of this vision is Stöss, who argues that '(r)ight-wing extremism is fundamentally anti-democratic in terms of its ideology and aims, whereas socialism is only anti-democratic when it is abused by bureaucracy, or becomes perverted'.[73]

The third group of scholars works within some form of the so-called modernisation theory, in which right-wing extremism is seen primarily as a reactionary backlash to some sort of modernisation process in society. This theory has also been used in the study of both historical fascism[74] and nationalism in its most broad sense.[75] In the more recent variant, right-wing extremism is seen as a reaction to the ongoing process of modernisation (for example, individualisation, decline of the welfare state, world migration). The right-wing extremist supporters are considered to be primarily the losers of this process.[76] The way the core of the modernisation process is defined differs between authors, and thus also the way the reaction is defined.

One variant of the modernisation theory defines the modernisation process strictly in terms of a process initiated (or personalised) by 'the left', hence describing the right-wing extremist parties as a reaction to the success of the left.[77] This vision was made famous in the study of historical fascism by the German historian Nolte, who saw historical fascism primarily as a reaction towards the rise of communism. In recent years an increasing variety of authors have linked right-wing extremist parties in this way with left-libertarian parties. Ignazi, for instance, argues that the new right-wing extremist parties of the late 1980s are a reaction to the success of the left-libertarian parties in the early 1980s.[78] Paraphrasing Inglehart, he speaks of a 'silent counter-revolution', which in his vision not only encompasses right-wing extremism, but also, especially in the case of the Anglo-Saxon countries, neo-conservatism.

The fourth and last group of authors argue that both groups of parties are one side of the same medal, that of 'new politics'. Even while the group is rather heterogeneous, as are the other groups, all authors agree on the assumption that these are modernising times, which have created two new political families. Most of the authors originally worked on new left-wing political parties. They stress the similarities between the two groups of parties, most notably their 'new' issues and their new style.[79] The way the two groups of parties are claimed to be either linked or different varies between authors.

Some argue that the left-libertarian parties are the political representatives of the (self-perceived) winners of the modernisation process, whereas the right-wing extremist parties represent the (self-perceived) losers of that same process.[80] Other authors see the two party families as the political representatives of a new cleavage that resulted from the modernisation process, that between the multi-culturalists on the one side and ethnic nationalists on the other.[81] In an even more extreme vision, the two party families are seen as the newest representatives of the old left-wing dichotomy.[82] The view of VB leader Dewinter seems to be a synthesis of the two:

> The Vlaams Blok owes its victory to the fact that it puts forward a few new problems that do not fit the ideological canvas of the traditional parties. [...] The old axis 'capital versus labour' is slowly but definitely replaced by a new axis 'multicultural versus national [*volkse*] identity'.[83]

The theory of right-wing extremism which a particular author supports has consequences not only for the way he explains the electoral rise (and decline) of these parties, but also for the focus of his study (most similar and most dissimilar parties). Moreover, it has consequences for the terms the author uses, and for the parties he studies. This ideal-typical relation has been schematically presented in Table 2 below.

TABLE 2
SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF THE IDEAL TYPICAL RELATION BETWEEN THEORETICAL SCHOOL, THE MAIN TERM USED, AND THE MAIN IDEOLOGICAL FRIENDS AND FOES

Theoretical school	*Main term used*	*Main ideological friends*	*Main ideological foes*
Marxist	(neo-)**fascism**	right-wing/capitalist parties	socialist/ communist parties
Extremism–theoretical	right-wing **extremism**	extreme left-wing parties	democratic parties
Modernisation	no specific term	conservative parties	progressive parties
New Politics	(some form of) **populism**	left-libertarian parties	traditional/ established parties

This notwithstanding, there is on the whole as much difference between definitions of the same term as there is between definitions of different terms. On the other hand, the observation that Scheuch and Klingemann made for the term right-wing radicalism in 1967 is still valid, and for an even wider variety of terms: almost all definitions are to a more or lesser extent based on definitions of historical fascism.[84]

Even more remarkable and disappointing is the fact that these different terms, including the new ones, are most often defined without much empirical basis. As far as the ideology of the parties in question are studied, this mostly does not go further than the election and party programme(s).

The few first empirical comparative studies have shown, however, that most definitions are far too demanding, and that even key features, like racism and anti-democracy, are absent in the ideology of several of the parties.[85] Instead of putting so much effort into defining the object of study a priori on the basis of some (vague) notion of historical continuity, it would be more useful to study the object itself first and to try to define it later.

NOTES

An earlier version of this article was presented as a paper entitled 'What, Who, Why? The Defining of the Extreme Right Party Family' in the workshop 'Racist Parties in Europe: A New Political Family' at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Bordeaux, 27 April–2 May 1995. As well as the participants of this workshop, I would like to thank Uwe Backes, Hans-Georg Betz, Roger Eatwell, Paul Hainsworth, Petr Kopecky, Peter Mair, Margo Trappenburg and Joop van Holsteyn for their valuable comments on earlier drafts.

1. See for Germany, Hans-Helmuth Knütter, *Hat der Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland eine Chance?* (Bonn: Der Bundesminister des Innern 1991) and Eckkart Zimmermann and Thomas Saalfeld, 'The Three Waves of West German Right-Wing Extremism', pp.50–74 in Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (eds) *Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right* (Boulder: Westview 1993). For the Netherlands, Frank Buijs and Jaap van Donselaar, *Extreem-rechts: aanhang, geweld en onderzoek* (Leiden: Liswo 1994).
2. Klaus von Beyme, 'Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe', *West European Politics* 11/2 (April 1988) p.6. Patrick Stouthuysen, *Extreem-rechts in na-oorlogs Europa* (Brussels: VUB-Press 1993) p.12. Franz Greß, 'Rechtsextremismus in Europa' in Wolfgang Kowalsky and Wolfgang Schroeder (eds), *Rechtsextremismus. Einführung und Forschungsbilanz* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 1994) p.187.
3. Buijs and van Donselaar (note 1) p.30.
4. 'Wenn sich der Prozeß wissenschaftlicher Aufarbeitung allzu sehr an politischen Konjunkturen orientiert, die Aktualität einer Problemstellung zum zentralen Kriterium für dessen Relevanz wird, besteht die akute Gefahr vordergründlicher, kurzatmiger, historisch unreflektierter Betrachtung. Politische Zweckgerichtheit dominiert oder beeinträchtigt zumindest den Erkenntnisgehalt empirisch abgestürtzter Analysen.' Uwe Backes, 'Nationalpopulismus und Rechtsextremismus im westlichem Deutschland. Kritische Betrachtung zum neuerlichen "Hoch" in Politik und Literatur', *Neue Politische Literatur* 35/3 (1990) pp.443–71.
5. Richard Stöss speaks of a 'Nichtexistenz einer Rechtsextremismusforschung'. See his 'Forschungs- und Erklärungsansätze – ein Überblick' in Kowalsky and Schroeder (note 2), p.25.
6. Paul Hainsworth, 'Introduction. The Cutting Edge: The Extreme Right in Post-War Western Europe and the USA', in Paul Hainsworth (ed.) *The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA* (London: Pinter 1992) pp.6–7.
7. Annvi Gardberg, *Against the Stranger, the Gangster and the Establishment: A Comparative Study of the Ideologies of the Swedish Ny Demokrati, the German Republikaner, the French Front National and the Belgian Vlaams Blok* (Helsingfors: Universitetstryckeriet 1993). Cas Mudde, 'Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed. A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of Three Alleged Right-Wing Extremist Parties', *European Jnl of Political Research* 27/2 (Feb. 1995) pp.203–24.
8. Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1994).
9. Armin Pfahl-Traughber, *Volkes Stimme? Rechtspopulismus in Europa* (Bonn: Dietz 1994) pp.119–34.

10. Buijs and van Donselaar (note 1) p.III. Wolfgang Kowalsky and Wolfgang Schroeder, 'Rechtsextremismus – Begriff, Methode, Analyse', in idem (note 2) p.8.
11. Geoffrey Roberts, 'Extremism in Germany: Sparrows or Avalanche?', *European Jnl of Political Research* 25/4 (June 1994) p.472.
12. For recent conspiracy literature, see Michael Schmidt, *Néo-nazis* (Paris: J.C. Lattès 1993). Rainer Fromm and Barbara Kernbach, *... und morgen die ganze Welt? Rechtsextreme Publizistik in Westeuropa* (Marburg: Schüren 1994). Yaron Svoray, *De nieuwe Hitlertjes. De bom onder de democratie* (Utrecht: A.W. Bruna 1995).
13. Von Beyme (note 2) p.11.
14. Theodor A. Herz, *Soziale Bedingungen für Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in den Vereinigten Staaten. Eine vergleichende Analyse der Anhänger der Nationaldemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und der Anhänger von George C. Wallace* (Meisenheim am Glan: Haim 1975) p.31. Mudde (note 7) p.205.
15. Wolfgang Benz, 'Die Opfer und die Täter. Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik', in idem (ed.) *Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik. Voraussetzungen, Zusammenhänge, Wirkungen*, new ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 1989) p.11. von Beyme (note 2) p.1.
16. Hugo de Schampheleire, 'Extreem rechtse populistische partijen in West-Europa: problematiek' in idem and Yannis Thanassekos (eds) *Extreem rechts in West-Europa. L'extrême droite en Europe de l'ouest* (Brussels: VUB-Press 1991) pp.31–2. Siegfried Jäger, 'Wezenlijke kenmerken van het actuele modernistische extreem rechts in de Duitse Bondsrepubliek', in De Schampheleire and Thanassekos, pp.188–9.
17. Ulrich Hartmann, Hans-Peter Steffen and Sigrid Steffen, *Rechtsextremismus bei Jugendlichen. Anregungen, der wachsender Gefahr entgegenzuwirken* (München: Kösel 1985) p.9.
18. Subrata Mitra, 'The National Front in France – A Single-Issue Movement?', *West European Politics* 11/2 (April 1988) pp.47–64. Cas Mudde, 'All Against One, One Against All! A Portrait of the Vlaams Blok', *Patterns of Prejudice* 29/1 (Jan. 1995) pp.5–28.
19. Mudde (note 7) pp.205–7.
20. Roy C. Macridis, *Contemporary Political Ideologies: Movements and Regimes*, 4th ed. (Glennview: Scott, Foresman and Co. 1989) p.231. '[...] eine Sammelbezeichnung für antidemokratische Gesinnungen und Bestrebungen, die traditionell auf die äußersten »Rechten« des Rechts-Links-Spektrums verortet werden'. Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse, *Politischer Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin: Propyläen 1993) p.474.
21. Jürgen W. Falter and Siegfried Schumann, 'Affinity Towards Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe', *West European Politics* 11/2 (April 1988) p.101.
22. Georgi Verbeeck, '"Schaduwen uit het verleden". Extremisme van rechts: definitie, ideologie en geschiedenis', *De Gids op Maatschappelijk Gebied* 85/3 (March 1994) p.219. Meindert Fennema, 'Some Theoretical Problems and Issues in the Comparison of Racist Parties in Europe', paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Bordeaux, 27 April–2 May 1995, p.6.
23. Mudde (note 7) p.206.
24. Paul Pennings and Kees Brants (eds) *Rechts-extreme jongeren. Theorie en praktijk van politiek gedrag* (Amsterdam: Vakgroep Collectief Politiek Gedrag 1985) p.44.
25. Mudde (note 7) p.218–19.
26. Ibid. pp.204–5.
27. See, for instance, Kurt Gossweiler, 'Faschismus aus der «Mitte der Gesellschaft»', *Marxistische Blätter* 33/1 (Jan. 1995) pp.35–44. Hans-Jürgen Schulz, 'Alter und neuer Faschismus', pp.8–20 in idem (ed) *Sie sind wieder da! Faschismus und Reaktion in Europa* (Frankfurt am Main: ISPO 1990). There are also a few non-Marxist authors who use the term 'fascism' for all periods; for instance, Roger Griffin, 'Post-War Fascisms: Introduction', pp.311–16 in idem (ed.) *Fascism* (Oxford: OUP 1995).
28. Walter Oswalt, 'Definition des Begriffs "Rechtsradikalismus/Rechtsextremismus"' in Martina Kirfel and Walter Oswalt (eds) *Die Rückkehr der Führer. Modernisierter Rechtsradikalismus in Westeuropa*, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Europaverlag 1991) p.28. Leonard Weinberg, 'Introduction', in Merkl and Weinberg (note 1) p.4.
29. 'Der Begriff "Radikalismus" bzw. "radikal" hat mithin eine Bedeutungsänderung erfahren. Das, was wir heute als "extremistisch" bezeichnen, wurde früher als "radikal" bezeichnet.

Heute werden als "radikal" solche Bestrebungen gekennzeichnet, die einseitige und "bis an die Wurzel gehende" Lösungen bestimmter Probleme anstreben, dabei aber gerade nicht oder noch nicht auf eine völlige oder teilweise Beseitigung der freiheitlichen demokratischen Grundordnung hinauslaufen.' Peter Frisch, 'Die Herausforderung unseres demokratischen Rechtsstaats durch Extremismus und Terrorismus', in *Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Bonn: Der Bundesminister des Innern 1990) pp.8–9.

30. Ehud Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right* (NY: OUP 1991) p.10.
31. Pfahl-Traughber (note 9) p.17.
32. Margaret Canovan, *Populism* (NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1981) p.3; Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (eds) *Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics* (London: Weidenfeld 1969).
33. Betz (note 8). Uwe Backes, 'Nationalpopulistische Protestparteien in Europa. Vergleichende Betrachtung zur phänomologischen und demokratietheoretischen Einordnung', *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 20/1 (Jan. 1991) p.13.
34. See, for instance, Pfahl-Traughber (note 9) p.20.
35. Frank Elbers and Meindert Fennema, *Racistische partijen in West-Europa. Tussen nationale traditie en Europese samenwerking* (Leiden: Stichting Burgerschapskunde 1993) pp.11–13.
36. See also Christopher T. Husbands, 'The Dynamics of Racial Exclusion and Expulsion: Racist Politics in Western Europe', *European Jnl of Political Research* 16/6 (Nov. 1988) pp.701–20.
37. J. Billiet, M. Swyngedouw and A. Carton, *Stemmen voor Vlaams Blok of Rossum. De kiezers zelf aan het woord* (Leuven: ISPO 1992). Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram, 'Überdehnung, Erosion und rechtspopulistische Reaktion. Wandlungsfaktoren des österreichischen Parteiensystems im Vergleich', *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 21/2 (1992) pp.147–64. Dieter Roth, 'Die Republikaner. Schneller Aufstieg und tiefer Fall einer Protestpartei am rechten Rand', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 43/B 37–38 (14 Sept. 1990) pp.27–39.
38. Elbers and Fennema (note 35) p.166.
39. Von Beyme (note 2) p.3.
40. Verbeeck (note 22) p.219.
41. From 1984–89 the fraction was constituted by the Italian MSI, the French FN and the Greece EPEN, whereas from 1989–94 the (original) members of the now 'Technical Fraction of the Euro Right' were the French FN, the German REP, and the Belgian VB (EPEN had lost its seat and the MSI left after disagreement with the REP and VB, over South Tyrol/Alto Adige). Because of the REPs poor showing, and the refusal of the Italian MSI (independent) and LN (liberals) to join, the fraction fell back to only two member parties (FN and VB), which left it with too few seats (13) to form an official party group.
42. Michael Billig, 'The Extreme Right: Continuities in Anti-Semitic Conspiracy Theory in Post-War Europe', in Roger Eatwell and Neil O'Sullivan (eds) *The Nature of the Right* (London: Pinter 1989) p.146.
43. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, 'Small Parties in Comparative Perspective: The State of the Art', in idem and Geoffrey Pridham (eds) *Small Parties in Western Europe. Comparative and National Perspectives* (London: Sage 1991) p.2.
44. Piero Ignazi, 'The Silent Counter-Revolution. Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe', *European Jnl of Political Research* 22/1–2 (July 1992) pp.3–34. Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver and Peter Mair, *Representative Government in Modern Europe*, 2nd ed. (NY: McGraw Hill 1995) p.203.
45. See, for instance, Uwe Backes, 'The West German Republikaner: Profile of a Nationalist, Populist Party of Protest, *Patterns of Prejudice* 24/1 (Jan. 1990) pp.3–18. Hans-Joachim Veen, Norbert Lepszy and Peter Mnich, *The Republikaner Party in Germany. Right-Wing Menace or Protest Catchall?* (Washington DC: Center for Strat. and Int. Studies 1993).
46. Gillian More, 'Undercover Surveillance of the Republikaner Party: Protecting a Militant Democracy or Discrediting a Political Rival?', *German Politics* 3/2 (Aug. 1994) pp.284–92. There are, however, scholars who work within the same extremism–theoretical tradition, yet come to different conclusions on the extremism of the REP. For instance, Armin Pfahl-Traughber, *Rechtsextremismus. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme nach der Wiedervereinigung* (Bonn: Bouvier 1993). Thomas Saalfeld, 'The Politics of National-Populism: Ideology and Policies of the German Republikaner Party', *German Politics* 2/2 (Aug. 1993) pp.177–99.

47. The FPÖ was not formally expelled by the Liberal International, as they anticipated the decision by their own withdrawal. Pfahl-Traughber (note 9) p.54.
48. Peter H. Merkl, 'Conclusion: A New Lease on Life for the Radical Right?', in Merkl and Weinberg (note 1) p.206. Gallagher *et al.* (note 44) p.197.
49. For the first position, see Betz (note 8) and Ignazi (note 44). For the second position, see von Beyme (note 2) and Stouthuysen (note 2).
50. M.P.J. Gooskens, 'The Budget Approach: Political Distance Measured in *Kroner*', *Acta Politica* 29/4 (Oct. 1994) pp.380–1. Gallagher *et al.* (note 44) p.195.
51. Richard Stöss, 'The Problem of Right-Wing Extremism in West Germany', *West European Politics* 11/2 (April 1988) p.36. See also his *Politics Against Democracy. Right-Wing Extremism in West Germany* (NY: Berg 1991) p.26–8.
52. Stöss, 'Problem of Right-Wing Extremism', p.37.
53. Ignazi (note 44) p.7.
54. Most notably the AP, CDS, FPÖ, FPD and FPN. As so-called prototypes of the new extreme right parties, he lists the FN, REP, FNB, VB, PFN, CD and AN/Vigilance. The prototype of the old extreme right parties is the Italian MSI, according to Ignazi the inspiration for all extreme right-wing parties up until the 1970s. Other old extreme right parties are the NPD, DVU, EPEN, FN/FN, BNP, NF, CP'86 and PDC. Ignazi (note 44).
55. Piero Ignazi, *L'estrema destra in Europa* (Bologna: Il Mulino 1994).
56. Ibid., pp.243–5. See also his 'Antidemocratic Antipolitics: The Re-emergence of the Extreme Right', paper presented at the colloquium 'Vienna Dialogue on Democracy', Vienna, 7–10 July, pp.8 and 15.
57. Ignazi (note 44) p.10.
58. Ibid.
59. Respectively Hans-Georg Betz, 'The Two Faces of Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe', *Review of Politics* 55/4 (Fall 1993) p.680 and Betz (note 8) p.108.
60. Betz (note 8) p.108. Betz explicitly mentions the following parties as representatives of neo-liberal populism: FPD, FPN, ND, FPÖ, AP and LN; and of national populism: FN, REP and VB.
61. Ibid., p.109.
62. Christopher T. Husbands, 'The Other Face of 1992: The Extreme-Right Explosion in Western Europe', *Parliamentary Affairs* 45/3 (Winter 1992) p.268.
63. Ibid.
64. Roger Eatwell, 'Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism', *Jnl of Theoretical Politics* 4/2 (April 1992) pp.170–2.
65. Stanley G. Payne, 'The Concept of Fascism', in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (eds) *Who were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism* (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget 1980) p.14.
66. Reinhard Kühnl, 'Der Aufstieg der extremen Rechten in Europa', *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 37/6 (June 1992) p.733.
67. Günter Bartsch, *Revolution von Rechts? Ideologie und Organisation der Neuen Rechten* (Freiburg: Herderbücherei 1975).
68. Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse, 'Totalitarismus und Totalitarismusforschung – Zur Renaissance einer lange tabuisierten Konzeption', in Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse (eds) *Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie*, Vol. 4 (Bonn: Bouvier 1992) pp.10–17.
69. Uwe Backes, *Politischer Extremismus in demokratischen Verfassungsstaaten. Elemente einer normativen Rahmentheorie* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 1989). Backes and Jesse (note 20). Armin Pfahl-Traughber, 'Der Extremismusbegriff in der politikwissenschaftlichen Diskussion – Definitionen, Kritik, Alternativen', in Backes and Jesse (eds) (note 68) pp.67–86.
70. *Verfassungsschutzbericht 19XX* (Bonn: Der Bundesminister des Innern).
71. Von Beyme (note 2) p.2.
72. Pfahl-Traughber (note 69) p.74. Roberts (note 11).
73. Stöss, 'Politics against Democracy' (note 51) p.15.

74. For instance, Henry Ashby Turner Jr. 'Fascism and Modernisation', *World Politics* 24/4 (July 1972) pp.547–64.
75. For instance, Nico Wilterdink and Ton Zwaan, 'Nationalisme, natievorming en modernisering. Een slotbeschouwing', pp.253–71 in Ton Zwaan (ed.) *Het Europees labyrinth: Nationalisme en natievorming in Europa* (Meppel: Boom 1992).
76. Kowalsky and Schroeder (note 10) pp.15–7. Stöss (note 5) pp.42–4.
77. An even more extreme historical and cyclical view is that of Roger Eatwell, who defines the whole right-wing as a variety of responses to the left. See Hainsworth (note 6) p.3.
78. Ignazi (note 44).
79. Betz (note 8). Marc Swyngedouw, 'De opkomst en doorbraak van Agalev en Vlaams Blok in de jaren tachtig en negentig', *Acta Politica* 29/4 (Oct. 1994) pp.453–76. Paul Taggart, 'New Populist Parties in Western Europe', *West European Politics* 18/1 (Jan. 1995) p.47.
80. Cas Mudde, 'Right-Wing Extremist Parties in the Low Countries: Agents of Anti-Party Sentiment or True Anti-Party Parties?', paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Madrid, 17–22 April 1994 p.20.
81. Koen Raes, 'De strijd om de wij-identiteiten en de culturele achtergrond van het rechtse appel', pp.105–29 in *Herfsttij van de 20ste eeuw. Extreem-rechts in Vlaanderen 1920–1990* (Leuven: Kritak 1992).
82. Stefan Immerfall, 'Neopopulist Parties in the New Europe: the Communalities of Neopopulist Resentment', paper presented at the Conference 'Party Politics in the Year 2000', Manchester, 13–15 Jan. 1995, p.6.
83. Dewinter has written this in an internal party publication called *Kaderblad* (May 1992).
84. Erwin K. Scheuch and Hans D. Klingemann, 'Theorie des Rechtsradikalismus in westlichen Industriegesellschaften', *Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik*, 12 (1967) p.12.
85. Elbers and Fennema (note 35). Gardberg (note 7), Mudde (note 7).

Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in the European Union[1]

GARY MARKS and DOUG McADAM

To the extent that European integration results in the decline in the importance of the nation-state as the exclusive seat of formal political power, we can expect attendant changes in those forms of interest aggregation and articulation historically linked to the state. This article suggests that a polity characterised by multi-level governance is emerging in Europe and that this poses a set of new constraints and opportunities for groups that wish to influence political decisions. We argue that group strategy in response to this is a function of: (1) the structure of political opportunities facing a group in the EU; and (2) inherited institutions and ideologies that constrain the capacity of a group to exploit those opportunities. We use this framework to analyse the effect of European integration on four groups: the labour movement, regional movements, the environmental movement and the anti-nuclear movement.

To an observer of the contemporary world it might seem obvious that social movements and revolutions are, first and foremost, political phenomena. In light of the momentous changes wrought by the Velvet Revolutions of 1988–89 and the myriad nationalist movements currently operating throughout the former Warsaw Pact countries, it would seem the height of folly to deny political status and significance to social movements and revolutions. And yet, barely 20 years ago, the prevailing academic view did just that. Reflecting the conceptual dominance of the collective behaviour perspective, social movements were seen as, at best, a form of 'pre-political' behaviour; as warnings to those in power of emergent strains in society.[2] Accordingly, movements were depicted as more ephemeral and expressive than enduring and instrumental. Indeed, on the issue of rationality, the classic movement theorists were quite explicit. Movements were motivated more by a need to cope with the psychological stresses

West European Politics, Vol.19, No.2 (April 1996), pp.249–278
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON