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## Original Article

# Positive country images, trust and public support for European integration

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**Abstract** In this paper I contribute to the scholarship on public support for European integration by arguing that member-states' positive images influence individuals' support decisions. An attribute of this positive image is trust, which individuals utilize given the complexity of the integration process, the salient impact it has on their lives and the low levels of information individuals possess. The use of a member-state's image is therefore a short-cut to evaluate integration's impact on individuals. As the development of integration is strongly influenced by the relatively more economically powerful member-state, trust in Germany increases the level of support, more so than trusting the remaining members.

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## Introduction

This paper offers a unique explanation of public support for European integration by focusing on the cognitive interplay between citizens and the European Union (EU) member-states. My work joins the new line of research which draws on psychological explanations that spotlight the mediating effects of citizen support for political community development (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Given that the process of integration is primarily driven by national elites, having political trust in elites' intentions gives individuals a short-cut in calculating whether integration provides them with overall benefits. Research thus far has tackled the question of national elite influence on domestic public opinion in general (Feldman, 1988; Zaller, 1992) as well as in the study of citizen support for European integration (Franklin *et al*, 1995; Snchez-Cuenca, 2000; Kritzinger, 2003; Ray, 2003a, b). This paper, however, suggests that the

level of individual support for European integration depends, in part, on the level of trust for other member-states. The logic behind the central argument relies on the perceived image of the member-states as a cue regarding a particular member-state's aggregate interests. If individuals have positive images of the member-states, then they believe that the member-states can be trusted.

This is not to say that economic and policy evaluations (Feld and Wildgen, 1976; Handely, 1981; Anderson, 1991; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Duch and Taylor, 1997; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998; Diez Medrano, 2003; Brineger *et al.*, 2004; Ray, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Kritzinger, 2005) are not helpful in explaining support for integration. If support is given when individuals have favorable egocentric and/or national sociotropic evaluations, then there is the possibility that European societies could be integrating into a broader social community. However, I assume that individuals possess incomplete information regarding the consequences of integration on their welfare. Instead, they can rely on the cognitive image of the member-states, used as a short-cut, with positive images translating into trust. I also consider the influence of uneven power distribution among the member-states. Trust in the more economically powerful member-state (Germany) will have a significantly larger impact on support levels because citizens may be concerned about its economic ambitions.

The remaining sections will further detail the logic behind the hypotheses through a review of the literature where I make connections between social identity and international relations theories. I then describe the research design that uses ordered logit regression analysis with data from the 1995 Eurobarometer survey. A discussion of the study's implications follows the reporting of results.

### **An Image-trust Model of Integration Support**

As European integration results primarily from bargaining among the member-states, individuals' perceptions regarding the intentions of other member-states are one factor that they use to decide whether they support integration. Social identity theory can help explain support by examining inter-group dynamics (in-group *vs* out-group). From this theory, I explain the connection between images of groups and inter-group trust. Specifically, trustworthiness is an attribute of an out-group's positive image. When trust is given, inter-group cooperation is easier to obtain. However, as I will further develop, trust in the more economically powerful group has stronger explanatory power regarding support for European integration.



Social identity theory rests on the following assumptions. First, individuals build attachments to groups as part of normal human behavior (Piaget, 1965). Second, individuals view their group (the in-group) as the embodiment of what is important (DeLamater *et al*, 1969). Research supports the existence of the condition known as an in-group bias: individuals tend to favor members of their in-group *vs* others who are not members (the out-group) (Tajfel, 1978). However, evidence also supports inter-group cooperation when the groups' memberships share common preferences (Brewer, 1968). Common preferences promote trust, which is defined as the likelihood of obtaining preferred outcomes without the need of oversight (Gamson, 1968; Wintrobe, 1995). Putnam (1993) shows that the level of inter-personal trust produces effective institutional performance because of the higher probability of obtaining cooperation.

In this paper, in-groups and out-groups refer to member-states. If we accept this, then the literature on citizen support provides evidence for many of the claims of social identity theory. Strong national identities and pride are inversely associated with support for integration (Carey, 2002). Therefore, the stronger an individual's in-group identity, the less support an individual will give for inter-group cooperation. McLaren (2002) also points to in-group biases when she discovered that hostility towards other cultures determines attitudes towards the EU. Luedtke (2005) finds an inverse association between national identity and support for EU immigration policy. In sum, the stronger an individual in-group identification, the smaller her or his perceived overlapping preferences and the less likely she or he will support inter-group cooperation (integration).

The literature also points out that Europeans hold multiple identities<sup>1</sup> (Marks, 1999; Risse, 2002). With multiple identities, inter-group cooperation can be facilitated through 'overlapping polities' (Citrin and Sides, 2004, p. 170), which the process of integration itself has an influence over when individuals form their primary allegiances (Van Kersbergen, 2000). Evidence does show that support for integration increases when multiple identities are present (Haesly, 2001; Klandermans *et al*, 2003). Individuals support inter-group cooperation when they perceive a commonality among groups' preferences as reflected in adopting multiple identities. But what factors lead individuals to develop European multiple identities and support inter-group cooperation? To answer this question, I develop a synthesis of a member-state's image and international relations theories.

An image is the sum total of subjective characteristics of an object, such as a member-state (Kelman, 1965; Scott, 1965). As information is exchanged among individuals through the normal process of political socialization, subjective characteristics develop in the minds of individuals. In making evaluations, individuals use these images to formulate the likes and dislikes of

out-groups (Druckman *et al.*, 1974; Hewstone, 1986; Druckman, 1994). Geva and Hanson (1999) have shown, in experimental work, that individuals' reactions to events do modify how they think of states. Although their work focuses on crisis points, I assume that influences on a state's image can also occur over a long set of iterated events, such as the events that occurred in Europe during the twentieth century. Therefore, over time, individuals form images, positive or negative, of the individual EU member-states.

One subjective characteristic of a positive image is trustworthiness, which is necessary to reduce the costs of transactions required in cooperation. Cooperation among groups is especially costly because of the high level of coordination required, thereby making trust more salient. In a process as complicated as integration, individuals may not have all the tools or information to accurately gauge if integration would benefit them in either a material or a non-material way. However, if individuals can trust the other member-states' governments, then they do not need to examine the integration process in detail. Therefore, individuals will tend to support integration if they have positive images and thereby trust the member-states given their key role in EU level decision-making.

However, the link between trust in member-states and support for integration is more complicated. Van Oudenhoven *et al.* (2002) demonstrate that the attitudes of individuals from small European countries towards larger European countries are shaped by in-group biases predicted by social identity theory. I wish to build on this line of reasoning by using it to understand support for integration. First, not all member-states have an equal weight in the decision-making process. The larger countries carry more weight because their leaders can leverage the countries' economic size during negotiations. Institutionally, the mechanism of qualified majority voting skews decision-making influence to the larger member-states. Therefore, a model that considers the images of the member-states must also address the fact that some images may be more salient than others because of the resource distributive consequences of the larger member-states' preferences. As size can potentially influence a country's image, I next examine the structure of the European regional state system and make a connection of these factors to supporting integration.

The structure of the European state system, like the global or other regional systems, is a function of power relations. This structure determines outcomes through the opportunities it offers, and the constraints it puts on, the leadership of each country (Lenin, 1939; Waltz, 1979; Organski and Kugler, 1980; Keohane, 1984; Keohane and Milner, 1996). The organization of the international system is hierarchical, with the most powerful country at the top of the structure and the less powerful countries grouped beneath it (Krasner, 1976; Keohane, 1980; Organski and Kugler, 1980; Gilpin, 1981). The same description applies to the organizational properties of regions (Lemke, 1996;



Tammen *et al.*, 2000). According to this view, intergovernmental decisions that lead to regional integration are more likely to reflect the preferences of larger countries. With greater economic clout, the larger countries are able to use their market size to attract and persuade smaller countries to mostly abide by their preferences. Smaller countries must also be satisfied with the cooperative arrangements. One reason for them to abide by larger countries' preferences would be to access the larger countries' markets.

In the EU context, integration is primarily guided by the preferences of the more powerful members (Moravcsik, 1991, 1993). Specifically, the propensity to integrate comes under certain structural conditions: a regional system must include both a set of uneven power relationships and satisfaction with how to develop integration (Efird and Genna, 2002). As the project is one of voluntary cooperation, countries can opt out of further integration if their preferences are not in line with the more powerful members. The regional leader strongly influences institutional construction jointly through its preferences and its ability to foster stability (Krasner, 1976; Keohane and Nye, 1977). The cooperation between France and Germany, the two largest EU economies, has often been characterized as the driving force behind European integration. However, evidence points to Germany as having greater influence in the integration process (Efird and Genna, 2002).

Behavior is also important in the development of a member-state's image and the impact this image would have on public support. Wendt (1992) states that the international structure is important only because of the resulting influence it has on the actors involved. He hypothesizes that countries go through a process of socialization because of their interactions within the structure. They are transformed '... by the institution of sovereignty, by an evolution of cooperation, and by intentional efforts to transform egoistic identities into collective identities' (Wendt, 1992, p. 395).<sup>2</sup> Images therefore reflect a country's socialization and transformation, and impact not only the views of a state's own people but also other people's views.

Germany has transformed its image into one that seeks cooperation and peaceful resolutions to problems. As an active member in building cooperation in Europe, it can be trusted to seek out positive sum outcomes to regional problems. It can also be trusted because it has shown itself to have a robust and stable economy. The competent handling of a large and complex economy improves the likelihood of trust (Van Oudenhoven *et al.*, 2002). In sum, because of Germany's leadership in EU affairs coupled with trust given due to its image as cooperative and economically competent, I hypothesize that trust in Germany plays a more significant role in explaining support levels than trust in France or Britain, the other large European economic powers.

In this section I developed an argument that leads to three hypotheses. The first is that trust in EU member-states is a factor explaining support for

integration. The socialization of individuals promotes varying images of out-groups. Positive images highlight commonalities for members of out-groups, thereby instilling trust. As trust increases for out-group members, in-group members are more likely to support inter-group cooperation (such as integration) because the coordination costs decrease. Second, trust in the larger member-states has greater explanatory power in explaining support than trust in the small, wealthy member-states or the less wealthy member-states. This is owing to the importance that power asymmetries of the member-states have on EU decision-making. Large population size translates to more votes at the EU level; however, wealth cannot be discounted because it can translate to a greater bargaining leverage and a perception of greater economic competency. Therefore, trust for other members will be important in conditioning support in proportion to both population size and per capita wealth. This leads to the final hypothesis: trust in Germany will be the most important variable (among all trust variables) because of its economic size.

### **Data Description and Testing Procedures**

The empirical analysis uses public opinion data from the Eurobarometer 44.1 (1995) survey. I chose this survey because it included key independent variables, namely those that measure trust in the EU member-states. The early 1990s included many innovations that increased the level of European integration. The survey was conducted 1 year following the Treaty on EU debate, at the time of the enlargement of the EU to include Austria, Finland and Sweden, and the beginning of the public debate on common currency. Therefore, the commission executed the questionnaire at a time when the future of the EU was highly salient.

I collapsed some of the national samples in these surveys, while others were not included: The Northern Ireland sample was included in the British sample and the East German sample was omitted given its unique attributes.<sup>3</sup> I weighted all national populations equally.<sup>4</sup> The analysis included eight of the 15 member-states. The Austrian, Danish, Finish, Irish, Luxembourgian, Portuguese and Swedish samples were excluded because these respondents were not asked the relevant trust questions. I used the ordered logit regression estimation procedure for the data analysis because the operationalization of the dependent variable uses the ordinal level of measurement.

### **Dependent variables**

The image-trust model examines citizen support for European integration in general terms. Easton (1965), however, points out that support comes in two varieties, utilitarian and affective. Using measures of both types of support is



useful to test the robustness of the model. I measure utilitarian support using a question that asks for a functional evaluation of European integration (Gabel, 1998). One question that is commonly used asks the respondent the following:

Generally speaking, do you think that your country's membership of the European Union is a good thing, bad thing, or neither good nor bad?

1. Good Thing
2. Bad Thing
3. Neither Good nor Bad

The responses for this question were recoded so that 'good thing' has a value of 3, 'bad thing' has a value of 1 and 'neither good nor bad' has a value of 2.

Affective support is given when an individual closely identifies with an object, such as European integration. If an individual personally identifies with European integration, she or he will not require a positive outcome in order to support it. One important question that directly measures the strength of individuals' European identity and therefore their degree of affective support (Gabel, 1998) asks,

In the near future do you see yourself as ... ?

1. (NATIONALITY) only
2. (NATIONALITY) and European
3. European and (NATIONALITY)
4. European only

The responses for values 2 and 3 were collapsed into one category and given the value of 2 because the two response categories do not appear to be different. 'European only' was recoded so that it has a value of 3.

### **Independent variables**

The central explanatory variables measure individuals' trust in EU member-states other than their own. I operationalize these variables through a series of questions asking the respondent to gauge her or his political trust in EU member-states.

The question asks,

Which, if any, European Union country or countries do you think can be more trusted politically than others?

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned




Figure 1: Trustworthiness of EU member-states.

The responses to this question also included individual evaluations of home countries. As the model specifies trust in other member-states, trust in the respondents' country was coded as missing. Figure 1 displays the aggregate outcome of these questions. The most trusted member-state is Germany and the least trusted is Greece. Given the variable's measurement, the regression estimations cannot include all national samples. At the very least, one national sample will need to be removed from the analysis. For example, an ordered logit regression estimate that includes the trust-Germany<sup>5</sup> variable cannot include German respondents because all the respondents are coded as missing. This is due to the listwise deletion procedure for a maximum likelihood estimation, which drops any observation that does not have values for all the variables. However, this will not be a large problem because the testing reflects the nature of the hypotheses.

The operationalization of the trust variables still poses a challenge. I wish to test the hypothesis that trust in Germany will have greater power in explaining support for regional integration than either Britain or France, the remaining larger states. I will assess the trust-Germany strength by using statistical and substantive significance. To make such an assessment, all three trust variables (trust-Britain, trust-France and trust-Germany) will be entered separately in each equation. This, of course, precludes the use of the British, French and German national samples. But to fully test the strength of the hypothesis, I will need to include all of the trust variables. In addition, including all the remaining samples in one equation is impossible given the missing observations. Therefore, the inclusion of the remaining samples (Belgian, Dutch,



Greek, Italian and Spanish) will require either of two possible procedures.<sup>6</sup> One procedure would be to estimate five different models for each dependent variable. Again, this requires that I drop one national sample from each equation. Owing to limited space and for the theoretical reason that calls for the inclusion of all five national samples, I use an alternative procedure. This procedure groups the remaining trust variables into one scale variable, which is labeled 'trust-remaining.' 'Trust-remaining' is a variable that measures individuals' level of trust for all the EU-12 member-states except Britain, France and Germany. I calculated this variable by determining the mean score of the remaining trust variables.<sup>7</sup> A mean score reduces the values of trust-remaining so that it has a range of 0–1. This allows me to easily compare all the trust variables. By having one variable that aggregates the trust level of the remaining member-states, I reduced the number of ordered logit regressions from 10 to 2 while estimating the effects of the remaining trust variables and including all of the five national samples.<sup>8</sup>

### **Control variables**

The analysis requires the use of control variables so that the results are understood in the light of some alternative hypotheses.<sup>9</sup>

### **Education**

To measure this variable, I used a standard Eurobarometer question: *How old were you when you stopped full-time education?* The Eurobarometer data code the responses into 10 groups: values from 1 to 8 begin with the age of 14 and end with the age of 21, with the value 9 assigned to those who finished after the age of 22. Of the sample, 11.5 per cent are individuals who are still studying and coded with the value 10. However, I recoded their values, assigning them a new value between 1 and 9 depending on their age. Individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to support integration because they are better positioned to take advantage of market liberalization (Gabel, 1998).

### **Income**

Respondents were asked to choose from among four annual household income categories (4 equals the highest income category). Wealthier individuals are more likely to support integration because capital liberalization will allow them to exploit more investment opportunities (Gabel, 1998). Lower income earners

are less likely to support integration because greater capital mobility will lessen their bargaining power (Gabel, 1998).

### **Occupation**

Different occupational categories would also vary in their opinion towards integration. Liberalized labor markets introduce greater competition that can favor some occupations (those with adaptable skills) over others (Gabel, 1998). For example, executives and other white-collar professionals are more likely to support integration than manual workers because they are more likely to be mobile between different industries and sectors. Also, the unemployed would be less favorable because economic liberalization tends to lower welfare benefits. Dummy variables were constructed based on the respondent's occupation: executive, other white-collar professional, manual worker, home-maker, self-employed and unemployed. In each model, 'self-employed' serves as the base category.

### **Government support**

Franklin *et al* (1994, 1995) show that support for integration is positively related to support of the respondents' government or the president in the case of France. They argue that as the heads of government or state negotiate the terms of integration, voters will project their evaluations of these leaders onto integration. As the Eurobarometer does not ask respondents their opinion of their home government or leaders, I constructed a variable that approximates this opinion. I identified the ruling party or coalition (or in the case of France, the president's party) for each member-state in 1995. The survey asks which party the respondent would vote for should there be a general election tomorrow. Those that selected a party that is in government received a value of 1. Those that selected a non-government party were coded 0.

### **Cognitive mobilization**

Another contending theory states that higher levels of political awareness and well-developed political communication skills are positively related to support for integration (Inglehart, 1970; Inglehart *et al*, 1991). Both allow individuals to better understand integration and therefore be less threatened by it. Individuals better understand integration when they are equipped to understand information regarding it. Also, overall information regarding integration



tends to be positive. I use the conventional method of measuring cognitive mobilization, which relies on two questions:

- (1) When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?
- (2) When you yourself hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives, or fellow workers to share your views? If so, does this happen often, from time to time, or rarely?

Replies were coded so that affirmative answers to both questions have the highest value.

### **War**

One of the founding reasons for European integration was to prevent war (Mitrany, 1966). If the countries of Europe became united economically, politically and socially, then war would be 'unthinkable.' Therefore, individuals would support integration if they believe it is necessary to prevent war. One Eurobarometer question asks,

Which of the following two statements comes closest to your opinion?

1. One of the main reasons for the European Union is to avoid war between member states.
2. Even if the European Union were dissolved tomorrow, a future war between any of its current member states is unthinkable.
3. I disagree with both (SPONTANEOUS).

I created a dummy variable coding those that agree with the first statement as 1 and 0 otherwise.

### **Age**

Age,<sup>10</sup> measured in years, is included in the regular set of demographic variables found in the Eurobarometer surveys. Age will control for any generational trends that may be present in the explanatory variables. It may also measure the level of flexibility. Older respondents can be less flexible and therefore less supportive of new ideas such as European integration.

### **Ideology**

Under certain circumstances ideological beliefs are a factor explaining support (Inglehart *et al*, 1991; Franklin *et al*, 1994; Marks, 2004; Ray, 2004). This is

placed in the analysis as a simple control. The respondents were asked to place themselves on a left–right continuum and then recoded into left (1), center (2) and right (3). The recoding is useful in assessing probability changes for each section of the ideological spectrum. Using the disaggregated measure produced similar substantive results.

### **Country effects**

Country dummies are included in each of the regressions. These dummy variables control for unmeasured effects that differ across countries in the analysis. Belgium is the baseline country in each of the regressions. Owing to space limitations, the coefficients and standard errors of the country dummies will not be reported.

### **Explaining Support for European Integration**

The overall results indicate that of all the trust variables, only trust in Germany has both statistical and substantive significance in explaining support for European integration. The explanatory strength of trust-Germany is similar to alternative variables. Ordered logit regression coefficients are reported for the purpose of demonstrating statistical significance. However, one cannot directly infer the influence independent variables have on the dependent variables using these coefficients. Instead, I will rely on the probability of individuals choosing a specific response for each dependent variable. Recall that only the Belgian, Dutch, Italian, Greek and Spanish national samples are included because of data and testing limitations.

The first column of Table 1 displays results using the functional evaluation dependent variable. The model supports the image-trust hypotheses while controlling for other factors. Of the trust variables, only trust-Germany has statistical significance. Trust in Germany increases the probability of evaluating membership in the EU as a ‘good thing’ by approximately 4 percentage points, holding all other variables constant at their means. This is similar to when respondents support their home government. In addition, the trust-Germany variable’s explanatory power is similar to those of two highly valued explanations for a positive functional evaluation: education and income. One unit increase of income corresponds with about a 2 percentage point increase in the probability that the average individual will evaluate EU membership as a ‘good thing.’ Education has the same effect. Another way of interpreting the results would be to plug in high values of those variables that are significant and calculate the likelihood that an individual would evaluate EU membership as a ‘good thing.’<sup>11</sup> If an individual mentioned trusting

**Table 1:** Support for European integration on trust in European member-states

	<i>Good/bad</i>	<i>Identity</i>
<i>Trust variables</i>		
Trust-Germany	0.219* (0.131)	0.362*** (0.121)
Trust-France	0.301 (0.194)	0.0547 (0.174)
Trust-Britain	0.019 (0.193)	-0.051 (0.173)
Trust-Remaining	0.634 (0.503)	0.967 (0.957)
<i>Control variables</i>		
Government support	0.263* (0.129)	-0.069 (0.113)
Left/right placement	-0.039 (0.067)	-0.124* (0.063)
Education	0.082*** (0.023)	0.109*** (0.022)
Age	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
Income	0.108* (0.055)	0.115* (0.052)
Cognitive mobilization	-0.030 (0.063)	-0.186*** (0.060)
War	0.147 (0.111)	0.095 (0.105)
Managers	0.040 (0.227)	0.157 (0.209)
White collar	-0.188 (0.191)	-0.282 (0.181)
Manual worker	-0.119 (0.177)	-0.368* (0.173)
Homemaker	0.360** (0.179)	-0.244 (0.170)
Unemployed	-0.236 (0.243)	0.047 (0.244)
$\tau_1$	-1.47 (0.456)	-0.797 (0.434)
$\tau_2$	-0.008 (0.453)	3.29 (0.452)
$\chi^2$	112.76***	189.64***
Cox-Snell $R^2$	0.066	0.107
$N$	2,119	2,132

Ordered logit. Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses.

\*\*\* $P \leq 0.001$ ; \*\* $P \leq 0.01$ ; \* $P \leq 0.05$  (one-tailed); Eurobarometer 44.1 (1995).

Germany, supported his or her government, had completed his or her education after the age of 22, and was at the highest income level, then he or she is approximately 84 per cent likely to evaluate membership as a 'good thing.' However, if an individual mentioned trusting Germany, but did not support his or her government, had completed his or her education at the age of 14, and was at the lowest income level, then he or she is approximately 60 per cent likely to evaluate membership as a 'good thing.'

The second model displays the results when substituting European identity for functional evaluation as the dependent variable. Overall, the results are somewhat similar to the previous model. Of the trust variables, only the trust-Germany variable was significant. If an individual trusts Germany, the probability of holding both a national and a European identity increases by about 7 percentage points and that of holding an exclusive European identity increases by about 1 percentage point. Support for the respondent's government was not significant. The ideology, education, income and cognitive mobilization are all significant. However, cognitive mobilization is not in the predicted direction. If an individual trusts Germany, states that he or she holds a right-wing ideology, completed his or her education after the age of 22, was at the highest income level, and scored at the highest level of cognitive mobilization, then there is an approximately 68 per cent likelihood that the individual would hold both a national and a European identity and an approximately 4 per cent likelihood that the individual would hold only a European identity. If an individual trusts Germany, states that he or she holds a left-wing ideology, completed his or her education at the age of 14, was at the lowest income level, and scored at the lowest level of cognitive mobilization, then there is an approximately 61 per cent likelihood that the individual would hold both a national and a European identity and an approximately 3 per cent likelihood that the individual would hold only a European identity.

## Conclusion

Evidence suggests that the image-trust model is important in a complete explanation of support for European integration. Social identity theory explains that individuals support inter-group cooperation when they perceive a commonality among groups' preferences. This perception develops from a group's positive image, given the imperfect information regarding a group's exact intentions. Trustworthiness is an attribute of the positive image. However, the impact that trust has on supporting inter-group cooperation is not uniform for all groups. When a smaller, less powerful group interacts with a larger, more powerful group, trust is a more significant factor in supporting cooperation. From the synthesis of the various theories, I hypothesized that



trust in the more economically powerful member-state Germany would be a more significant factor in explaining support for integration than trusting the other member-states.

Empirical evidence supports these arguments. The association between trust and individual support is different for the various member-states. Only trusting Germany had statistical significance in explaining support levels. This is due to the individual images of the more economically powerful member. Trusting Germany means that individuals lower their integration transaction costs. The more powerful member leads the process of integration, and their preferences are more influential in the final outcome. As a result, if individuals trust these countries, they will have higher support levels. Also, the substantive significance of trusting Germany was similar or larger than the control variables included. Overall, however, individuals rely on trusting Germany when determining their support for integration.

Three implications are evident from these results, each of which warrants further analysis. The first is the central role of the German state's image. As trust in Germany impacts support levels, its behavior in the integration process will have ramifications if its intentions are viewed as untrustworthy. Other members could act in a manner that would give it negative marks in the public's minds, but such behavior may not erode support levels. In the world of negotiations, the lack of a negative impact means that other member-states have greater room for maneuverability than Germany. German actions that reduce perceptions of its trustworthiness would matter more. In the case of Germany, the public requires it to have an image characterized by 'working for the good of Europe.' Although this implication is drawn from the results, its overall strength is not measurable with the available data.

The second implication involves the eastern expansion countries. With some exception, these new member-states are small. If the image-trust model is generalizable to individuals of the newer member-states, then Germany's image with regard to support levels is more important today than in 1995, the year of the survey used in this analysis.

The final implication also involves the potential generalizability of this model to other regions. East Asia has demonstrated some momentum towards regional integration with the continuing efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the potential formation of the East Asian Economic Community (EAEC). EAEC would expand the integration efforts of ASEAN by including China, Japan and Korea. In addition, the Asian Development Bank has begun tracking accounts using an Asian Currency Unit. The image-trust theory suggests that Japan's image in East Asia may not be different from that of Germany in Europe. In fact, there may be more of an impact given the lack of meaningful reconciliation between China and Japan. If this is the case, we may see that Japan's actions in the process of integration

(and therefore its image) would have a significant impact on public support. This proposition also requires testing before it can be considered valid.

### About the Author

Gaspare M. Genna is an Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at The University of Texas at El Paso. His research interests include explaining the success and failure of regional integration in both economic and political dimensions. His research appears in *European Union Politics*, *Review of International Political Economy*, *International Interactions*, *Latin American Perspectives* and *The Journal of Developing Societies* as well as in various books on integration. In addition, he is an associate editor of the journal *Politics and Policy*.

### Notes

- 1 Multiple identities in this paper refer to holding a national and European identity simultaneously.
- 2 See also Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990).
- 3 The East German sample may exhibit questionable results given its early phase of democratic transition and its recent EU membership, which may distort findings. One such fear is an inaccuracy of questionnaire responses due to the public's long legacy of authoritarianism.
- 4 The nature of the hypotheses requires an individual-level analysis. Although some researchers believe that aggregation of individual-level responses to opinion surveys removes random 'noise' from the measurements (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Stimson *et al.*, 1995), more recent research shows that the error associated with individual-level variation may be systemic (Duch *et al.*, 2000). Therefore, aggregating the data would not remove any associated 'noise,' but instead may harm the robustness of potential results owing to a lower number of observations.
- 5 For the purpose of brevity and clarity, I refer to each trust variable in the following manner: trust in Germany is 'trust-Germany;' trust in France is 'trust-France' and so on.
- 6 Another method would be to use a 'pairwise' selection method similar to one that is sometimes used in OLS estimations. However, I wish to test the hypothesis using the ordered logit regression, which is a maximum likelihood estimation. Such an estimation requires all variables for each observation to be included because they are needed to compute every likelihood value. Therefore, only a 'listwise' selection of observations can be used.
- 7 I calculated the 'trust-remaining' variable in the following manner. Let  $n$  represent the set of the remaining trust variables, which has nine elements:  $a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h$  and  $i$ . If the respondent comes from country  $a$  then her trust-remaining score =  $(b + c + d + e + f + g + h + i)/8$ . If the respondent comes from country  $b$  then his trust-remaining score =  $(a + c + d + e + f + g + h + i)/8$ , and so on. This then allows for all the five remaining national samples to be included without missing values.
- 8 I also estimated the 10 ordered logit regression equations using the disaggregated trust variables. The results followed the same pattern as the procedure reported in this paper.
- 9 I could not include two control variables in this study because the appropriate questions were not asked in the 1995 survey: satisfaction with EU-level democracy (McCormick, 1999; Schmitter, 2000; Rohrschneider, 2002) and postmaterialism (Inglehart, 1971, 1977a, b, 1990).



- 10 The Age and Education variables can affect each other in the model and possibly give inaccurate estimates. However, running both variables together and separately produces similar results.
- 11 All trust variables expect trust-Germany are set at zero; other variables not mentioned are set at their mean values.

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