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Soft Power: What it is, Why it's Important, and the Conditions Under Which it Can Be Effectively Used

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Introduction[1]

The concept of soft power has risen significantly in the hierarchy of scholarly and public debates on foreign affairs in recent years. In fact, few scholarly concepts have transcended the ivory towers of academia as vigorously as the concept of soft power, and its corollary smart power. The terms have been fairly visible in leading newspapers and popular magazines in articles on foreign affairs. The concepts have even captured the attention of leading decisionmakers around the globe, especially those in the U.S. The scholarly attention to the concepts has risen conterminously.[2] Yet with all this scholarly attention, the concept has evolved little theoretically,

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[2] Nye introduced the concept of soft power in "Soft Power" (1990b) and *Bound to Lead* (1990a) and further applied and developed it in Nye (2002, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2007). The literature on soft power has grown significantly over the past decade. Especially insightful treatments, both from a supportive and critical perspective, can be found in and Gallarotti (2004, 2010a and 2010b), Berenskoetter and Williams (2007), Baldwin (2002), Kurlantzick (2007), Yasushi and

and its historical applications have been limited and far from rigorously executed (being principally restricted to the analysis of contemporary U.S. foreign policy). In essence, the treatment of soft power has developed little beyond what its critics would refer to as "soft theory." Furthermore, there has been insufficient attention to the how changes in world politics have affected the importance of both soft and hard power. Finally, little has been said about the decisionmaking conditions required for leaders to appreciate and effectively use soft power. This article attempts to offer contributions that address all three of these deficiencies: to articulate a more rigorous and systematic understanding of the process of soft power, to explain how changes in world politics have raised the value of soft power relative to hard power, and finally to propose several prescriptions that will encourage decisionmakers to appreciate and effectively use soft power strategies in their foreign policies.

Understanding soft power is an especially important venture today. Aside from the need to better understand processes of power in international relations for intellectual reasons, the

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McConnell (2008), Lennon (2003), Ferguson (2003), Fraser (2003), and Meade (2004). Also, Johnston's (2008) work on socialization introduces categories that reflect processes of soft power.

The idea of "smart power" suggests that a foreign policy based on the combined use of both hard and soft power can yield superior results over one that relies exclusively on one or the other kinds of power. On smart power see, Nossel (2004), *Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission on Smart Power* (2007), and Etheridge (2009). Gallarotti's (2010b) Cosmopolitan power represents a theoretical development and historical application of the idea of smart power.

world is in an especially tumultuous and sensitive period at present, and this situation promises to be with us in the future. Indeed, while the issue of power is at the very core of interactions among nations, the study of international power is still quite underdeveloped relative to its importance in international politics (Baldwin 2002 and Berenskoetter 2007). Moreover, the traditional visions of power in international politics are poorly suited to understanding the modern cosmopolitan world system where there is a pronounced need for a more compatible or cosmopolitan theory of power in world politics (Gallarotti 2010b and Barnett and Duvall 2005, p. 40). The global system has changed rapidly and significantly. In fact, there has been a greater transformation in the lives of humans in the last 100 years than there has been in the preceding 12,000, since the rise of farming communities. We are presently caught in this break-neck wave of change. In a sense, the modern world system has placed us in an environment where everything is coming harder and faster. And with this speed and magnitude of outcomes, we are faced with ever greater threats and opportunities. This has created a far more "hazy power space" than has heretofore been embraced by scholars and decisionmakers (Beck 2005). National power has become transformed by these changes in ways that have made it far more difficult to gauge and consequently manage. This hazy power space requires new approaches to power and its changing role in world politics.

Greater attention to soft power itself reflects the changing landscape of international relations. It is no coincidence that such sources of power have been embraced by Neoliberalism and Constructivism, paradigms that have underscored the changing nature of world politics. In this case, theory has been influenced by events. While history has shown soft power always to have been an important source of national influence (certainly the case studies in hard and soft

power do), changes in modern world politics have raised its utility all the more (Gallarotti 2010a and 2010b).[3] Indeed the world has become and is continuing to evolve into a "softer world." World politics in the modern age has been undergoing changes that have elevated the importance of soft power relative to hard power. In this transformed international system, soft power will be a crucial element in enhancing influence over international outcomes because it has become more difficult to compel nations and non-state actors through the principal levers of hard power (i.e., threats and force). The world stage has become less amenable to Hobbesian bruts, and more amenable to actors that are sensitized to the soft opportunities and constraints imposed by this new global environment.

This article is divided into six sections. The first offers a systematic analysis of the process of soft power in the context of the faces of power underscored in the literature on power. The second section offers a further analysis of the relationship between hard and soft power. The third section presents a more formal articulation of soft power in the form of a simplified graphical representation of the process of soft empowerment. The fourth attempts to explain the growing importance of soft power in modern world affairs, and concomitantly shed light on the reasons for the growing public and scholarly attention to the concept. The fifth section presents important decisionmaking conditions that are necessary for effective employment of soft power policies. While the final section offers concluding remarks.

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[3] In case studies on power seeking that span history and issue areas, Gallarotti (2010a and 2010b) demonstrates that soft power could have significantly enhanced the influence of nations whose leaders were predominantly swayed by the allure of hard power (i.e., victims of a hard power illusion).

What is Soft Power?

The traditional vision of power that has prevailed among scholars of international politics

has been a Realist vision. [4] Realists have tended to espouse a hard concept of power, oriented

around the idea of nations using "material resources" to influence other nations (Barnett and

Duvall 2005, p. 40 and Schmidt 2007). The visions of the leading contemporary Realists

demonstrate this all too well. [5] There exist no greater spokesmen for contemporary Realism than

John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz. For Mearsheimer (2001, p. 55) "power is based on the

particular material capabilities that a state possesses." These material capabilities are essentially

"tangible assets" that determine a nation's "military" strength. Waltz (1979, p. 131) shows a

similar hard disposition in defining power. Power is defined in terms of capabilities, which in

turn consist of "size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability,

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[4] Like Keohane and Nye (1989), this analysis will not make cumbersome distinctions between

Realists and Neorealists.

[5] Gallarotti (2010b) has, however, demonstrated that both the classical and more modern

inspirations for contemporary Realists (Machiavelli, Hobbes, Thucydides, Carr and Morgenthau)

in fact underscored the important role of soft power in their visions of politics and society.

military strength, political stability and competence."[6] Indeed, Waltz (1979, p. 113) contents that "In international politics force serves, not only as the *ultima ratio*, but indeed as the first and constant one." Similarly, in his *War and Change in World Politics*, Gilpin (1981, p. 13) defines power as "the military, economic, and technological capabilities of states." National influence in the final analysis is dependent on an industrial-military complex that can be used to threaten or marshal force. Ultimately it is this "muscle" that fundamentally determines a nation's power. The emphasis falls on the tangible power lexicon that determines a nation's capacities to employ force in pursuit of its goals.

This fundamental reliance on tangible power emanates from the purity of Realist interpretations of anarchy, which in their most fundamental forms derive from the conventional Realist interpretations of Hobbes' account of the state of nature.[7] The sacred catechism of Realist tenets about the behavior of nations that follow from the condition of anarchy, defined "as no common power above actors to keep them in awe," leads actors to optimize tangible power resources (i.e., hard power) only because such resources are more certain to provide protection (whether it be defensive or offensive in nature). While even perceptions of power may

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[6] For Realists, power also derives from some intangible sources: Waltz' comepetence (i.e., leadership, policy, decisionmaking). Hence it is not tangibility that determines the principal distinction between soft and hard power. Realists would also embrace the utility of threat or other types of coercive posturing. But ultimately, these intangible measures rely on actual material capabilities to be effective, hence muscle is the key to power for Realists.

[7] For an alternative interpretation of Hobbes' state of nature, one that suggests that Hobbes' logic underscored the importance of soft power, see Gallarotti (2010b).

reduce the vulnerability of an actor, they are no guarantee against victimization by force, nor are they guaranteed to be able to deter and/or compel actors to behave in ways that make one less vulnerable. Tangible power resources, both in their manifest and symbolic (i.e., threat) use, can be employed to repel acts of force, and they can be used to compel actors into submission. All intangible, good will (i.e., soft) sources of power carry no such guarantees. They carry no guarantees that an act of aggression can either be confronted or perpetrated to eliminate a menacing actor.

The logic is akin to insurance protection in civil society where individuals often choose to purchase insurance against specific disasters to guarantee recovery. It is possible to be fully protected without such insurance by relying on sources of influence consistent with soft power, (i.e., relying on the goodwill of friends or relatives to protect against losses). But these are not guaranteed options like insurance compensation.

For the Realists, armies and control over other tangible resources that have military applications serve an insurance function in that a response against some potentially disastrous outcome is guaranteed (i.e., one actor is not dependent on others, such that an actor is controlling his/her own fate).[8] Hence, for the Realists, every nation that can indeed field an army should do so, even though reliance on soft power may reduce the probability of a military attack

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[8] Of course, a guaranteed response does not guarantee staving off disaster (e.g., your army might lose). But neither does the ownership of insurance always assure full compensation in the case of disaster.

vis-a-vis a pure military strategy. At least nations will have something to fight with in case good will fails to attract supporters.

While Realists have traditionally looked at a nation's influence in the world as a function of these tangible and coercive sources of power (threat and force), Nye has highlighted the influence that derives from a more intangible and enlightened source: a positive image in world affairs that endears nations to other nations in the world polity. This positive image derives from a number of sources: the domestic and foreign policies that nations follow, the actions they undertake, and/or national qualities that are independent of specific policies or actions (e.g., such as culture).[9] This positive image generates respect and admiration, which in turn render nations that have soft power more endearing in the eyes of other nations. The endearment can be so strong that other nations may even attempt to emulate the policies and/or actions of soft power nations, domestic and/or foreign.[10] Endearment serves to enhance the influence of soft power

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[9] In some cases, the endearing qualities may emanate from hard power resources themselves: such as the admiration generated by great economic achievements or an extensive international presence. But the hard power would have to be used according to the liberal principles under girding the process of soft power. This is discussed below.

[10] There is no single word that effectively describes the foundation of soft power. I use "endearment" as a term that is most representative. The terms admiration and respect could be used instead, but they insufficiently capture the quality of being liked or esteemed (i.e., you can respect and admire a nation more than you esteem or like it); which are often foundations for soft power. This does not mean that all the actions, qualities, and policies of soft power nations are necessarily endearing. In fact, other nations may dislike a number of qualities, actions and

nations as other nations will more readily defer to their wishes on international issues, and

conversely avoid confrontations. Hence, decisions about issues affecting the soft power nations

will be bounded within a somewhat favorable range of options for the soft power nations.[11] In a

similar vein, emulation creates a system of nations that are comporting themselves (actions,

policies, goals) in a manner consistent with the interests of the role-model nations. In these

ways, soft power ultimately configures the context within which other nations make decisions in

ways that favor the interests soft power nations (i.e., meta-power, discussed below). [12]

The principal difference between hard and soft power can be understood in the following

way: hard power extracts compliance principally through reliance on tangible power

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policies of a soft power nation. But the preponderance of such "output" by soft power nations

should endear those nations to other nations in some form however it is distributed among

respect, admiration, and esteem. For the purpose of elegance, I strive to use a broadly

representative term such as endearment, rather than an extended checklist of terms.

[11] While such a vision recalls some of the categories of Weberian charismatic authority, soft

power differs significantly from charisma. While soft power generates endearment, these

qualities are not necessarily consistent with Weber's vision of such authority, *qua* an authority

founded on perceptions of possessing "extraordinary," "exceptional," or "supernatural"

qualities (1978, p. 242).

[12] This recalls Lasswell and Kaplan's (1950, p. 156) process of "identification": where rank and

file members of a group adopt the values of their leaders out of respect and admiration. Even

Realists argue that such an identification process can manifest itself in the emulation of

successful military strategies and preferences for certain hard power resources (Waltz 1979).

resources—more direct and often coercive methods (either their symbolic use through threat or actual use), soft power cultivates it through a variety of policies, qualities, and actions that endear nations to other nations—more indirect and non-coercive methods. In this respect, hard power exhibits a greater conflict of interests relative to soft power. Hard power contemplates nations compelling other nations to do what the latter would ordinarily not otherwise do (Dahl's [1957] classic definition of power). Soft power, on the other hand, conditions the target nations to voluntarily do what soft power nations would like them to do, hence there is far less conflict of interests in the process of soft power.

Soft power represents a form of meta-power. Meta-power describes situations in which power relations themselves are embedded within some greater constellation of social relations that influence those relations and thereby influence final outcomes that derive from the interactions among actors. The structures of the bargaining boundaries are determined by the processes going on in the greater social relations within which they are embedded (i.e., endogenous rather than exogenous). To quote Hall (1997, p. 405)

"Meta-power refers to the *shaping* of social relationships, social structures, and *situations* by altering the matrix of possibilities and orientations within which social action occurs (i.e., to remove certain actions from actors' repertoires and to create or facilitate others)." (Italics in original)

Under conditions of meta-power, little can be inferred about the balance of power in a bargaining process merely by simply looking at the equilibria within the existing bargaining

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space. One actor may seem to be moving the other actor closer to his/her preferred position within the a bargaining space without in fact enjoying much influence over the seemingly compliant actor. Since the preferences or objectives are endogenous, and therefore the result of some greater constellation of social relations, the bargaining space itself can be the outcome of some greater configuration of power that has set possible equilibria in a range highly consistent with the interests or preferences of the seemingly compliant actor. Hence, even losing a struggle for immediate power within the prevailing bargaining space may in fact still be winning the bargaining game if some greater set of social relations can skew the bargaining space in favor of the compliant actor. This would be a case of losing a battle but winning the war.

Meta-power is often equated with agenda control. Nye (2004b, p. 9) himself refers to soft power as a control over the "political agenda" and attributes the origin of the concept to the work of Bachrach and Baratz (1962 and 1963). Agenda control, in its more precise context, would indeed represent a subset of meta-power. Within some collective bargaining process that is guided by a formal agenda, outcomes are circumscribed by the range of issues and strategic possibilities configured by the agenda setter him/herself. The agenda defines what issues will be raised, and in doing so therefore sets the bargaining boundaries.[13]

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[13] While both Lukes (1974) and Isaac (1987) underscore fundamental differences between their work and that of Bachrach and Baratz (1962 and 1963), all three visions of power in fact demonstrate an embedded (i.e., metapower) social quality in which the direct interaction between bargaining agents is itself conditioned by some greater constellations of social relations.

The work of Bachrach and Baratz and the formal work on agenda setting and control , referred to in the power literature as the second face of power, has been theoretically applied much more directly to a restricted set of political processes than the idea of meta-power generally deals with. [14] In this more restricted application, the idea of agenda control has been developed within issue-contexts such as constitutional design, budgetary politics, bureau-sponsor situations, logrolling, political decisionmaking structures, and majority-rule cycles. The work is tied together by a concern with the processes by which specific political issues are framed and institutions designed among adversarial actors competing in domestic political contests.[15] The adversarial relations among the bargaining agents in this second face of power is not abated through agenda control, hence there remains a strong conflict of interests among the bargainers. There are definite winner and losers in these contests over the agenda, and the losers are cognizant of having lost. In this respect, the second face of power is quite distinct from a process of soft power that generally is instrumental in abating conflicts of interests.

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[14] Four faces of power have been identified in the power literature. The first constitutes direct contests between actors, where the outcomes from bargaining are reflective of the relative distribution of power (i.e, the conventional view of power relations). The other three faces of power constitute meta-power relations. The work on agenda control has been designated as a second face of power. Barnett and Duvall's (2005) typology of international power conflates much of this second face into their concept of institutional power. The other two faces will be described below. On the four faces of power, see Digeser (1992), Berenskoetter (2007), and Barnett and Duvall (2005).

[15] For excellent surveys of the applications of agenda setting, see Mueller (1997 and 2003).

While agenda control could be consistent with some elements of soft power (through the construction of rules and support of institutions), the principal essence of the idea of soft power relates much closer to the third face of power, as seen in the work of Lukes (1974) and Isaac (1987), insofar as it represents the manifestation of empowerment through the process of co-optation. Lukes'(1974) idea of three-dimensional power, Isaac's idea of structural power, and Nye's idea of co-optation postulate that influence can be acquired if an actor is able to mold the preferences and interests of other actors so as to converge closer to its own preferences and interests. There is one fundamental difference however. The third image, or radical vision of meta-power , exudes a far greater conflict of interests among actors than does the idea of soft power.[16] This is because the logic is inspired by the idea of Gramscian (1988) hegemony, which in turn develops Marx's (1972) idea about the ideological legitimation of capitalism. The radical vision of meta-power contains a strong element of conflict in the social relations it contemplates because the process of co-optation imposes ideas that are against the objective interests of the groups being co-opted (Gramsci 1988 and Pellicani 1976).[17] As with Gramscian hegemony of the state, Neo-Marxists that study international relations posit that dominant nations also produce an "historical bloc" in dominating the international political system. This domination is exerted through the venues of institutions that are portrayed as legitimate guarantors of collective

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[16] I this context, I stress the ideas of Lukes as formulated in the first edition of *Power: A Radical View* (1974). In the second edition, Lukes (2005), as will be noted below, has acknowledged possibilities of power relationships that abate conflicts of interests, and hence are closer to the idea of soft power.

[17] Barnett and Duvall's category of structural power best conforms to this radical conception of meta-power.

interests in world politics, but in fact are oriented around the interests and preferences of dominant nations (Cox 1980 and 1987; Gill 1993; Sklair 1995; and Murphy 1994).

While this Gramscian hegemony, or the radical conception of the third face of power, would represent meta-power for dominant nations, it would nonetheless represent a kind of imposed control which manifests itself through a co-optive indoctrination. The radical vision is based on the idea of false consciousness, which suggests that the interests of subordinate nations have not really merged toward the interests of dominant nations, but that only a concerted effort to sell a universal ideology has inculcated a false sense of interests onto subordinate nations (Marx 1972, Lukes 1974 and Gramsci 1988). Hence, it would not qualify as soft power because in such hegemony there is an element of adversarial manipulation, which would be an illiberal means of generating compliance--i.e., fooling subordinate nations. Hence, there is most definitely a strong conflict of interests in this radical vision of power.[18]

Soft power generally eschews a strict conflict of interests as posited in the second and third faces of power. This can be clearly seen in Nye's (2004b, p. 10) application of the idea in the context of Bretton Woods. His own interpretation of the Bretton Woods institutions differs sharply from the Neo-Marxist contemplation of such institutions as modes of capitalist hegemony, and as such Neo-Marxists see these institutions as the creators of a false

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[18] Even Dahl's own conception of power is not necessarily grounded in a conflict of interests. Interestingly, Dahl's classic work *Who Governs* (1961), as influential as it has been, has nonetheless been given insufficient credit as a thorough statement about the faces of power (Polsby's 1980).

consciousness among developing nations. This reflects a fundamental disjuncture from a Nyeian vision that sees liberal principles of economic relations as truly beneficial for all nations, hence socialization of less developed nations into the liberal-capitalist mode is not false consciousness but represents a true facilitator of their objective interests. Since both external observers such as scholars and national leaders themselves are able to come to the realization of the imperialist intent behind radical attempts at hegemony in some longer run, then not only would such radical hegemony not qualify as soft power, but would in fact diminish the soft power of the imperialist nations perpetrating such attempts at adversarial indoctrination. Hence, nations can rise above a sense of false consciousness, and consequently the process of radical hegemony compromises rather than creates soft power.[19] But even more generally, it is clear from the sources of soft power (see Table 1 below) that such behavior modes would indeed be generally considered beneficial to any nation willing to adopt them.

Lukes' (2005) second edition of *Power: A Radical View* marshals revisions of the ideas on power he articulated in the first edition (1974) by proposing categories of power relations that eschew conflicts of interests. In this second edition, he critiques his earlier conceptualization of power in the first edition by citing that this earlier conceptualization was unsatisfactory for, among other reasons, equating "dependence inducing power with domination." In this regards he draws on Wartenberg's (1990) distinction between "domination" and "beneficent power." In this latter manifestation, notes Lukes, power can be exercised in a way that can be "productive,

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[19] The New International Economic Order (NIEO), as a conter-hegemoic movement, demonstrated that developing nations are not easy victims of false consciousness (Gosovic and Ruggie 1976).

transformative, authoritative and compatible with dignity" (Lukes 2005, pps. 84, 109). He cites

examples of such manifestations of power: the mother, teacher or therapist (Lukes 2005, pps.

84, 85). This is an affirmation that actors can benefit from the power of others, and this

possibility breaks down the conflation of power and domination (i.e., power as conflict of

interests) that pervades his logic of power relations in the first edition of the book (Lukes

1974).[20] Indeed, such categories would be more consistent with the process of soft power than

his purely radical notion expressed in the first edition of the book. Notwithstanding the

acknowledgement about such possibilities, however, the second edition of the book still exudes a

fairly radical tone with respect to the nature of power, *qua* a process that unfolds within a general

conflict of interests among actors.[21]

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[20] There is also a possible reference to such categories in the first edition, in what Lukes (1974,

p. 32) calls "rational persuasion." Lukes himself is perplexed as to the nature of this category of

power. In one respect rational persuasion is adversarial in that it may get an actor to think and

do that which he/she would not otherwise do, however, in another respect, it is possible that the

acceptance of the persuasive argument derives from a sense of a harmony of interest on the part

of the persuaded actor. In any case, Lukes (1974, p. 33) does not elaborate on the significance of

this concept for his theory of power, preferring to shuffle it off to a philosophical dustbin as a

"fundamental (Kantian) antinomy between causality, on one hand, and autonomy and reason, on

the other."

[21] Luke's (2005, pps. 84, 85) undertakes a somewhat cursory analysis of power as beneficent in

this respect: his analysis falls far short of systematically integrating such forms of power into his

overall logic of three dimensional power. With respect to this relation between power and

conflict of interests in Lukes' work, Morriss' (2006) underscores the continuity of Lukes' logic

Finally, there is the fourth face of power. This brings up the relation between Foucault's (1980) vision or "analytics" of power (which Barnett and Duvall refer to as productive power) and the idea of soft power. In one respect soft power is closer to Foucault's vision of power than the radical vision in that both soft power and Foucault eschew ideas of conflict of interests to a far greater extent than radical visions. While Foucault's analytics of power, like third face or radical visions, embrace a broad indoctrination of society which imprints a particular consciousness onto members of that society, the path to "resistance" for Foucault is far more difficult to access as compared to the radical visions (which posit an awakening that will eventually lead to a collective resistance to, and overthrow of, the dominant system). In this respect, manifest conflict among society and those that might be able to resist it (and these subversives, if they could exist at all, would be few and far between for Foucault) is much more muted for Foucault. This reflects the pervasive and compelling effects of the workings of power networks in society, networks which dominate every facet of knowledge and social relations. Indeed, in such a setting, independently ascertaining what objective interests might be is a truly imposing task on the part of individuals. Hence, processes of "subjectifcation" in Foucault's analytics are far stronger than the processes of Granscian hegemony posited in radical visions of power. But the resulting greater harmony within society, as compared to the radical vision of power, is different from the limited conflicts of interests posited by soft power. In the case of soft

across the two editions. He notes that while Lukes' acknowledges the possibilities of power in the context of a greater harmony of interests, Lukes' analytical focus in the second edition of the book is still essentially oriented around power unfolding within an adversarial context. As Morriss (2006, p. 132) notes, Lukes "is only looking at power that demeans someone."

power, limited conflict reflects the proximity of interests between the dictates of prevailing social relations and the interests of society at large. While in Foucault's analytics, it reflects the greater difficulty of escaping the pervasive power networks in society in order to determine what objective interests would be (Digeser 1992, p. 981-983).

Foucault's inconsistencies on the question of resistance creates some leeway in the nature of the process of subjectification. At the most extreme level, the process is so pervasive and engulfing that it would be impossible to ascertain objective interests independently from those which are imprinted through the subjectification process . At a more moderated conceptualization of subjectification, individuals can arrive independently at "essential interests" and "true desires," and hence conflicts of interests could arise from resistance to prevailing networks of power (Digesser 1992, p. 983). While it is indeed the case that Neoliberals (within which Nye's work can certainly be positioned) envision mixed games among nations (i.e., games that contain both elements of conflict and cooperation), the process of soft power itself represents a subset of neoliberal logic that more emphatically embraces the idea that nations can ascertain their objective interests and that there are abundant possibilities of harmony among those interests.

Furthermore, for Foucault the process of the realization of power is "omnipresent," pervasive in every "background condition" underlying all social relations. Thus, it represents an all-encompassing undercurrent of norms, values, ideas and knowledge that inspire the very processes of socialization at the most general levels of human interaction (Brass 2000 and Digeser 1992). In this respect, the manifestations of power are neither specifically contextual nor situational. Soft power manifests itself in more specific contexts and situations – that is, having

to do with the relationship between the actions and policy orientations of particular nations on the one hand and the responses to these actions and orientations by other nations on the other hand.[22]

It has become all too common to equate the concept of soft power with the influence emanating from the seductive cultural values created by media and fashion (Fraser 2003). Soft power is much more than that. Soft power can be systematically categorized as deriving from two general sources: international sources (foreign policies and actions) and domestic sources (domestic policies and actions), with multiple sub-sources within each. All of these sources ultimately contribute to a positive image that endears nations with soft power to other nations, which in turn enhances these soft power nations' influence in world politics. Hence, the sources of soft power converge onto one process of empowerment. The policies and actions that deliver soft power are enumerated below and presented in Table 1.

Under international sources, first, nations must demonstrate a pronounced respect for international law, norms, and institutions. This commitment to "the rules" exudes dependability, sensitivity, legitimacy, and disposition against violence. This general commitment is the principal source of international soft power, as the sources that follow are more specific elements of this more general orientation.

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[22] On Foucault's vision of power, see especially Foucault (1980), Digeser (1992), Brass (2000), and Barnett and Duvall (2005).

In this respect nations must embrace a multilateral disposition and eschew a overly unilateralist posture in the promotion of their foreign policies. Disregarding multilateralism can be costly. Nations relying decreasingly on multilateral fora to respond to threats or problems alienate regime members and consequently risk the possibility of marginalization in those regimes, which in turn diminishes such fora as viable options in attending to foreign objectives. At worst, the fora themselves could increasingly function in ways that are adversarial. Similarly, respect for alliance commitments and treaties are crucial to the creation of soft power. As with the above two sources of soft power, forsaking erstwhile allies and international commitments in favor of unilateral solutions produces a maverick image that comprises traditional sources of power embedded in multilateral support networks. Furthermore, nations must be willing to sacrifice short-run particularistic interests in order to contribute toward substantive collaborative schemes that address important multilateral problems. Consistent with international commitments and fair play, nations will garner considerable respect by foregoing short-run national objectives for the sake of the collective good. Finally, a nation must pursue policies of economic openness. This dictates a liberal foreign economic policy orientation. Free trade in goods and open capital markets represent a commitment to maintaining opportunities for economic growth in other nations. The greater this commitment, the more elevated will be the national image.

With respect to domestic sources of soft power, Nye notes (2004b, pp. 56,57), "How [a nation] behaves at home can enhance its image and perceived legitimacy, and that in turn can help advance its foreign policy objectives." Domestic sources can be broadly categorized under two rubrics: the power inherent in culture and in political institutions. With respect to politics,

institutions must be founded on strong principles of democratic agency. The political system must deliver democracy, pluralism, liberalism, and constitutionalism. Indeed, it will be oriented around the political empowerment of civil society and reducing political gaps (Huntington 1971). Culturally, soft power is created by social cohesion, an elevated quality of life, freedom, abundant opportunities for individuals, tolerance, and the alluring characteristics of a lifestyle that garners great admiration and even emulation (Nye 2002, pps. 113,114,119,141). Numerous observes have underscored the power emanating from an admired culture, in these cases, that of the U.S. (Klein 1999, Barnet and Cavanagh 1996, Sklair 1991, and LeFeber 1999).

Both domestic and international sources of soft power reflect an emphasis on policies and actions that exude an orientation of justice, collective concern, and rules of fair play. In this respect we clearly see pervasive principles of political liberalism at work in both sources.

Table 1. Foundations of Soft Power

International Sources	Domestic Sources
Respect for international laws, norms, and institutions	Culture --Pronounced Social Cohesion --Elevated Quality of Life --Freedom --Sufficient Opportunities --Tolerance --Alluring Lifestyle
Fundamental reliance on multilateralism, and disposition against excessive unilateralism	
Respect international treaties and alliance commitments	Political Institutions --Democracy --Constitutionalism --Liberalism/Pluralism --A Well Functioning of Government Bureaucracy
Willingness to sacrifice short-run national interests in order to contribute toward the collective good	
Liberal foreign economic policies	

More on the Relationship between Soft and Hard Power

While the difference between soft and hard power revolves around the difference between extracting compliance with (usually) tangible resources as opposed to cultivating voluntary compliance through a positive image that endears soft-power nations in the world community, the relationship between hard and soft power is hardly simple. Indeed, their relationship is complex and interactive. The two are neither perfect substitutes nor are they rigid complements. Often, they can actually reinforce one another. In fact, it will often be the case that each set of power resources require at least some of the other for maximum effectiveness (i.e., Cosmopolitan power, discussed below). Hence soft power resources can enhance hard power, and vice versa. Certainly, a strong positive image can garner many more allies, which in turn can bolster a nation's defenses. And of course, committing troops to defend a nation against invasion will certainly garner a better image for the protector state. Gilpin (2002) underscores the extent to which the global economic primacy enjoyed by America in the post-war period has been founded on the Pax Americana, which American military primacy has sustained. Furthermore, the possession of hard power itself can make a nation a role model in a variety of way. For example, Realists such as Waltz (1979) underscores the image generated by large military arsenals and successful military strategies. As a symbol of national success, this extensive hard

power generates significant soft power by enhancing respect and admiration.[23] But these hard

power resources cannot be used in ways that undermine that respect and admiration. In other

words, they cannot be used in ways that deviate from the politically liberal principles under

girding soft power (see Table 1). So even the employment of force can generate soft power if it

is used in the service of goals widely perceived as consistent with such principles: e.g., for

protecting nations against aggression, peacekeeping, or liberation against tyranny.

As much as each kind of power can reinforce the other, it is also the case, of course, that

the use of one kind of power may also detract from the other kind. Hard power carries obvious

disadvantages for image if it is manifest in an aggressive-unilateralist style: invasion,

imperialism, economic sanctions, and threats. But actions that enhance soft power can be perhaps

even equally costly in terms of sacrificing hard power. This is the position that many American

unilateralists take in their distaste for the entangling limitations on individual actions created by

international agreements: e.g., global warming agreements will stunt American economic

growth, Law of the Sea will limit access to important resources, the ICC may compromise the

effectiveness of military operations overseas.

Moreover, the separation of the two types of power resources can be somewhat arbitrary

and imperfect categorically. Giving international aid for example may enhance a nation's image,

but may also provide liquidity to purchase donor exports or to pay back debts to banks in donor

nations. Here, a single instrument generates both hard and soft power. Similarly, the use of

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[23] Gallarotti (2010b) demonstrates a number of historical cases in which economic hard power

was an important source of emulation.

aggressive military force can generate a positive image with nations who are benefiting from such an initiative: e.g., liberating Kuwait and protecting Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War (another dual effect in the use of a single-power resource). Moreover, the exercise of each of the kinds of power resources has complex consequences within its own specific context. The use of hard power resources can in fact diminish the hard power position of a nation in various ways. For example, military atrocities may stiffen resistance in a manner that weakens an aggressor nation if the victims either grow to hate the aggressor or sense that such atrocities can be tolerated. Also, the use of threats that are never carried out may diminish the influence of the nation issuing such treats. Similarly, the use of soft power resources may also adversely affect a nation's image no matter how innocuous the resources. A clear example is the contempt that many hold for international development organizations (IMF, World Bank) because they see such institutions as promoting neo-imperialistic economic relations between North and South. In a related example, while many embrace the values of Western culture, others see them as a source of cultural imperialism and contamination.[24]

Another interesting interaction effect among the two kinds of power is that the use of one set of resources may either economize on or enhance the need for another set of resources. A positive image may create outcomes within such favorable boundaries for a nation that it actually reduces its need to use hard resources (i.e., carrots and sticks) in order to gain compliance on important issues. For example, a reputation for loyalty may attract more allies whose own loyalty can vitiate the need to expend hard resources in order to achieve one's foreign policy goals.

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[24] Reflective of this view are national laws that limit the foreign content of media transmissions. On cultural imperialism, see Sklair (1995) and LeFeber (1999).

Moreover, accepting restraints on one's unilateral actions through ratifying a treaty may not adversely affect relative hard-power positions if such an action fosters similar restraints by other nations, as would be the case with an arms reduction treaty. Hence, a reduction of hard power has been compensated by a soft effect: others have accepted similar reductions. However, intransigence to multilateralism may in fact reduce one's hard power position even though it frees that nation from restraint. Such would occur if reactions to such intransigence resulted in a more antagonistic international system. In such cases, the intransigent nation would have to compensate in other ways (both hard and soft) to restore its former position of influence (Nye 2002, pp. 9,10 and 2004b, pp.25-27).

It should be noted that although there is a tendency to equate hard power with tangible resources and soft power with intangible resources, their principal distinction does not depend on tangibility. [25] Even for Nye (2002, p. 8 and 2004b, p. 5) , whose language highlights a distinction between tangible resources and intangible resources, tangibility is not a strict source of differentiation among the two categories. Nye's own logic would allow for intangible applications of hard power. For example, a threat is intangible, but a threat forces a mode of action onto another nation involuntarily, thus violating liberal rules of fair play (Baldwin 2002). Furthermore, a large military force can generate attraction effects through "perceptions of invincibility" (Nye 2004b, p. 26). Nations may show deference and even admiration because

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[25] Indeed, critics of soft power underscore a problematic distinction between hard and soft power based on tangibility. See Baldwin (2002) and Meade (2004).

they want to be associated with a winner.[26] Conversely, soft power can be enhanced through the use of tangible resources, as tangible resources may be necessary to institute the policies and actions that deliver soft power.

But ultimately, as interconnected as the two sources of power are, and thus could share many qualities (like tangibility and intangibility, international effects, etc.), the real differentiation of power is in the context of its use. In order to effect soft power, the context of actions (whether tangible or intangible) must be a manifestation of politically liberal principles (see Table 1). In this vein, hard power itself can be used in a manner that engenders the respect and admiration of other nations if it manifests itself in actions consistent with these principles (e.g., peacekeeping, protecting against aggression or genocide, or providing economic aid on terms favorable to recipient nations). Hard power, of course, will fail or be counterproductive in enhancing influence when it is used illiberally. [27] There is no inherent incrimination of hard

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[26] Another example of the soft power generated by an extensive military presence would highlight the good will promoted by American civil-military functions abroad: education, political stabilization, provision of public goods.

[27] This clarifies what many believe to be an inconsistency in the process of soft power. If indeed hard power can generate feelings of respect and admiration, then one is tempted to conclude that individuals such as Hitler, Napoleon, and Genghis Khan could also enjoy soft power owing to the admiration they would receive as a result of marshaling a preponderant military force. And this would be a surprising outcome to people who purport to understand the meaning of soft power. No doubt, a strong military can and has generated respect and admiration, and even endearment for those that benefited from the uses of that military force. But while individuals

power as necessarily evil. Ultimately, tangible resources can deliver both hard and soft power. But tangible resources are merely instruments and are no better or worse than the manner in which they are used.

A Model of Soft Empowerment

We can model soft empowerment within the context of a bargaining space.[28] Figure 1 represents a bilateral bargaining space between nations M and N with several possible equilibrium points. This model represents an unembedded power (i.e., not meta-power) contest in which hard power (both actual and symbolic use) is solely responsible for determining the

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such as these conquerors did generate much admiration with respect to the power they were able to amass and exercise, they surely compromised that soft power and much more as a result of the way they used it. Surely, few leaders would conceive of such conquerors as role models, especially in the modern world system. Interestingly, Hitler, as a fledgling head of state, enjoyed enormous soft power as a perceived victim of an unfair peace settlement, one which abused Germany both politically and economically. This soft power was quickly compromised when he set about persecuting Jews in Germany and began his rampage of conquest across Europe (Gallarotti, p. 140).

[28] This is a simple model of soft power. A more elaborate formal model of soft power in the context of Cosmopolitan power is presented in Gallarotti (2010b).

bargain outcomes or equilibria.[29] National goals or objectives on the bargaining space are

defined continuously over possible equilibria ranging from point M, representing nation M's

preferred outcome (i.e., that bargaining outcome completely consistent with M's national

goals—M's point of bliss), to point N, representing nation N's point of bliss. This power contest

or bargaining process could be consistent with either a relational or a proprietary model of power

in that outcomes could be modeled as functions of the strict balance of power of material

resources or also as functions of a more complex balance of influence among nations M and N.

National goals or objectives are completely exogenous or given in this bargaining space (i.e.,not

shaped by any greater constellation of social relations and hence are static). Equilibria in this

contest will converge toward consistency with some balance of resources and/or relational

factors among the respective actors. Hence, E_3 would reflect an outcome strongly beneficial to

nation N and antithetical to the interests of nation M: here nation N has a strong superiority in the

relational balance of resources or influence. E_2 would show greater equality in the power

contest, with an outcome that shows an equilibria that roughly divides the spoils among M and

N. E_1 would be the antithesis of E_3, with nation M being the superior nation with respect to the

relational balance of resources or influence, and therefore getting the lion's share of the spoils in

the bargaining contest.

Figures 1-4 approximately here

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[29] For simplicity, we assume a one dimensional bargaining space, but this depiction of bargaining

need not preclude mutual gains under assumptions of soft power. as will be demonstrated below.

Figures 2-4 represent embedded power or meta-power contests. In these representations,

nation N enjoys the benefits of soft power. Now national goals are endogenous in that they are

embedded in a greater constellation of social relations, hence are variable according to the effects

of this greater constellation. Figures 2 and 3 represent a change only in the goals or objectives of

nation M. In both cases, the goals of nation M have shifted closer to the point of bliss for N, thus

shrinking the bargaining space in favor of nation N. Bargaining outcomes will fall in a range that

is closer to the objectives of nation N. In Figure 2 the new space is M_1-N, while in Figure 3 the

new space is more constricted, now being M_2-N. Hence, nation N enjoys greater soft power in

Figure 3 than it does in Figure 2.[30] Aside from manifesting itself in an endogenous manner (a

shifting of the goals of nation M), soft power can manifest itself in an exogenous manner

through deference. In this case, given the new bargaining space, N can make additional gains by

shifting the equilibrium closer to its point of bliss through M's accommodations within the

prevailing bargaining space. This would be represented in Figure 2 by a shift from equilibrium

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[30] This should not suggest a conflict of interests in the shifting of national goals as a result of

soft power. Adapting the goals of the role-model nations may in fact work better in terms of the

objective national interests of the nation that has shifted its goals. Nations adopting the

objectives and goals of others should tend to benefit from those adoptions. There will not be a

false consciousness at work in the long run as nations can clearly ascertain what is in their best

interest. Even so, in the bargaining space, even without false consciousness, some conflict of

interests still remains among nations as their points of bliss are not the same. Hence, soft power

diminishes conflicts of interests, it does not purge them completely. And this is consistent with

the mixed-game orientation of Neoliberal visions that embrace processes of soft power.

E_2 to E_3 . In this case, N has enjoys a compound benefit of soft power: not only did the bargaining space shift in its favor, but the bargaining equilibrium within that space also shifted closer to N's point of bliss.

   We could also envision a situation of mutual gain within an endogenous process. Let us assume that with the introduction of soft power we move from some previous state of E_1 in Figure 1 to E_2 in Figure 2. In this case, under the new structure of objectives (M_1-N) both parties would have made gains from their previous state in Figure 1, as the new equilibrium is now closer to both points of bliss. Figure 3, with new bargaining space is M_2-N, demonstrates a bargaining space that is constricted even more in favor of nation N. In this case, all possible equilibria will fall closer to N's point of bliss viv-a-vis the bargain space in Figure 2. In Figure 4 we see a bilateral manifestation of soft power, where both nations enjoy some of the benefits of soft power. This is depicted by a mutual movement of points of bliss, with the new bargaining space being M_3-N_2. The effects of soft power on bargaining strength would depend upon the previous state or point of reference. If the actors were previously at a bargaining structure defined in Figure 1, then nation N would be the preponderant beneficiary (i.e., have greater soft power vis-a-vis nation M). Here, nation M's goals would shift far more than did nation N's toward the other's point of bliss. But if the previous state suggests a bargaining structure defined by Figure 3, then you would have a much more balanced outcome, with both nations enjoying equal gains from soft power in the bargaining structure due to equal movements of goals away from the former points of bliss (M_3-M_2 = N-N_2). Such an outcome could also create mutual gains if the nations remained at equilibrium E_3 from one state to the next. The equilibrium is now closer to each nation's respective point of bliss.

The Growing Importance of Soft Power

Other paradigms (Neoliberalism and Constructivism) have arisen to challenge the scholarly primacy of Realism, and concomitantly introduced alternative vision of power oriented more around soft than hard power. It is no surprise that such alternative visions have been nurtured in an historical breeding ground that has seen a transformation of international politics, a transformation that has augmented the utility of soft power. A number of changes in world politics stand out as especially transformative forces elevating the utility of soft power relative to hard power.

First, there is the impact of interdependence and the pervasive process that compounds its effects on power: globalization. The diminishing utility of hard power is partly the result of a specific political, social and economic context created by modernization: that context is interdependence (Herz 1957, Osgood and Tucker 1967, Keohane and Nye 1989, and Nye 2004a). Using sticks, or whatever kinds of coercive methods, generate considerable costs in an interdependent world. Indeed in such an interpenetrated world, punishing or threatening other nations is tantamount to self-punishment. In such an environment strategies for optimizing national wealth and influence have shifted from force and coercion to cooperation. But even more elusive than the quest to limit the fallout from coercion and force in such an environment, is the quest to impose some specific outcomes onto targeted actors. In an interpenetrated world, targeted actors have many more avenues of escape. Transnational actors and national leaders could avoid being compelled by carrots or sticks because of their free reign and access to the international political economy. They can merely escape coercion or buy-offs by taking refuge in

numerous possible international havens. In one important respect, this modern day "economic feudalism" created by interdependence is shifting the nexus of power from the territorial state to transnational networks (Nye 2002, p. 75).

Globalization has strongly compounded the effects of interdependence by enhancing the process of social and economic interpenetration in the international system. The global age has given civil societies the capacity to receive and transmit information, as well as move across nations with ever greater speed and magnitude. These greater links compound the interdependence among networks containing both transnational actors and national governments. As the international stakes of these transnational actors grow, so do their incentives to expend political capital within their own domestic political systems to reinforce the economic ties between their nations (Milner 1988). This enhanced access to foreign governments and citizens created by globalization also compounds the effects of democratization in creating political impediments to the use of hard power (Haskel 1980). These forces have both diminished possibilities of political conflict and have thus shifted the epicenter of competition away from force, threat, and bribery (Rosecrance 1999 and Nye 2004b. p. 31).

Third, the costs of using or even threatening force among nuclear powers have skyrocketed. Indeed, current leading scholarship in the field of security has proclaimed that the nuclear revolution has been instrumental in creating a new age of a "security community," in which war between major powers is almost unthinkable because the costs of war have become too great (Jervis 1988, 1993, 2002). Mueller (1988) reinforces and modifies the nuclear deterrent argument by introducing the independent deterrent of conventional war in an age of

advanced technology. In short, the utility of respect, admiration and cooperation (i.e., soft power) has increased relative to the utility of coercion with respect to the usefulness of the instruments of statecraft. Moreover, the exorbitant dangers that the hard resources of military technology have produced require far greater use of the instruments of soft power in order for nations to achieve sustainable security in the long run.

Fourth, the growth of democracy in the world system has served to compound the disutility of coercion and force as the actors bearing the greatest burden of such coercion and force (the people) have political power over decisionmakers. In this respect, the process of democratic peace has altered power relations among nations (Doyle 1997, Russett and Oneal 2001, and Ray 1995). As individuals become politically empowered, they can generate strong impediments to the use of force and coercion. But even beyond the enfranchisement effect, democratic cultural naturally drives national leaders towards the liberal principles manifest in the cannons of soft power. Hence, national leaders are much more constrained to work within softer foreign policy boundaries, boundaries that limit the use of force, threat and bribery. Rather, outcomes are engineered through policies more consistent with liberal democratic legitimacy.

Fifth, social and political changes have made modern populations more sensitive to their economic fates, and consequently far less enamored of a "warrior ethic" (Jervis 2002 and Nye 2004b, p. 19). This "prosperous society" has compounded the influence of economics and made economic interdependence that much more compelling as a constraint to the utility of hard power. With the rise of this welfare/economic orientation and the spread of democracy, national leaders have been driven more by the economic imperative and less by foreign adventurism as a

source of political survival (Gallarotti 2000 and Ruggie 1983). This prosperous society, through the political vehicle of democracy, has shifted not only domestic but also foreign policy orientations. The economic welfare concern has put a premium on cooperation that can deliver economic growth and employment, and worked against hard power policies that might undercut such goals.

Finally, the growth of international organization and regimes in the post-war period has embedded nations more firmly in networks of cooperation: themselves being fundamental components of soft power. As these networks have evolved, so too has the soft power of norms and laws they represent increased (Krasner 1983 and Keohane and Nye 1989). In such a world, unilateral actions that disregard these institutions become far more costly. Such institutions have effectively raised the minimum level of civil behavior in international politics, and consequently raised the importance of soft power significantly. Expectations have gravitated more toward the sanctity of such institutions, and hence hard power policies and actions that are inconsistent with these expectations generate greater fallout relative to an environment where no such institutional superstructure existed. Consequently, the networks of cooperation have made nations far less likely to extract compliance in what are considered illegitimate ways (i.e., through force, coercion, or bribery).

Prescriptions for Instituting Strategies of Soft Power

Even under an acknowledgement that soft power can promote the optimization of national influence and security, harnessing the benefits of soft power will depend on decsionmakers' abilities to appreciate and exploit such benefits. Decisionmakers will have to be especially perspicacious in evaluating and monitoring their portfolios of power in order to fully integrate soft power into their foreign policies. History has shown that decisionmakers have in fact been hesitant to employ soft power strategies even in the face of devastating failures when over-relying on hard power strategies (Gallarotti 2010a and 2010b). To this purpose, several decisionmaking strategies will be crucial. But such strategies will be especially challenging because of common psychological tendencies and cognitive limitations among humans. Hence, decisionmakers will have to be especially vigilant and enlightened in the ways they assess and monitor national influence if they are to enjoy the benefits of soft power.

First, theories of power must be continually questioned and power audits continually undertaken with significant sensitivity to the changing face of power in world politics. This would mean constantly assessing and reassessing the effectiveness of a nation's principal sources of influence in world affairs. Sources that perform well should be enhanced. Conversely, sources that perform poorly need to be re-evaluated, and possibly reconfigured or eliminated. Moreover, national leaders need to clearly ascertain changes in world politics and how these changes affect the risks and returns generated by differing sources of power. Changes may, in fact, cause leaders to conceptualize and rely on completely new sources of power heretofore neglected as important wedges of influence in world politics. Continuous auditing will be a necessary vehicle for appreciating alternative power resources often neglected by conventional

visions of power. It is the case that many such sources are in the soft power category. Hence, all such alternatives must remain viable options to decisonmakers committed to enhancing national influence. But such a strategy is absolutely necessary for placing decisionmakers in a position to shift their reliance away from hard power resources. This is because hard power resources can exude a hypnotic allure. They are easy to count, given the fact that they tend to be largely tangible. Moreover, a large arsenal of such tangible resources can create a kind of moral hazard effect: large stores of tangible resources may make decisionmakers perceive limited vulnerability, hence they may be lax in pursuing important soft power strategies.

As important as this strategy will be to the optimization of national influence, it will prove difficult to realize because it is inconsistent with common tendencies of human psychology and cognitive limitations. People are quite hesitant to spill the apple cart on pre-existing beliefs and theories. In this respect people tend to be cognitively rigid: they think paradigmatically. Consequently, theories or paradigms that people use to understand the world are fairly stable and compelling. Moreover, it is uncommon for people to do frequent empirical tests of their theories and critically scrutinize facts that support or disconfirm their theories (Jervis 1976). Hence, while such strategies will be essential to optimizing national influence and attaining security, they will prove challenging; and hence will call on leaders to be especially vigilant, pro-active and highly perspicacious.

Second, decisionmakers must consider the manifold consequences of power-enhancing strategies. This prescription pertains especially to the problem of complexity in international

politics and suggests extensive perspicacity in clearly ascertaining the manifold consequences of

national actions. Because international politics comprises a complex system, relations among

nations are neither simple, linear, predictable, nor exogenous. Feedback and indirect effects are

pervasive, and such effects generate manifold consequences for any action or policy (Jervis

1997). In this context, power is neither exercised nor accumulated in a vacuum. Power-seeking

behavior is always endogenous, and as such generates manifold consequences that feed back

onto the original actions and ultimately alter the conditions within which these actions unfold.

Often such consequences can create self-defeating or counter-productive outcomes with respect

to national influence. Polices intended to enhance influence, in fact, can often have the opposite

effect and compromise a nation's influence. The counter- productive outcomes that emanate

from over-reliance on hard power are a direct manifestation of such complex processes

(Gallarotti 2010a and 2010b).

Complexity has especially important consequences for soft power. Many of the benefits

of soft power are in fact indirect and longer term: two signature characteristics of complexity.

This in turn makes the benefits of such soft power that much more difficult to ascertain and

evaluate. But such benefits are pervasive. Hence, soft empowerment strategies require more

thorough evaluation and a pronounced commitment on the part of decisionmakers to fully

scrutinize the relative effectiveness of policy options bearing on use of power resources. This

makes a more complete inventory and assessment of national power necessary, one that in fact

covers the various manifold possibilities for soft empowerment.

As with the first prescription, this one will also be challenging given common psychological and cognitive tendencies. The cognitive costs of dealing with complexity are normally very high, which explains why people are guided by paradigmatic thinking in analyzing the world around them. Consequently, there will be a pronounced tendency for decisionmakers to make choices using bounded rationality, which itself is based on limited information and simple models in making decisions (Jervis 1976). Such thought processes, however, tend to produce fairly shallow models of decisonmaking, and therefore will prove ripe for neglecting the potential of soft power and victimization from over-reliance on hard power.

Third, decisionmakers must think in terms of net rather than nominal power. This is a corollary of the previous strategy, as complexity entails the evaluation of net effects, which are the outcomes one is left with after all the reactions to initial uses of power have occurred. This strategy is underscored because of it is especially effective in breaking down a deleterious tendency among decisonmakers to over-rely on hard power. No factor contributes as greatly to the victimization from such over-reliance than a tendency to evaluate power in nominal terms. In accumulating power resources, decisionmakers should be especially careful about assessing the costs and consequences of acquiring and using such resources, and factoring those costs and consequences into their estimates of the nation's overall influence in international relations.[31] Such consequences make nominal power calculations useless at best since the use of power as an endogenous process is subject to feedback effects in complex systems.

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[31] Karl Deutsch (1966, p. 155) underscored the importance of a "net" conception of power over four decades ago.

This strategy will also prove to be quite challenging for decisionmakers to operationalize. Since the cognitive costs of dealing with complexity are high, decisionmakers will find it difficult to make policies that effectively account for the full net effects of their actions. It is much more tempting to associate levels of influence with measures of nominal power, and in this case hard power resources will dominate because their greater tangibility make them more quantifiable. This tendency toward nominalism in assessing national influence will create a bias in perceptions against the limitations of hard power and against the benefits for soft power.

Fourth, decisionmakers must judge power based on outcomes rather than resources. One of the stark lessons from case studies on power accumulation is that decisionmakers appear to be especially tolerant of ongoing failures in attaining their most vital foreign objectives. Much of this is the result of the blinding effects of resource moral hazard: because their nations were endowed with significant tangible resources, setbacks in terms of outcomes did not generate the same sense of urgency and panic that might have arisen in the face of more modest stocks of resources (Gallarotti 2010a and 2010b). Assessing power based on resources rather than outcomes makes decisionmakers especially susceptible to victimization from the over-reliance on hard power. As noted, hard power resources are more easily quantified and evaluated relative to the sources of soft power. But hard power resources enjoy an especially great advantage relative to outcomes. It is far less difficult to agree on the size of a military arsenal, for example, than it is to agree on the meaning of certain outcomes in international relations, and how such outcomes are indicative of national influence. Hence, decisionmakers may remain confident

about national influence even in the face of disconfirming outcomes if their tangible power resources remain abundant.

With respect to outcomes, the issue of interpretation presents further problems. And this suggests an especially difficult challenge for building effective strategies that vigorously employ soft power. Since people rely on paradigmatic thinking, they tend to interpret and assess outcomes by filtering them through pre-existing theories about international relations. Such paradigmatic filtering makes it likely that the significance and even the nature of the outcomes themselves are misinterpreted or misperceived. It is often the case that such cognitive rigidity distorts incoming information to conform to the pre-existing beliefs and theories themselves. In this respect , people tend to be more rationalizers than rational (Jervis 1976). Evidence that might disconfirm such paradigms or pre-existing theories may be distorted in ways that makes it less salient as a source of falsification, or even distorted to the point of being transformed into something that actually confirms such paradigms or theories. There is ample evidence in case studies of power accumulation that such cognitive rigidity distorted perceptions of outcomes in ways that limited the ability of decisionmakers to institute policies that effectively enhanced national influence (Gallarotti 2010a and 2010b).

As with the other strategies, this strategy will also challenge the ability of decisionmakers as a result of asymmetries in information. Given human tendencies to limit cognitive costs, the evaluation of power will be biased in favor of resources that are quantifiable or clearly assessed (Jervis 1976). This will give tangible resources an advantage over outcomes as measuring sticks of influence, thus giving hard power an advantage over soft power.

In Lieu of Conclusions: Cosmopolitan Power is the Real Goal

Much of the present emphasis on soft power is a reaction to a long tradition of decisonmaking that has neglected the benefits of soft power and over-relied on hard power. But it would be as devastating to national influence to become a paper tiger in over-relying on soft power. Proponents of soft power have been quite demonstrative in prescribing some golden mean between soft and hard power if nations are to achieve their full potential in terms of influence (Gallarotti 2010b and Nye 2004). The above prescriptions and warnings of over-reliance cut both ways. They are as applicable to over-using soft power as they are to depending too much on hard power strategies. In this respect, the greatest possible influence a nation can achieve would be obtained through some optimal diversification among soft and hard power resources. While this diversification has always proved a superior strategy, it is all the more important in the world of the present and future. Indeed the changes in international politics highlighted above suggest that indeed it is becoming a more complex and sophisticated world order (i.e., a cosmopolitan world order) in which the brut forces of hard power have diminished in their importance relative to soft power. This more cosmopolitan world requires very different strategies for optimizing influence in world politics. It requires a concomitantly sophisticated theory that can effectively accommodate such changes in articulating a theory of power. Indeed, it requires a cosmopolitan theory of power that is much more in keeping with the times.

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
Figures

Figure 1

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Figure 2

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Figure 3

M E_1 E_2 M_2 E_3 N

Figure 4

M E_1 E_2 M_3 E_3 N_2 N