Articles
Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program (with Susan W. Parker), Journal of the European Economic Association (2009)
We investigate empirically the extent of misreporting in a poverty-alleviation program in which self-reported information,...
Do School Subsidies Promote Human Capital Investment among the Poor? (with Susan W. Parker), Scandinavian Journal of Economics (2008)
We investigate the hypothesis that conditioning transfers to poor families on school attendance leads to...
Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation (with Helios Herrera and David K. Levine), Journal of Public Economics (2008)
We model electoral competition between two parties in a winner-take-all election. Parties choose strategically first...
When Are Stabilizations Delayed? Alesina–Drazen Revisited (with Raul Escorza), European Economic Review (2007)
In an influential article, Alesina and Drazen [1991. Why Are Stabilizations Delayed? American Economic Review...
Rational Ignorance and Voting Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory (2007)
We model a two-alternative election in which voters may acquire information about which is the...
Group Formation and Voter Participation (with Helios Herrera), Theoretical Economics (2006)
We present a model of participation in large elections in which the formation of voter...
Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?, Journal of Economic Theory (2006)
We analyze an election in which voters are uncertain about which of two alternatives is...
Should Transfers To Poor Families Be Conditional On School Attendance? A Household Bargaining Perspective (with Susan W. Parker), International Economic Review (2003)
This article considers the welfare implications of transfers to poor families that are conditional on...
Simple Plurality versus Plurality Runoff with Privately Informed Voters, Social Choice and Welfare (2002)
This paper compares two voting methods commonly used in presidential elections: simple plurality voting and...
Convergence Results for Unanimous Voting, Journal of Economic Theory (2002)
This paper derives a necessary condition for unanimous voting to converge to the perfect information...
A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries (with John Duggan), Games and Economic Behavior (2001)
We model voting in juries as a game of incomplete information, allowing jurors to receive...
Elections with Privately Informed Parties and Voters, Public Choice (2001)
This paper studies a situation in which parties are better informed than voters about the...
Reputation with Noisy Precommitment (with David K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory (1998)
A long-run player, with private information about how long the game will last, must precommit...
Unpublished Papers
A Spatial Theory of Media Slant and Voter Choice (with John Duggan), forthcoming in Review of Economic Studies (2010)
We develop a theory of media slant as a systematic filtering of political news that...