César Martinelli is a professor of economics at ITAM in Mexico City. He received his PhD in economics from UCLA, 1993.
Industrial Organization
Reputation with Noisy Precommitment (with David K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory (1998)
A long-run player, with private information about how long the game will last, must precommit...
Political Economy
Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation (with Helios Herrera and David K. Levine), Journal of Public Economics (2008)
We model electoral competition between two parties in a winner-take-all election. Parties choose strategically first...
The Role of Media Slant in Elections and Economics (with John Duggan), Wallis Institute Working Papers (2008)
We formalize the concept of media slant as a relative emphasis on different issues of...
When Are Stabilizations Delayed? Alesina–Drazen Revisited (with Raul Escorza), European Economic Review (2007)
In an influential article, Alesina and Drazen [1991. Why Are Stabilizations Delayed? American Economic Review...
Rational Ignorance and Voting Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory (2007)
We model a two-alternative election in which voters may acquire information about which is the...
Group Formation and Voter Participation (with Helios Herrera), Theoretical Economics (2006)
We present a model of participation in large elections in which the formation of voter...
Social Policy
Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program (with Susan W. Parker), Journal of the European Economic Association (forthcoming) (2008)
We investigate empirically the extent of misreporting in a poverty-alleviation program in which self-reported information,...
Should Transfers To Poor Families Be Conditional On School Attendance? A Household Bargaining Perspective (with Susan W. Parker), International Economic Review (2003)
This article considers the welfare implications of transfers to poor families that are conditional on...