Deference to Administrative Agencies in Interpreting Treaties: Chevron, Charming Betsy, and Global Decisionmaking

Catherine E. Sweetser

Abstract

This Article examines how national courts in the United States should deal with domestic agency interpretations of international treaties. Under Chevron deference, a court defers to an agency interpretation where it believes that Congress when passing a statute intended to delegate lawmaking power to the agency. The Charming Betsy canon assumes that Congress also has an interest in complying with international norms and in binding the United States to follow international rules. In both these canons, Congressional intent becomes the touchstone. I first examine whether international law itself, as a rule of treaty interpretation, suggests that domestic agencies should receive discretion, and conclude that it does not. I suggest looking at the specific role for the domestic agency and the international interpreter (whether lawmaking/rulemaking or judicial/adjudicatory) in deciding whether Congress intended the domestic agency to have the force of law. I further argue that national court review of international agencies, thus engaging in dialogue with said institutions, may further American interests by influencing the behavior of international agencies.