Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay Recent documents in Catherine de Fontenay en-us Thu, 12 Nov 2009 23:24:22 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/13 http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/13 Wed, 11 Nov 2009 22:13:39 PST This paper considers the effect of exclusive contracts on investment decisions in a market with two upstream and two downstream firms. Segal and Whinston's (2000) irrelevance result is generalized and it is show that exclusive contracts have no effect on the equilibrium level of internal investment for the contracted parties when competition exists in both the upstream and downstream markets. Furthermore, by considering a more competitive environment we are able to demonstrate that strongly internal investment by rival upstream-downstream bargaining pairs is similarly unaffected by the presence of exclusive contracts. Catherine C. de Fontenay http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/12 http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/12 Thu, 28 May 2009 01:57:25 PDT We add a new sector called Crime to a traditional two-sector two-input Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade between countries. Trade is found to increase crime in the resource-rich country and to reduce crime in the resource-poor country by an equal amount. The negative externality from increased crime can be strong enough to cancel out the gains from trade for the resource-rich country. The paper also explores the impact of aid, capital flows, and migration on crime rates, and how crime shapes the degree of specialization in each economy. Catherine C. de Fontenay http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/11 http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/11 Tue, 21 Oct 2008 03:04:48 PDT We analyze a model in which (1) managers require experience in order to be productive; (2) providing managers with experience is costly and non-contractible. We demonstrate that if there is an increase in the mobility of managers, there may be a free-riding problem, in that each firm has too little incentive to give managers experience. Surprisingly, welfare may be higher in the state of the world with more mobility. We explore individual managers' incentives to invest in generalizing their skills to improve their mobility. Catherine C. de Fontenay http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/9 http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/9 Tue, 29 Jan 2008 22:23:23 PST Catherine C. de Fontenay http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/8 http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/8 Tue, 29 Jan 2008 22:15:28 PST Catherine C. de Fontenay http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/7 http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/7 Tue, 29 Jan 2008 22:13:35 PST Catherine C. de Fontenay http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/6 http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/6 Tue, 29 Jan 2008 22:11:38 PST Catherine C. de Fontenay http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/5 http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/5 Tue, 29 Jan 2008 22:09:47 PST Catherine C. de Fontenay http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/4 http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/4 Tue, 29 Jan 2008 22:06:09 PST This paper considers the outsourcing choice of a downstream firm with its own upstream production resources or assets. The novelty of the approach is to consider the outsourced function as involving resources consistent with the resource-based view of the firm. From a bargaining perspective, we characterise a downstream firm's decision as to whether to outsource to an independent or established upstream frim. In so doing, that firm faces a trade-off between lower input costs afforded by independent competition and higher resource value associated to those who can consolidate upstream capabilities. We show that this trade-off is resolved in favour of outsourcing to an established firm. Catherine C. de Fontenay http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/3 http://works.bepress.com/catherine_de_fontenay/3 Tue, 29 Jan 2008 21:58:34 PST This paper provides an analysis of a non-cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network. We establish that there exists an equilibrium that generates a coalitional bargaining division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of externalities between agents. That is, we provide a non-cooperative justification for a cooperative division of a non-cooperative surplus. The resulting division is akin to the Myerson-Shapley value with properties that are particularly useful and tractable in applications. We demonstrate this by examining firm-worker negotiations and buyer-seller networks. Catherine C. de Fontenay