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2000

The Netherlands: Explaining the Limited Success of the Extreme Right

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Available at: https://works.bepress.com/cas_mudde/64/

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Netherlands: explaining the limited success of the extreme right

Cas Mudde and Joop Van Holsteyn

Introduction

The third wave of right-wing extremism in West Europe, which started in the early 1980s (von Beyme, 1988), did not pass the Netherlands by. This chapter deals with the Dutch manifestation of extreme right parties, most notably its main representative, the *Centrumdemocraten* (Centre Democrats, CD). In the following three sections, a portrait of this party is presented, describing its history, organization and ideology, and electorate. The last section will discuss the limited success of the extreme right in the Netherlands, compared to that of equivalent parties in countries like Austria, Belgium and France.

History of extreme right parties in the Netherlands

Though the Netherlands has a long history as a (semi-) sovereign state, within its current borders it has existed only since 1830 (see Kossman, 1978). In that year, the country lost its southern part to the new state of Belgium. Unlike the situation in the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium, this did not give way to a significant 'revanchist' movement in the Netherlands. Aspirations for a Greater Netherlands (or *Dietz*) were not strong within the Dutch population. As far as there were any 'nationalist' sentiments, they were focused upon the colonies (such as Surinam and especially Indonesia).

During the inter-war years, the Netherlands experienced a plethora of extreme right organizations (see De Jonge, 1982; Zaai, 1973). Most of these were groups of only a few people, sometimes publishing amateurish-looking papers, but hardly ever with any significant influence on political life. With

Mussolini's coup in Italy in 1922, several new groups emerged in the Netherlands, such as the *Verbond van Actualisten* (Association of Actualists, VVA) and the *Algemene Nederlandsche Fascisten Bond* (General Dutch Fascists' Association, ANFB), openly calling themselves fascist despite their often different ideology, or even lack of fascist ideology. These groups always remained sectarian, and never contested elections with any success. A new impetus to the Dutch extreme right was provided by the rise to power of Hitler's *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei* (German National Socialist Workers' Party, NSDAP) in the 1930s. Many former fascist organizations and activists now transformed themselves into National Socialists. However, the extreme right camp was highly fragmented by internal strife, caused by personal rather than ideological animosities. At one time, there were no fewer than five different organizations with the name *National-Socialistische Nederlandse Arbeiders-Partij* (Dutch Nationalist Socialist Workers' Party, NSNAP), none of them with any substantial following (see De Jonge, 1979, 1982).

The only extreme right organization that experienced some electoral success during the inter-war years was the *National Socialistische Beweging* (National Socialist Movement, NSB), founded in December 1931 (see De Jonge, 1979; Meyers, 1984). Despite the party's name, the NSB founder and leader, Anton Mussert, was not a devoted follower of Hitler. Rather opportunistically, he was attracted to the combination of the terms 'national' and 'socialist', without knowing what the German version of Nazism really meant; he also wanted to avoid the label 'fascist', because there were so many fascist parties already (Meyers, 1984: 63–4). Though in part a translation of the NSDAP programme, the NSB programme did not contain some of the more typical National Socialist features, most notably racism and anti-semitism, and therefore rather resembled the other (non-Nazi) fascist programmes of that time. Unlike the other extreme right *groupuscules*, however, the NSB was able to attract both members and voters. Within three years it had 21,000 members, and two years later it reached its peak of 52,000. Moreover, the first time it contested an election, in the provincial election of April 1935, the party secured an average of almost 8 per cent of the votes (with significant regional differences; see Kooy, 1964; Von der Dunk, 1982). Nevertheless, the success evaporated quickly: in the parliamentary election of 1937, the NSB gained only 4.2 per cent of the votes. This was followed by a severe drop in membership, which fell back to less than 30,000 before the German invasion of the Netherlands in May 1940.

Under the German occupation, the NSB became, in 1941, the only legal political party in the Netherlands, and its membership increased to around 100,000 at its height. The Germans rewarded the party with most positions of mayor as well as offices in the police, judicial system and media. Thousands of NSB members joined the *Nederlandsche SS* (Dutch SS), mainly

fighting in the *Westland* division (alongside Flemish volunteers) on the Eastern Front. At the same time, the party itself was internally divided between the *Diets* camp of Mussert and the *Deutsch* camp of Meindoud Rost van Tonningen. Whereas Mussert had hoped for a sovereign Greater Netherlands within a National Socialist Europe dominated by Germany, Rost van Tonningen fully supported the Netherlands' inclusion in the Greater German Reich. This internal strife was noted by the German Nazi leadership, which generally supported Rost van Tonningen (who was especially backed by Himmler), though without ousting Mussert.

After World War II, most people in the Netherlands were determined that fascism and Nazism should never return. The exiled Dutch queen, Wilhelmina, had made it clear that there would be no place for traitors in the future, referring primarily to NSB members. In the post-war climate, therefore, it was very hard for people with extreme right sympathies or opinions to organize or speak out openly. Only a few such organizations emerged, but all were minuscule and tried to pose as social rather than political organizations.¹ When, in the early 1950s, a political party was founded that resembled the pre-war NSB in ideology and even in name (*Nationale Europese Sociale Beweging*, National European Social Movement, NESB), it was banned (Van Donselaar, 1991: 51–79).

Not until the early 1970s was the extreme right able to make its comeback on the Dutch political stage. In March 1971, the *Nederlandse Volks-Unie* (Dutch People's Union, NVU) was founded (see Bouw *et al.*, 1981). In its first three years of existence, the party was unknown to the general public and preoccupied with internal struggles. In 1974, though, Joop Glimmerveen's openly racist, aggressive local election campaign in The Hague provoked much negative publicity. The NVU did not win a seat on the city council, but its name was firmly established, as was the position of Glimmerveen as new party leader. However, the NVU had to pay a price for its radical, aggressive campaign and for later provocative actions. In fact, legal action was taken against the party, which subsequently lost most of its electoral support.²

The radicalization of the NVU even went too far for some of its own members. They left the party and founded other, relatively more moderate, though still extreme right-wing, parties. One of these was the short-lived *Nationale Centrumpartij* (National Centre Party, NCP), born in December 1979. After a meeting in February 1980 – the first official meeting of the party – some of the younger members raided an Amsterdam church in which 'illegal' foreigners were sheltering against expulsion. This led to a storm of protest and negative publicity, and one week later the NCP dissolved itself. The next day, though, a new party – the *Centrumpartij* (Centre Party, CP) – was set up by some of the NCP members; the most significant, Henry Brookman, had also been a prominent member of the NVU.

The CP was the first 'successful' post-war extreme right party in the Netherlands (see Brants and Hogendoom, 1983). It won 1 seat (out of 150) in the parliamentary election of 1982, which was taken by Hans Janmaat, a political wanderer who was one of the first CP members.³ Subsequently, the party developed: it claimed over 3000 members in 1984, and at the 1983 local by-election in the new city of Almere, the CP won almost 10 per cent of the votes. Success, however, had its drawbacks. Problems arose between the party leadership (chairman Konst and vice-chairman De Wijer) and the parliamentary party, i.e. Janmaat. The internal tensions, which were as much of a personal as of a political nature, finally led to a split: the party leadership expelled Janmaat and some of his followers in October 1984. Janmaat refused to give up his seat in the Second Chamber and he joined the *Centrumdemocraten* (Centre Democrats, CD) in December 1984. Hence, this new party, founded on 7 November 1984 by former aides of Janmaat, had a good start: it had a member of parliament right from the beginning, and this brought advantages such as publicity and state subsidies.

The CP, on the other hand, soon faced serious difficulty. The internal struggle received a great deal of media attention, and both Konst and De Wijer were pressed by their employers to choose between the CP and their professions as teachers. They chose the latter. The CP's membership was also badly depleted, as some former members left politics, and others joined Janmaat and his' CD. A further blow to the CP came in 1986: after winning a mere 6 seats in the March local elections, the party won no seats in the parliamentary election of May 1986. Furthermore, the CP was convicted of electoral fraud and subsequently declared bankrupt. Only a few days after this verdict, on 20 May, the *Centrumpartij* '86 (Centre Party '86, CP'86) was created.

After almost a decade of internal strife and splits, therefore, two very small parties competed on the political fringe over the legacy of the once moderately successful CP. Whereas CP'86 was the legal heir to the old CP, the real continuation in membership (especially cadres) and ideology was with the CD. In 1989, the CD won a seat in the Second Chamber, which was taken again by Janmaat, but CP'86 was in too much disarray to contest the parliamentary election. The 'victory' of the CD here surprised most observers of the extreme right: after the internal problems of the mid-1980s, it was thought that these parties would simply disintegrate. The 1990 local election caused an even greater shock, as the so-called *centrumstroming* (centre movement)⁴ won a total of 15 seats (CD 11, CP'86 4), mostly in the bigger cities in the *Randstad*, the highly urbanized western part of the Netherlands. In the provincial election the following year, the CD was again successful in this area, winning a total of 3 seats in the provinces of North and South Holland and Utrecht (see Husbands, 1992b).

Nineteen ninety-four was an election 'super' year, with elections for the

local councils on 2 March, for the Second Chamber on 3 May and for the European Parliament on 9 June. Both parties were very successful in the local election, gaining a total of 85 seats, 77 for the CD and 8 for CP'86 – as well as one seat for the CD splinter *Nederlandse Blok* (Dutch Block, NB) in Utrecht (see Muddé and Van Holsteyn, 1994; Van Holsteyn, 1995). In almost all municipalities where the CD stood, it gained representation. CP'86, on the other hand, was primarily successful in municipalities that were not contested by the CD. In the few municipalities where the extreme right did not win a seat, especially the big cities in the northern provinces, this was (partly) due to internal competition. All in all, the extreme right parties had submitted candidates in only 50 of the more than 600 municipalities and received approximately 200,000 votes, an average of 7.4 per cent in the constituencies that they contested (Buijs and Van Donseelaar, 1994: 117).

At the same time, and in part as a consequence of this success, the CD in particular encountered problems, as Jannmaat and other prominent party members received much bad publicity. This led to defections from the CD, including several newly elected council members. Some left the party and politics altogether, others founded their own party, or kept their seats on the local council as independent representatives.⁵ These setbacks were accentuated by the impact of stories from three undercover journalists during the campaign for the parliamentary election, portraying the CD as 'a party of fascists, criminals and scum' (see Rensen, 1994a; see also Kooleman, 1994; Van Hou, 1994). Arguably, most damaging was a television programme about a newly elected council member in Amsterdam, who bragged that, in the early 1980s, he had started several fires in centres providing services for foreigners. This was screened less than a week before the parliamentary election, and may well have contributed to the disappointing (from the party's viewpoint) result of 2.5 per cent. One month later, the party polled under 1 per cent in the European election. Within four months, therefore, the CD had gone from a record high to a score which was only marginally higher than the CP's 1982 electoral returns. This downward trend was continued in the provincial election of 1995, in which the CD lost 1 seat (in Utrecht) in comparison to the 1991 provincial election.

Moreover, the CD lost members, and returned to a shadowy existence. Perhaps this prompted its short-lived overtures to CP'86. Despite the fact that this party had renamed itself the *Nationale Volkspartij/CP'86* (National People's Party/CP'86) in November 1995, to make apparent its difference from the CD, the two parties held joint demonstrations and intensified merger negotiations in 1996. However, when the CP'86 party conference rejected fusion, CD leader Jannmaat returned to public allegations of extremism and anti-semitism against his former ally. CP'86, in turn, purged its leadership of the merger protagonists, most notably party leader Henk Ruitenbergh. His successor, party veteran Wim Beaux, openly denounced

the half-hearted politics of Jannmaat's CD.⁶ Both parties also became subject to increasing legal pressure. Jannmaat, Schuurman and the CD were convicted for incitement to racial hatred in May 1994 and, after some appeals, were finally fined in December 1996 (the criminal proceedings were based on statements made in 1989 and 1990). Penalties varied from Dfl. 1000 for Jannmaat himself to Dfl. 5000 for the (executive) committee of the CD. Among a host of court cases against individual members of the party, in May 1995, an Amsterdam court found CP'86 guilty of being a criminal organization intent on insulting behaviour and inciting racial hatred (AWR, 1996). On top of that, almost the entire leadership was given a month's suspended sentence and a fine of Dfl. 5000; half of it was suspended. On 18 November 1998, the Amsterdam court banned and dissolved the party, which by then amounted to just a handful of members after continuous splits (Van den Brink, 1996).

Organization and ideology of the CD

Extreme right parties in the Netherlands have always suffered from a shortage of membership, cadres and organizational stability. The CD is no exception to this rule. Its membership figures are kept secret or are, at best, vague: for years, Jannmaat claimed that the party had a membership of 3000 that was increasing rapidly. Journalists and scholars see this as an exaggeration, generally placing the number between 1000 and 1500 (Buijs and Van Donseelaar, 1994: 8; Van den Brink, 1994: 211–12; 1996: 178), although Rensen puts it at 2700 (Rensen, 1994b: 122, 126). However, only a small part of the membership is active within the party, at most 100 members. Not surprisingly, these are mainly party delegates on the various representative bodies, as the CD is first and foremost an electoral party, believing that electoral victory is the only way to exercise political influence (Muddé, 1996: 271).

At first glance, the party statutes of 1991 present a democratic, formal structure. The CD is organized through four party organs: the congress (conference), the council, the executive and the committee (*Dagelijks Bestuur*, DB; art. 14). The first of these layers, formally the most important, is constituted by all paying members (who ask the party secretary for permission to attend), yet it is convened only once a year. The DB, which has fewer formal powers, and only a few members, runs the party on a daily basis. On closer scrutiny, the many exceptions to this formal hierarchy point to a far stronger formal position for the DB *vis-à-vis* other party organs and branches (see Esser, 1996: 11–12); for instance, article 34.2 states that the DB is qualified to allocate tasks or competencies from the congress to the council whenever it is deemed to be in the interest of the party. There is no appeal possible against such decisions. Moreover, the old DB nominates its

successor to congress, which then either elects it for seven years or rejects it – the latter is only possible with a two-thirds majority (art. 16.2e).

Despite the reasonably democratic formal structure, Jansmaat has dominated the CD completely from the moment he joined the party. This has been possible for two reasons: the inactivity of the party membership and the accumulation of party positions. Jansmaat is party leader, leader of the parliamentary party (and from 1989 to 1994 he was the *only* member), chairman of most party foundations, and 'adviser' in almost every other party structure. Moreover, two of his most loyal supporters, party secretary Wil Schuurman (his wife) and party treasurer Wim Eisthout, also hold several party offices at the national, regional and local levels. Therefore, Jansmaat is either directly or indirectly involved in every major (and often even minor) decision of the party. Because of the pivotal position of Jansmaat in both the formal and the informal party structures, he is also able to suppress internal opposition. At the same time, Jansmaat's character – 'tormenting and resentful' as one psychologist put it (Van Ginneken, 1994: 146) – and his authoritarian style of leadership have always been a source of frustration for many ambitious or talented party members.

Ideologically, the CD has remained loyal to the moderate and superficial brand of ethnocentric nationalism of the CP (Halbertsma-Wardi Beckman, 1993; Mudde, 1998). In short, the ideology of the CD is almost exclusively focused on the immigration issue and can be summarized as offering a choice between assimilation and repatriation. This is clearly stated in the second chapter of the 1989 party programme. Point 2 of this chapter states this very concisely: 'Foreigners and minorities either adjust to the Dutch ways and customs or leave the country.' In the 1990s, this policy nucleus was embedded increasingly within broad, populist anti-party propaganda (Mudde, 1996). This is not to say that the CD is an ideological party or even that it is active in distributing propaganda. In fact, the party rarely issues statements (they are generally ignored by the press anyway), distributes pamphlets or demonstrates on the streets. 'Ideology' is propagated mainly through a limited number of election programmes and party papers.

Since its foundation at the end of 1984, the CD has contested four parliamentary elections. The 1994 election programme was entitled *Oost West, Thuis Best* (East West, Home Best), and contained 22 themes (policy areas) elaborating on the 1989 programme. The elaboration was largely an optical illusion, however, caused by a different lay-out, rather than proof of ideological development. The core of the self-proclaimed 'centre democratic ideology', as stated in the preamble of both programmes, remained:

[On] the one hand, the quest for the preservation and development of Dutch political and cultural identity and, on the other hand, the promotion of national solidarity in our country; either by trying to prevent unwanted divergences between distinctive sections of Dutch

society or by coming to a harmonious solution to these divergences (p.1).

The programme was no more than a muddled collection of only slightly interrelated policy demands. The party itself summarized the programme in ten points (a tradition dating back to the beginning of the CP):

1. stop discrimination against the Dutch;
2. introduction of the death penalty;
3. lower the costs of living;
4. promotion of Dutch products;
5. petrol for Dfl. 1.50 per litre;
6. place asylum seekers in labour camps;
7. a cleaner environment without raising taxes;
8. stop the destruction of Dutch culture;
9. control the movement of travellers at the border;
10. the Netherlands is not an immigration country.

In this top ten of political goals, the ethnocentric themes of 'the Dutch first' and 'stop the anti-Dutch policy' figure prominently in points (1), (4), (9) and (10), but also in points (6) and (8). The other points are vague indications of a conservative (2), social (3) and environmentalist (7) outlook. The rather peculiar point (5), the desire for the price of petrol to be lowered, is a good example of the superficial, 'populist' nature of the party's demands and programme.

Compared to the old programme, the 1994 version contained some new policy statements, which can be classified into four different groups. First, there are demands that could be labelled as culturally conservative (e.g. a ban on televised pornography, restrictions on divorce). Second, there are proposals of a protectionist nature, especially in the field of economics (e.g. pleas for partial autarky of the Dutch defence apparatus and agriculture). The bulk of the new demands, however, fall into one of two non-ideological categories: issues that made headlines in the period before the election (e.g. strengthening of dykes, and increasing their height; protection of the status of elderly people) or mere details (e.g. moving fog lamps from the left to the middle rear of cars). The term 'ideology' should thus be very loosely applied to the CD, conjuring up more a collection of unrelated thoughts on different topics than a consistent and comprehensive theory of how society should be organized. This can also be seen in the 'ideological' content of the party papers (see Mudde, 2000).

The most important of the party papers is *CD-Info*, a seven-page pamphlet sent to all members (and donors) on a monthly (or bi-monthly) basis since January 1988. In this paper, the party discusses current political and social themes superficially, primarily applauding the activities of its own member(s) of parliament, Jansmaat in particular, and criticizing those of all

other parties.⁷ For a more 'elaborate' position, the scientific bureau of the CD, since 1992 called the *Thomas Hobbes Stichting* (Foundation) after Janmaat's favourite philosopher (see Fennema, 1992), publishes *CD-Actueel*, nominally quarterly but in practice a very irregularly distributed journal of some twenty pages. The journal carries longer articles, primarily from the few academics in the party, but even these 'intellectuals' seldom present a sophisticated view on the issues they discuss.

The articles in the CD party papers have even less ideological content, focusing mainly on four, often interlinked, themes: opposition to multiculturalism; populist anti-party sentiments; the allegedly undemocratic struggle against the CD; and crime prevention. Opposition to multicultural society is omnipresent and linked to almost every other issue that is discussed in the party papers. Though the CD's discourse is openly xenophobic, its opposition is based principally on demographic (the Netherlands are full) and economic arguments (foreigners take away jobs and cost money). In the eyes of the CD, the main culprit in creating a multicultural society is not 'the foreigner', but the 'olighe' of established parties, which started the disastrous immigration and which later tried to cover it up by placing a taboo on discussing the issue. This also explains why 'they' fight every righteous force (i.e. the CD) that tries to defend with every fibre the Dutch people. Not totally without foundation, Janmaat believes that he is the victim of an unprecedented smear campaign (or conspiracy), led by the 'Socialists' of the *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA, Labour Party) and its 'subsidized vassals' (i.e. anti-racist and anti-fascist movements).

The electoral basis: protest or xenophobia?

For the past twenty years, Dutch extreme right parties have appealed to the voter with varying success in European, national, provincial and (sub)-local elections. We shall concentrate our analysis on the first-order elections for the Second Chamber. In 1982 and 1989, the CP and the CD respectively were able to return 1 member of parliament, while in 1994, the CD gained enough votes to send 3 representatives to parliament (see Table 7.1). In 1998, however, all three lost their seats – to add to the near-total loss of the CD's 77 local seats in March.

As already intimated, the extreme right parties traditionally have their electoral strongholds in the *Randstad*, as well as in the strongly urbanized parts of the rest of the country (see Husbands, 1992b). In the 1980s, the extreme right parties' electoral success was mainly in the three biggest cities of the Netherlands: Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague. In the parliamentary election of 1982, more than 40 per cent of all votes for the CP were cast in these cities; in 1986, 38 per cent (for the CP and the CD); and in 1989, 45 per cent (for the CD). In that period, the extreme right parties also had

Table 7.1 Support for Dutch extreme right parties in parliamentary elections, 1977–98

Year	Party	Number of voters	Percentage of all voters	Seats in Second Chamber
1977	NVU	33,434	0.4	—
1981	NVU	10,641	0.1	—
	CP	12,242	0.1	—
1982	NVU	1,632	0.0	—
	CP	68,423	0.8	1
1986	CP	36,741	0.4	—
	CD	12,277	0.1	—
1989	CD	81,472	0.9	1
1994	CD	220,621	2.5	3
	CP86	32,311	0.4	—
1998	List Janmaat/CD	52,226	0.6	—

Source: Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics, *Election Statistics* for 1977, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998.

moderate success in some of the strongly urbanized medium-sized cities in the *Randstad*. This picture changed only slightly in the 1980s, yet did so dramatically in 1994 (Table 7.2). In the parliamentary election of 3 May, the CD won just 17 per cent of its total number of votes in the biggest cities. However, the drop in the party's vote in the West was accompanied by electoral penetration of the southern provinces and, rather surprisingly, of smaller communities. So, in the period 1981–94, electoral support for the CD shifted geographically from the West to the South, as well as from the biggest cities to the smaller cities and communities.

The electoral rise of the NVU, and especially the national breakthrough of the CP in 1982, raised questions about the motivations of extreme right voters. Did they vote principally as a protest against foreigners and ethnic minorities? Or were they rather people who voted CP as a protest against the established political parties or politics in general? Which element was the more important: support for the extreme right party, or protest against the established parties? In this section, the electoral basis of the extreme right in the Netherlands will be examined in this context, situating the discussion within one of the prevailing controversies of the international research on the extreme right (see Hainsworth, 1992; Stöck, 1994; Billiet and De Witte, 1995).

In the early 1980s, a choice for the NVU or CP was seen primarily as a consequence of racist convictions. The term 'racist electorate' was used widely to describe the group of (potential) voters of extreme right parties

Table 7.2 Support for Centre Party (CP) and Centre Democrats (CD) by region and degree of urbanization, 1981-98

	1981 (CP)	1982 (CP)	1986 (CP)	1989 (CD)	1994 (CD)	1998 (CD)
The Netherlands (%)	0.1	0.8	0.4	0.9	2.5	0.6
<i>Average percentage by region</i>						
The Randstad	0.23	1.0	0.6	1.4	2.8	0.67
The rest of the country	0.06	0.29	0.18	0.52	2.0	0.38
Coefficient Randstad/rest	3.7	3.4	3.3	2.7	1.4	1.2
<i>Average percentage by degree of urbanization</i>						
Non-urban	—	0.3	0.1	0.4	1.8	0.4
Weakly urban	—	0.2	0.2	0.5	2.0	0.5
Moderately urban	0.1	0.7	0.3	0.7	2.3	0.6
Strongly urban	0.1	0.7	0.3	0.8	2.4	0.8
Very strongly urban	0.4	1.8	0.9	2.0	4.1	0.9

Note: The Randstad consists of the Western provinces of North and South Holland and Utrecht; the rest of the country consists of all the other provinces. The division and labelling of degrees of urbanization changed somewhat over the years, but this does not influence the trend. In 1988, the CD did not participate in the province of Drenthe.

Source: Daalder *et al.* (1998).

(Van Donseelaar, 1982: 134; Brants and Hogendoorn, 1983: 42). At the same time, it was clear that it was not only racist sentiment that led people to opt for an extreme right party. The voters also felt abandoned by the major political parties and 'the system', and a vote for the extreme right could be viewed as 'a powerless protest' against these forces (Bovenkerk *et al.*, 1980: 118).

The debate on the nature of support for extreme right parties was fuelled by the entrance of Janmaat into the Second Chamber. Commentators looked increasingly at the possible difference between the ideology of extreme right politicians and their voters' motivations, as well as at the importance of dissatisfaction with and distrust of traditional parties and politics (Van Schendelen, 1983; De Jong *et al.*, 1984). However, a satisfactory or convincing answer as to the relative importance of the various voters' motivations was not found in the results of empirical analyses. One examination of the two main explanations of a choice for the CP, for instance, led to ambiguous results and to disagreement among the researchers. In fact, it was argued that a choice for the CP was primarily inspired by two sorts of motives: protest against minorities and protest against established politics in general (Van Donseelaar and Van Praag, 1983: 103).

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The authors disagreed, though, with Van Donseelaar seeing xenophobia as the dominant motivation, while according to Van Praag, it was a more general political protest.

Research into support for the extreme right was impeded significantly by the fact that almost no data at the individual level were available. In virtually all research, aggregated data (election results, unemployment figures, age structure, number of ethnic minorities in a certain geographical area and so on) were used, and this made the search for individual voting motives difficult. Opinion polls, however, shed some light on the phenomenon. Comparatively, the electorate consisted of more men than women, relatively poorly educated voters, people living in the big cities of the Randstad, persons with low incomes and those claiming social benefits, individuals without religious convictions, and those who did not read a newspaper (De Hond, 1983). Subjectively, CP voters were relatively dissatisfied with their personal housing conditions, and generally dissatisfied with their personal situation, past and present, and with the state of the country as a whole. They combined a rather gloomy view of the future with an expectation of an (unwelcome) increase in their neighbourhood in the number of foreigners, already too numerous in their view. The CP voters supported the opinion that unemployed Dutch people should take over the jobs of foreigners and that all unemployed foreigners should be expelled. With respect to development aid and the death penalty, they held very conservative opinions. According to this extensive opinion poll, two groups of extreme right voters could be distinguished: the victims of society and the ultra-conservatives (De Hond, 1983: 6). In conclusion, aversion to foreigners and protest against established politics were both seen as important, though the former seemed to be of slightly more importance. A second and more limited study emphasized predominantly the importance of the 'victims of society' subjective factor (Stapel, 1984). CP voters could be seen as people in a difficult socio-economic position, who believed that non-Dutch groups were being disproportionately supported by the state. Individuals living in the same neighbourhood as 'foreigners' and who harboured this idea were particularly inclined to vote CP.

This pattern of negative opinions towards 'foreigners' and ethnic minorities, combined with feelings of dissatisfaction and protest against established political parties and processes, characterized the 1980s. There was, however, a shift in interpretation of the motives of extreme right voters, towards defining the protest variable as the more determinant factor. Thus, it was suggested that there was a small hard core of extreme right voters, but that the bulk of extreme right voters consisted of protest voters (Van Holsteyn, 1990). For these protest voters, the immigration question still played an important role, but the 'political class' was especially blamed for allowing too much immigration.

Research into the extreme right received a new impetus in the run-up to




Figure 7.1 Centre Democrats in the polls, January 1990–January 1999
Source: (NIPO-Dutch Gallup; monthly averages).

super election year, 1994. In the opinion polls, support for the CD increased dramatically in the period 1991–3; in 1993, the CD stood consistently above 4 per cent and reached a peak in November with a monthly average of 5.5 per cent (see Figure 7.1). In a sequel to the 1983 opinion research, evidence was again found for the thesis that the CD profited both from supporters of its ideas and from dissatisfied protesting citizens (Van der Veen and Dicke, 1993). With regard to socio-demographic characteristics, there was not much change since 1983,⁸ although there had been a shift towards the average income among extreme right supporters. Subjectively, CD voters in 1993 were still more dissatisfied with life than were other voters, but less so than CP voters had been in 1983; the CD voters saw themselves less as 'victims of society' in 1993. The ambivalence in the relationship between the CD and its voters showed up most clearly in the attitudes of the voters towards certain political issues and towards the CD as a political party (see Table 7.3). In 1993, as in 1983, the extreme right voters shared the party's 'tough' viewpoint on development aid and capital punishment, and they also showed a negative attitude towards foreigners – that is, they tended to believe that foreigners should not be allowed to enter the country, and that those already present should be sent back to their own country or ought to adjust fully to Dutch customs and society. However, these voters were hardly convinced and loyal adherents: only a minority thought that the CD had the best proposals for solving problems concerning foreigners, a third did *not* know that Janmaat was 'their' representative in the Second Chamber, and very few had much faith in him as a member of parliament. In 1993, one out of ten CD voters even hoped that their party (that is, the party they once voted for or intended to vote for) would *not* be represented in

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Table 7.3 Some political attitudes of extreme right voters, 1983 and 1993 (%)

	CP voters 1983	Other voters 1983	CD voters 1993	Other voters 1993
Development aid should be stopped	37	10	30	6
Capital punishment should be restored for serious crimes	70	35	72	36
We should allow people from developing countries to enter our country	5	21	11	31
All unemployed foreigners should be sent back to their own country	76	29	72	32
Unemployed Dutchmen should take over the jobs of foreigners, who should then be sent to their own country	57	15	52	24
Foreigners who stay in the Netherlands should accommodate themselves more	—	—	93	69
Trust in none of the major traditional political parties	39	19	30	12
The party with the best proposals for solving the problems with foreigners is:				
• the CD	—	—	40	3
• no party at all	—	—	14	6
• don't know	—	—	26	53
People who do <i>not</i> know the name of the CD member of Parliament (Janmaat)	32	48	31	45
Faith in Janmaat as member of Parliament				
• (very) much faith	34	5	18	2
• some faith	43	6	38	16
• (almost) no faith at all	23	89	44	81
Wants no representation of CP/CD in the Second Chamber after the next elections	3	73	11	66
Wants CP/CD <i>not</i> to participate in government	23	82	34	85
	N = 231	N = 207	N = 207	N = 267

Source: Van der Veen and Dicke (1993); CP (Centre Party) and CD (Centre Democrat) voters are people who said they have voted for the party in the past or are intending to vote for the party in the future.

parliament after the next elections, and about one-third did *not* want their party to participate in government.

In the media, which covered the scandals of extreme right parties and politicians extensively, the dissatisfied (potential) protest voter was highlighted as the classic example of an extreme right elector in the run-up to the elections of 1994 (Van Holsteyn, 1995). The daily and weekly press featured articles on the electoral basis of the CD, and dissatisfaction and political protest were portrayed as the voters' main motivations. The idea of protest as the dominant driving force for the majority of extreme right voters can be substantiated by employing the so-called 'elaborated theory on second-order elections' (Oppenhuis *et al.*, 1996). Second-order elections – that is, elections where national political power is not at stake (in the eyes of the voters, at least) – can function as markers of party strength, depending on the timing of the parliamentary (i.e. first-order) election. When such power is not really at stake, voters perceive local, provincial and European elections as some sort of super opinion poll. When the second-order election is held shortly before the first-order election, some voters will use it to voice their protest.

The tactical situation in such a 'marker-setting election' is characterised by an apparent lack of consequences for the allocation of power on the one hand and by the attentiveness of politicians and media on the other. In this circumstance, strategic voting may take the form of what is generally referred to as 'protest voting', benefiting small radical parties in particular. Knowing that politicians are attentive to the results, while no actual power is at stake, some voters apparently take the opportunity (in the phrase of the British football hooligans) to 'put in the boot' (Oppenhuis *et al.*, 1996: 302).

However, when second-order elections are held shortly after the first-order election, they are largely ignored. As they neither involve the question of power nor provide the occasion for a significant national protest vote, the same authors speak of 'throw-away elections'. So, whereas the first second-order election gives the voter the opportunity to vote 'with the boot', the second will particularly attract voters who vote 'with the heart'. In the Dutch elections of 1994, this meant that the approximately 7.4 per cent of the votes gained by the CD in the local election, two months before the parliamentary election, were mainly from 'protesters', whereas the real core of support was revealed in the following month's European election, and stood at a mere 1 per cent (Mudde and Van Holsteyn, 1994; Van Holsteyn, 1995). Subsequently, the CD polled generally under 2 per cent, dropping to 0.6 per cent in the May 1998 parliamentary election (see Table 7.1), and 0.5 per cent in the June 1999 European election.

Explaining the limited success of the Dutch extreme right

The Dutch extreme right can be considered to be one of the least successful representatives of the current West European extreme right. Even their electoral high point, 2.5 per cent of the votes in 1994, is only half of the electoral support that extreme right parties averaged in twelve West European countries in the 1980s and 1990s (Weinberg *et al.*, 1995: 42). To further illustrate the limited success of the Dutch extreme right, a brief comparison with the Flemish *Vlaams Blok* (VB) (Flemish Bloc) is illuminating. In 1982, these two parties were the only extreme right parties of the third wave in Western Europe represented in parliament, both parties scoring around 1 per cent of the votes (see Swynegdouw, Chapter 6). More than ten years later, the VB polled 12.5 per cent in the European election of 1994, whereas the CD won a mere 1 per cent.

How could the Dutch extreme right be one of the first successful representatives of the third wave in the early 1980s and yet be one of the least successful in the 1990s? In this section, the limited success of the CD in particular, and of the extreme right in the Netherlands in general, will be discussed. As almost all studies turn to 'external' factors to explain the success of extreme right parties, we will start our discussion by finding out whether the absence of these factors can explain the lack of success in the Dutch case. Most of the studies on the success of extreme right parties focus on mapping their objectively favourable circumstances. This implies that the prime reason for the parties' success is external – that is, located outside the parties. Following this argument, we might expect that the breeding ground of extreme right parties is not as favourable in the Netherlands as in other West European countries.

In general, two different, yet interlinked, favourable conditions are identified in the literature: anti-politics sentiment and xenophobia (Betz, 1994). Anti-politics sentiment contains a wide range of resentments against 'the political' – that is, the system, the parties, the politicians, and so on. The importance of these sentiments for the party system is clearly visible in the recent political turmoil in Italy, where years of growing frustration with the corrupt political system led to the creation of the Second Republic, in which not only was the system changed in several respects, but most key players (politicians and parties) were ousted, and several individuals were even convicted (see Morino, 1996; Rosenthal, 1996). Admittedly, Italy is an exception, but growing and destabilising forms of anti-politics sentiment have been identified in other West European countries, such as Austria (see Chapter 3) and Belgium (Chapter 6). When we look at comparative data, we see that the Dutch are traditionally one of the most satisfied people in the European Union and that there is no decline in the level of overall life satisfaction in the period 1974–94 (see Eurobarometer, 1995; SCP, 1996). On the other hand, the Dutch National Election Studies show that a

substantial part of the Dutch electorate, over 20 per cent, can be classified as politically (very) cynical.⁹ Although this figure has not really increased in the past decade or so, it shows that there is at least some fertile soil for parties trying to capitalize on political protest.

Apart from survey data at the individual level, there are various other indicators of anti-politics sentiment. One of the most often used is low voter turnout (Andeweg, 1996; Betz, 1994; Poguntke, 1996). The Netherlands is no exception to the general trend of decreasing voter turnout. Even though turnout in parliamentary elections is still rather high, comparatively, it is nonetheless declining slightly: 1998 saw the lowest turnout (73.3 per cent) at parliamentary elections, since the abolition of compulsory voting in 1970. This trend of declining turnout is most apparent in second-order elections, especially the provincial and European elections. At the 1994 European election, turnout was lowest in the Netherlands (and Portugal and the United Kingdom), where a mere 35 per cent voted. In the 1999 Euro-election, the abstention rate in the Netherlands was 70 per cent, not far behind the United Kingdom's 77 per cent. So, even when we accept that anti-politics sentiment in the Netherlands is less widespread than in many other West European countries, it is clear that the extreme right mobilizes only a small part of it.

The second aspect of a generally favourable breeding-ground for extreme right parties is xenophobia, or rather strong dissatisfaction with the presence of large and/or growing numbers of immigrants. If the extreme right of the third wave has been identified with one issue, it is with the issue of immigration (von Beyme, 1988; Husbands, 1992a). The explanation follows the same pattern as the anti-politics argument: the limited success of the Dutch extreme right can be explained by the limited spread of xenophobia in the Netherlands. Again, empirical evidence rejects, or at least undermines, this line of reasoning. Several surveys show that substantial groups of the Dutch population think that there are too many foreigners in the Netherlands, that they should leave the country (after finishing their employment), or that the number of asylum seekers is too high (Moors and Beets, 1991; SCP, 1996). In 1994, 'immigration and ethnic minorities' were perceived by most voters as the main national problem in the Netherlands (Aarts, 1995). Compared to countries with successful extreme right parties, like Belgium and France, the percentage of people who see the number of 'foreigners' in their country as too high is not that much lower (57, 55 and 47 per cent respectively in 1994; see Melich, 1995). Even though the differences are relatively bigger in the case of the acceptance of foreigners (especially from the Southern Mediterranean) and asylum seekers, and in the case of a more general 'index of xenophobia' (Melich, 1995), the fact remains that the extreme right in the Netherlands is far less successful in profiting from the existing circumstances.

We can conclude that the breeding-ground, as far as attitudes to politics

and immigrants are concerned, is only slightly less favourable in the Netherlands than in other West European countries. This factor thus cannot explain the relatively poor electoral results of the Dutch extreme right parties. Again, we look to other countries for possible other explanations. One of the few cases of unsuccessful extreme right electoral mobilization that has received serious scholarly interest is that of England. In the English case, the failure of the extreme right is generally explained by two external factors: the electoral system (Elbers and Fennema, 1993; Van Donselaar, 1995), and the fact that the Conservative Party under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher took the issue of immigration away from the extreme right (Eatwell, 1992; Taylor, 1993).

The first explanation sounds plausible, as the first-past-the-post system allows for only one winner in each constituency (but see Eatwell, Chapter 8). However, this kind of reasoning cannot be used for the Dutch case with its system of extreme proportional representation, which is considered to be one of the most open political systems in the world (Andeweg and Irwin, 1993). Moreover, Dutch politics has a tradition of party pluralism which is considered valuable by politicians of both small and large parties, and by voters as well. Voting for small parties is not considered a wasted vote in the Netherlands. Indeed, in 1994, 80 per cent of the electorate disagreed with the statement that people who vote for a small party are wasting their vote, and 49 per cent disagreed with the statement that only big parties really meant something in politics (Anker and Openhuis, 1995: 64). As a political party requires no more than 0.67 per cent of the votes to get a seat in parliament, new parties enter the political arena quite often (see Lucardie, 1996). The only possible negative side of the electoral system for the Dutch extreme right might be that the voter has a very wide variety of parties to choose from, thereby diluting potential support. Still, the fact that it was not so much the extreme right that profited from the substantial loss of votes by the established Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties in the 1994 parliamentary election, as was generally expected, but some other established parties and two rather 'new' parties – the *Socialistische Partij* (Socialist Party, SP) and the *Algemeen Ouderen Verbond* (General League of the Elderly, AOV) (see Irwin, 1995) – once again proves that the Dutch extreme right performs very poorly despite generally favourable circumstances.

The second explanation, as regards the English case, has also recently been employed in the Netherlands. Thus the surprisingly poor result of the CD in the 1994 parliamentary election has been explained in part by the victory of the conservative-liberal *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, VVD) (see Brill, 1994; Fennema, 1995). It is argued that this latter party has won over voters on the immigration issue, on which its party leader, Frits Bolkestein, spoke out on several occasions in recent years. It should be noted that this contention was

largely 'created' by strong, somewhat exaggerated reactions in the media and by reactions from other politicians to the (occasional) remarks by Bolkestein. However, more important than the VVD leader speaking out on immigration was the fact that he was generally linked with this issue in the media (Kleinjehuis and Pennings, 1995). In the Dutch case, the evidence is far from convincing to support the argument that the traditional right appropriated the issue and thereby the voters of the extreme right. First and foremost, the 'evidence' is based primarily on voter shifts at the aggregate level. Information about the motives of new VVD voters shows that the immigration issue did not play an important role in their party choice (Schmeets *et al.*, 1996; Irwin and Van Holsteyn, 1997). It may also be the case that if there was any effect on the electoral support for the VVD, the issue may have won some but lost other voters for the party (Kleinjehuis *et al.*, 1995: 140). In addition, we have no proof that these (attracted) voters even considered voting for an extreme right party. There is also a theoretical problem: the same argument is used in a completely different way in the case of some other countries. In France and Belgium (i.e. Flanders), for instance, it is generally argued that, as the traditional right became more preoccupied with the immigration issue, this only increased support for the extreme right, as it gave legitimacy and salience to the issue and consequently to the extreme right party (Fitzmaurice, 1992; Kühnl, 1992). In the often-quoted words of *Front National* (FN) leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, the people like the original better than the copy. Hence, again the question is why the Dutch case was different, i.e. why in the Netherlands the original is weaker than the copy – if there was any real copy at all.

The answer to this question must be found in internal factors. The propitious breeding-ground has to be utilized by a political entrepreneur (Ignazi, 1996), but not every entrepreneur is equally successful. If there is one common theme in the history of the extreme right in the Netherlands, it is that it is simply too weak (organizationally, electorally, ideologically) to become a real political force. Whereas the CP and VB had almost the same level of electoral support in the early 1980s, the VB was able to expand its support considerably. The VB profited from the fact that the *Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten* (Flemish Liberals and Democrats, VLD) adopted 'its' issues of immigration and law and order, and, as a result, the VB dominated the political campaign for the 1991 parliamentary election (Maddens, 1994). In sharp contrast, the CD remained an outsider, even when the VVD made immigration one of the topics of the 1994 electoral campaign.

One reason why the CP and its successor parties never used their opportunities to the full is that they are all badly organized parties, lacking both cadres and members. In addition, and in part because of this, the Dutch extreme right has always been plagued by scandals and splits. Therefore, it has never been able to present successfully to the voter its potentially 'attractive product'.¹⁰ In comparison to well-organized and professional

parties like the VB and the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (Austrian Freedom Party, FPÖ), the CD failed to convince the voter that it was a viable alternative to the established parties. The data on voters presented above, for instance, clearly show the ambivalent relationship of many CD voters with 'their' party. Also, the simple fact that the CD and the CP'86 contested the same election in effect kept both out of various local councils, whereas together they would have gained enough votes for at least 1 seat.

This explanation, however, brings in another question: why are extreme right parties in the Netherlands such weak organizations? A commonplace explanation for both the organizational and electoral weakness of the Dutch extreme right is the character of Hans Janmaat.¹¹ According to most observers, he lacks the political skills (of a Dewinter or Haider) necessary to build a good organization and fully exploit the grievances of the electorate. Should Janmaat, therefore, be replaced by a person of higher calibre, then the Dutch extreme right arguably would enjoy success, like its Flemish or Austrian counterparts. However plausible this might sound, the thesis has several shortcomings. It is undeniably true that Janmaat has had a negative impact on the organizational capacity of the Dutch extreme right. Since his expulsion from the CP in 1984, he has made certain that this kind of coup would be impossible in his new party, the CD. Also, the fusion talks between the CD and other extreme right parties (most notably CP'86) have often been frustrated by Janmaat or deadlocked by the aversion of leaders of the other parties towards him. This notwithstanding, Janmaat is the only leader of the post-war extreme right in the Netherlands who has been able to get his party (and himself) into parliament. One can even argue that it is his personal name as much as (or even more so than) that of the political party that has enabled this success. Surveys show that Janmaat is one of the best-known politicians in the Netherlands: his name is known by over 90 per cent of the eligible voters (Anker, 1995: 206–7). Significantly, too, in 1993 only one-quarter of Dutch voters were of the opinion that the CD would be a more attractive party without Janmaat (Van der Veen and Dicke, 1993: 21). Of course, the 1998 parliamentary election result and Janmaat's loss of seat was a personal and party blow, but did not fundamentally disturb his leadership of the CD.

An alternative interpretation has been suggested by Van Donseelaar, who explains the weakness of the Dutch extreme right by pointing to the repressive social and legal climate in the Netherlands. This leads to a so-called adjustment dilemma for the extreme right: on the one hand, they have to moderate their stand because of the threat of criminalization and legal action but, on the other hand, they cannot be too moderate because they might offer too vague a political profile and thereby lose core members and voters (Van Donseelaar, 1995: 13). Though plausible, this thesis has some empirical snags. First, it cannot be tested, as the social and legal climate has always been repressive and thus the independent variable is a constant.

Second, it seems to presuppose that the extreme right is voted for primarily on the basis of support rather than protest, which contradicts the dominant interpretation as presented above. Finally, the case of the former *Communistische Partij (van) Nederland* (Communist Party [of the] Netherlands, CPN) shows that it is possible to build a well-organized political party under conditions of extreme repression in the Netherlands (see Verrips, 1995).

So, though we accept the fact that the repressive social and legal climate in the Netherlands creates organizational problems for the Dutch extreme right, the case of the CPN shows that these can be overcome, especially with support from others. As in many other West European countries, the Communists in the Netherlands had to live under strong repression, particularly in the 1950s. Still, they had two advantages while building and maintaining a strong party apparatus. First and foremost, they had the backing of the communist world, notably the Soviet Union. Not only were they supported financially, but the Soviet Union also provided for the schooling of cadres – a necessity in order to maintain an organization, yet almost an impossibility in a situation of strong repression. Second, the Communists had sufficient of a shared ideological and organizational history with the Social Democrats to enable them to link their political struggle to themes that were accepted by large parts of the political establishment. Even though the leadership of the social democratic *Partij van de Arbeid* (Labour Party, PvdA) was among the main opponents of the CPN and vice-versa, activists at the regional and local level from both parties were less rigorously separated, and often worked together in various front organizations of the Communist Party.

This brings us to the most specific problem of the Dutch extreme right parties: unlike kindred parties in some other countries, they do not benefit from the existence of an organized nationalist subculture (Mudde, 1994). In the case of the VB, this party escaped the political fringe only after introducing so-called 'Operation Rejuvenation', in which various young VB members, mostly ex-leaders of nationalist youth and student bodies, were integrated into the party leadership (Mudde, 1995). Also, parties like the Austrian FPÖ profit from the broad German-national *Lager*, and Le Pen's FN attracts highly educated cadres from networks like the *Club de l'Horloge* and various New Right channels. In sharp contrast, the Dutch extreme right has had to do virtually everything on its own, in almost complete isolation and under strong social and legal pressure as well.

The lack of a Dutch nationalist subculture is caused by the fact that in the Netherlands, unlike in countries such as Belgium (Flanders) and Austria, the so-called national question does not play any significant role at all. One reason for this may be the long tradition of the Netherlands as a trading nation, with an international orientation that does not allow for narrow-minded nationalism. Also, though a reasonably young country within its

current borders, the Netherlands has never been threatened in its national identity or integrity, except for the five years of German Nazi occupation. This persistent feeling of 'national security' may explain the absence of the national question from the political agenda.¹² As a consequence, almost every form of Dutch nationalism is directly linked to the extreme right – and kept largely separate from the 'democratic' camp. Related issues such as ethnic or cultural identity are similarly suspect and do not figure centrally in the political debate. Hence, extreme right parties have little or no possibility of linking up usefully with more widely supported themes and organizations, and are consequently forced into a role on the fringe.

Notes

A preliminary version of this chapter was presented as a paper entitled 'Small and Struggling: Some Thoughts on the Limited Success of the Dutch Extreme Right' at the International Conference on Political Extremism, Hostility and Violence towards Foreigners and Other Marginalised Groups, Ljubljana, 22–24 March 1996. In rewriting, we benefited from comments by Paul Hansworth and Jaap Van Donselaar.

1. Most notably, the *Stichting Oud Politieke Delinquenten* (Foundation for Former Political Criminals, SOPD) and the *Werkgenootschap Europa in de Lage Landen* (Working Community Europe in the Low Countries, WEEL) – the Dutch section of the Malmö-based European Social Movement. For a general history of the early post-war extreme right, see Van Donselaar (1991, 1993), Iddekinge and Paape (1970), and Hiri (1987).
2. After several years of discussion, the NVU was named a 'criminal association' by the Amsterdam court on 8 March 1978. Because of legal technicalities and flaws, this meant that the party was not banned, and was thus still legal, but it was excluded from contesting elections. This bizarre verdict was repeated by the Supreme Court in 1979, which ruled that as long as the party was not banned, it could not and should not be obstructed in functioning as a political party in any way (see Eskes, 1988; Van Donselaar, 1991: 165–7).
3. J. G. H. (Hans) Jansmaat, born on 3 November 1934 in Gouda. After studying aircraft construction for two years, he had to stop because his father went bankrupt. After several more or less unsuccessful jobs, including two years as a 'guest worker' in Germany, he decided to return to university. He completed his political science study at the University of Amsterdam at the age of 40 and became increasingly active in various political parties. He claims to have presented a radio speech on the 'foreigner issue' in the late 1970s for *Democratische Socialisten 70* (Democratic Socialists 70, DS'70), a conservative splinter from the Social Democratic PvdA. According to Jansmaat, he was then thrown out of DS'70 because the party leader had become jealous and afraid after the enthusiastic reactions to the speech. Jansmaat joined the CP, as its seventh member, after reading an article in the left-wing journal *Vrij Nederland* (see Van Ginneken, 1994: 146–54; Van Holsteyn, 1998: 47–60).

4. The term *centrumstroming* is used as the collective noun for the CP and its successor parties. The term originated in the CP, where Jannat, especially, used it, and has since become integrated into media and scholarly discourse.
5. On 12 June 1996, the Dutch newspaper *Trouw* reported that 26 of the 78 seats won by the CD at the local election of 1994 were no longer held by the party. Eight seats had never been taken up at all, nine people had left the party but kept their seats as independents, and nine of the elected persons had joined (or founded) other extreme right parties such as CP-86, the NB and the *Burgervrij Nederland* (Citizen's Party of the Netherlands, BPN). Van Riel (1997: 20-1), in research on the extreme right local councillors elected in 1994, claims that, by 1 May 1996, there were only 41 CD representatives left (in 26 municipalities). The others had voluntarily left the party, were expelled or suspended by it, or had left the council. CP-86 also lost several seats (especially in *deegemeenten*, city districts) through defections and expulsions.
6. In November 1996, the NVP/CP-86 was again plagued by internal strife, this time leading to the expulsion of the neo-Nazi wing around Martin Freling (council member in Rotterdam) and Stewart Mordant (local councillor in The Hague and vice-chairman of the party). After a lengthy legal battle, this 50- to 100-member strong section acquired the official right to the party name and changed it back to CP-86. The 'moderate' wing was left without the party name and most of its leading members (who left politics altogether), and has since tried to survive under various different party labels.
7. These articles are often contributed by Jannat himself, though often under an obvious alias like W. Leidsman (which translates roughly as W. Leader).
8. For other analyses of support for extreme right parties over a ten-year period, see Scheepers *et al.* (1993, 1994) and Eisinga *et al.* (1998). Using opinion poll data, extreme right voters are described here in terms of sociological characteristics, and several hypotheses are tested that are derived from theories concerning the electoral support of former fascist parties.
9. In 1994, almost 90 per cent of the respondents of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (fully) agreed with the statement that politicians promise more than they can deliver, 34 per cent with the statement that ministers and secretaries of state are primarily concerned about their own personal interests, and 40 per cent with the statement that one is more likely to become a member of parliament because of one's political friends than because of one's abilities. All in all, almost 20 per cent were very cynical – that is, they agreed with all three statements (Anker and Oppenhuis, 1993: 175-6).
10. See, for a similar argument in the English case, Husbands (1988); for the German case, see Stöss (1994).
11. Some non-Dutch scholars hold another view, placing Jannat alongside successful extreme right leaders such as Le Pen and Haider (Hafeneeger, 1994; Ignazi, 1996).
12. This is in contrast to, for instance, Flanders, where a broad nationalist subculture (the 'Flemish Movement') developed as a consequence of years of oppression of the Dutch-speaking population by the French-speaking elite (see Willemsen, 1969). Through its various mouthpieces, among which are political parties like the VB and the *Volksunie* (People's Union, VU), the Flemish national question has almost always been on the political agenda.

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