<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1" ?>
<rss version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Byron G. Stier</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2009  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/byron_stier</link>
<description>Recent documents in Byron G. Stier</description>
<language>en-us</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2009 15:29:12 PDT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>3600</ttl>





<item>
<title>Another Jackpot (In)Justice: Verdict Variability and Issue Preclusion in Mass Torts</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/byron_stier/2</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/byron_stier/2</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2008 12:11:12 PDT</pubDate>
<description>If there are no prior inconsistent verdicts, non-mutual offensive issue preclusion generally allows a finding by a single jury to bar relitigation, in future cases, of the issue by the defendant who lost in the prior case.  This approach, however, ignores the possibility that the first verdict delivered may have been an outlier if further verdicts were permitted to be delivered.  In mass tort litigation, such a flawed approach may result in critical issues such as defect or negligence being resolved by only six jurors, whose potentially outlier verdict is then applied to resolve the cases of thousands, perhaps bankrupting a company or an industry when most juries would not so hold.  Focusing on mass tort litigation, this article presents the growing empirical evidence of verdict variability and then critiques the use of issue preclusion, whose downside is applied only against defendants, not plaintiffs, because only defendants were parties to the prior action.  As a result, the article argues that courts should exercise their discretion to deny issue preclusion in mass tort litigation.  Instead, courts should join the emerging consensus of mass tort management that ultimately better serves the goals of efficiency and public respect supposedly underlying issue preclusion: allow multiple verdicts to unfold a more balanced view of liability that will frequently be used for well-informed and far-reaching settlements.</description>

<author>Byron G. Stier</author>


<category>Dispute Resolution</category>

<category>Judges</category>

<category>Practice and Procedure</category>

<category>Products Liability</category>

<category>Torts</category>

</item>


<item>
<title>Jackpot Justice: Verdict Variability and The Mass Tort Class Action</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/byron_stier/1</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/byron_stier/1</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 20 Aug 2007 01:14:36 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Mass tort scholars, practitioners, and judges struggle with determining the most efficient approach to adjudicate sometimes tens of thousands of cases. Favoring class actions, mass tort scholars and judges have assumed that litigating any issue once is best. But while litigating any one issue could conceivably save attorneys' fees and court resources, a single adjudication of thousands of mass tort claims is unlikely to further tort goals of corrective justice, efficiency, or compensation in a reliable way. That is because, as recent empirical research on jury behavior shows, any one jury's verdict may be an outlier on a potential bell curve of responses applying the law to the facts before it. Indeed, one aberrational, high jury claim valuation, if extrapolated to thousands of claims through a class action, may inappropriately bankrupt an entire industry. Similarly, one unusually low jury verdict might deny legions of plaintiffs the compensation that they deserve. To illustrate the problems of attempting to resolve a mass tort with a single jury, this Article discusses the Engle tobacco class action of Florida smokers, where the application of a single jury verdict to approximately 700,000 smokers appears to be an outlier verdict in light of prior juries' verdicts in Florida tobacco cases. In contrast, this Article argues that the use of multiple juries in individual cases is a superior method of resolving a mass tort. While the use of multiple juries in class actions to create statistically cobbled claim values has been rejected as violating due process and state tort law, no such problems accompany the approach espoused here: that individual-plaintiff lawsuits, each with its own jury, be tried and that the jury verdicts be used by mass tort litigants to develop claim values for broad mass tort settlement. In addition to remaining within the strictures of constitutional and tort law, this clustering of multiple juries around an accurate valuation of mass tort claims and the resulting likely settlement furthers both the procedural goal of litigant autonomy and the tort aims of efficiency, corrective justice, and compensation.</description>

<author>Byron G. Stier</author>


<category>Torts</category>

<category>Products Liability</category>

<category>Practice and Procedure</category>

</item>



</channel>
</rss>
