Bryane Michael (bryane.michael@eueconomics.org)

Whither Turkish Capitalism?

Bryane Michael — Thu, 19 Jan 2012 03:57:16 PST

Turkish families will likely cede their controlling interests in Turkey’s dominant holding companies in the upcoming decades as Wall Street clamours for a greater share of developing world profits and families enjoy the fruits of their oligopolistic labours.

The Prosecution and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Illicit Enrichment

Bryane Michael — Wed, 28 Dec 2011 00:19:43 PST

These training slides show prosecutors and judges how to find and recover the proceeds of corruption (under Macedonian law as a practical example).

The Size and Structure of Government

Bryane Michael et al. — Fri, 14 Jan 2011 17:16:55 PST

Does government size and structure adapt to changes in government’s organisational environment (particularly to uncertainty and complexity) as predicted by organisational theory? We find – using a range of statistical analyses – support for each of the major theories of organisation adaptation (the contingency-based view, resource-based view, and rational choice view). We find that both government size and structure change – holding other factors constant – for changes in the uncertainty and complexity of governments’ organisational environments. We find seven clusters of governments which adapt their organisational sizes differently in response to changes in the uncertainty and complexity of their organisational environments – and four clusters of governments with differing preferences for the way they adapt governmental structures. We also use the available data to divide governments according to the extent to which they adapt their organisational size and structure reactively (after changes occur in their organisational environment), contemporaneously or strategically (before these changes in their organisational environment occur).

Foreign Under-Investment in US Securities and the Role of Relational Capital

Bryane Michael — Fri, 19 Nov 2010 00:38:23 PST

Over 70 academic papers attempt to explain why foreigners invest in US securities. All ignore the vital role of the US broker-dealer. Macroeconomic factors like a trade balance or corporate governance may guide foreign investors toward certain markets. But US broker-dealers provide information to foreign investors and execute the actual trades. We hypothesize that particular foreign investors under-invest in US securities because of a lack of relational capital with US broker-dealers. We find that broker-dealer marketing intensity in foreign markets partly explains foreigners’ decisions to invest in US securities. We also estimate “pent-up” demand for US securities in developing countries -- like China, Argentina, Turkey and Russia --equals roughly half-a-trillion dollars. Such pent-up demand – represented as a convergence gap with investment-to-GDP ratios in highly developed capital markets -- helps predict which markets these broker-dealers are likely to invest marketing effort in the future. As such, broker-dealers interested in assisting foreign investors find the right securities for their portfolios should not focus on big, rich economies. They should focus on economies with the largest convergence gaps. We also find that broker-dealers must take in account the effect their marketing effort has on the typical variables (like relative returns, risks, asymmetric shocks and communication with the US) when they use these screening variables in deciding where to build their relational capital (and place their sales effort) in any year.

Do Customs Trade Facilitation Programmes Help Reduce Customs-Related Corruption?

Bryane Michael et al. — Fri, 19 Nov 2010 00:35:12 PST

Customs-related corruption costs World Customs Organisation (WCO) members at least $2 billion in customs revenue each year. Using recent data only about bribe payers’ actual experiences in paying bribes, we show that trade facilitation would only help reduce corruption and improve efficiency – in a large number of customs agencies -- if the customs agency’s director undertakes a big-bang approach to reform. We also find support for the corruption clubs theory – that customs agencies in the process of reform are either moving toward OECD levels of integrity and efficiency; or they are sliding toward a “red zone” group of countries. Such a sliding results from the incentives corrupt customs officers have to stymie reform. As such, countries undertaking customs programmes – such as those endorsed by the World Customs Organisation – should not adopt reform measures piecemeal. They need to engage in anti-corruption and efficiency-enhancement programmes deeply enough to ensure they benefit from trade facilitation.

Issues in Anti-Corruption Law: Drafting Implementing Regulations for Anti-Corruption Conventions in Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union

Bryane Michael — Mon, 28 Jun 2010 21:11:10 PDT

Since the mid-1990s, many Eastern European and Former Soviet countries have adopted anti-corruption laws. These laws have failed to reduce corruption. This article discusses how to improve the implementation of these laws through regulatory instruments -- implemented by executive agencies. It discusses how to structure repressive anti-corruption organs within law enforcement agencies and set the optimal fine for administrative offences.

What Do we Know about Corruption (and Anti-Corruption) in Customs?

Bryane Michael et al. — Fri, 30 Apr 2010 00:50:12 PDT

What are the lessons from anti-corruption programmes in Customs agencies over the last 20 years? The data suggest that many of the usual activities -- like codes of conduct and posters do not work. Internal inspectorates, and particularly internal audit, has a large effect on reducing corruption. A review of the literature and best practice presented.

Saving Ukraine One Block at a Time

Bryane Michael — Sat, 30 Jan 2010 10:34:11 PST

book review for mongraph on local associations in Ukraine

What Does Kosovo Teach Us About Using Human Rights Law to Prosecute Corruption Offences?

Bryane Michael — Sun, 17 Jan 2010 21:32:51 PST

If a patient must pay a bribe to obtain life-saving surgery, does the doctor’s solicitation of a bribe represent a violation of the victim’s human rights? This paper explores the ways in which anti-corruption practitioners can look to various provisions in human rights law in order to prevent or prosecute corruption-related offences. We use Kosovo as a case study because its constitution gives direct effect to the major international human rights conventions. We find -- using Kosovo as a case study -- that some types of corruption lead to separately prosecutable human rights offences. We also find that pre-existing violations of human rights law create strong incentives for individuals to engage in corruption. We offer concrete suggestions to lawyers and prosecutors for using human rights provisions to encourage the prosecution corruption offences in highly corrupt countries like Kosovo. We also present a method of prosecuting human rights offences leading to – or resulting from – corruption as administrative offences and offer pricing models for assessing the optimal fine for the human rights offences occurring concomitant with cases of corruption.

Extradition Law and the Ukraine: Looking for Principles in the ECHR's Case Law

Bryane Michael — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 23:45:13 PDT

This presentation provides a review of ECHR's case law since 2005 related to extradition cases. The Ukraine represents one of leading countries in the Strasbourg's court for human rights violations involving extradition cases. The presentation offers concrete ways which the Ukrainian authorities can help bolster human rights in its processing of extradition cases.

The Evolution of the Anti-Corruption Industry in the Third Wave of Anti-Corruption Work

Bryane Michael — Sun, 25 Oct 2009 06:45:11 PDT

Work on anti-corruption has changed significantly in the mid-1990s -- reflecting a "third wave" of anti-corruption work. If the first and second waves of anti-corruption work reflected the marketisation of anti-corruption projects, the third wave reflects the direct cross-border co-operation between law enforcement agencies (particularly in the European Union). The first part of this paper reviews the literature and the data we consulted in our (rather informal) study. The second part traces the evolution of the anti-corruption industry across time – showing the beginning of each new wave as a “structural break” in the organisational structure of project delivery. The observation of such structural breaks provides an objective criteria for determining when a new wave began – independently of the observer. The third part of the paper reviews the economics of the anti-corruption industry through each of these waves. The fourth section provides tentative observations for other donors and participants in the anti-corruption industry – such as UNDP, the World Bank, NGOs and consulting companies – on lessons from the European Union. This paper unabashedly uses New Institutional Economics as a framework for explaining the interaction of donors, countries, consulting companies and consultants in contributing to the three “structural breaks” in the organisation of the anti-corruption industry during the last 20 years.

Issues in Anti-Corruption Law: How Can Code of Conduct Laws Be Drafted in Order to Reduce Corruption in a Public Sector like Romania’s?

Bryane Michael — Fri, 09 Oct 2009 23:48:38 PDT

International organisations, like the UN and EU, have encouraged their member states for years to increase civil servants’ compliance with particular codes of conduct. Romania represents probably one of the most advanced countries in attempting to legislate on civil servant ethics through its Code of Conduct Law. Yet, the Romanian Code of Conduct Law possesses significant weaknesses, emanating both from the inherent difficulties of using hard law in a soft law area (like civil servants’ ethics) and the Law’s silence as to specific procedures which government agencies should use in implementing the Law. Given these weaknesses, Romanian government agencies should adopt regulatory instruments which compensate for these weaknesses at the legislative level. In this paper, we present the provisions – particularly related to the establishment of agency-level ethical doctrines -- which regulatory drafters can use to implement these codes of conduct in a civil law system without running afoul of the basic requirements of civil law jurisprudence for clarity and predictability. We discuss the legal basis in Romanian administrative law for the elaboration of specific ethics-related doctrines and the ways in which such a “doctrinal approach” to administrative ethics can help achieve the objectives of the flawed Code of Conduct Law. We specifically discuss the ways in which Romanian governments can adopt such regulatory instruments and the types of provisions which should be included in order to help overcome the flaws of the Code of Conduct Law.

Should the World Customs Organisation Develop a Hard Law Approach to Anti-Corruption in Customs?

Bryane Michael — Wed, 02 Sep 2009 19:48:16 PDT

The WCO, among international organisations, remains conspicuously absent in its work on anti-corruption. This brief, a set of notes for a conference lecture, provide the steps the WCO should take in order to help customs agencies adopt anti-corruption legislation world-wide.

Issues in Anti-Corruption Law: Can an Activist Regulatory Stance Overcome Legislative Problems in Preventive Anti-Corruption Agencies Like Montenegro’s?

Bryane Michael — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 21:02:54 PDT

Article 6 of the UN Convention Against Corruption requires that signatory states establish an anti-corruption agency (or agencies) responsible for preventing corruption. However, the Convention – and legal scholarship in general – provides little direction about how such agencies should be organised. Moreover, the piece-meal nature of anti-corruption legislation in most developing countries makes the efficient operation of such agencies difficult to impossible. This article argues that regulatory instruments can help overcome the inherent weaknesses of legislative governing many anti-corruption agencies. Using the Montenegro’s Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiatives (DACI), I show how the design of a regulation – relying on already existing legislative and other legal provisions – can help improve the preventive anti-corruption agency’s ability to tackle corruption. I provide an analysis of the specific provisions of such an activist regulation point out potential pitfalls in the use of such regulations as a way of circumventing the legislature’s weakness in fighting corruption.

Use of Functional Reviews and Audits in Eastern European Public Administration

Bryane Michael — Mon, 03 Aug 2009 10:00:19 PDT

This presentation provides an overview of the internal audit methodology as applied to functional reviews and audits in the public sector. Specific examples and cases given (and critiques of the classical way of conducting these reviews).

Using Court Statistics to Improve Justice Sector Outcomes in Armenia

Bryane Michael — Sun, 19 Jul 2009 21:34:50 PDT

This presentation discusses the collection and use of court statistics in order to improve justice outcomes. The Council of Europe's CEPEJ's approach is presentated and concrete proposals for Ministry of Justice rulemaking made.

Закон за спречување на корупција во локалната власт: Правни прашања поврзани со дизајнирање на прописи и тела за спречување на корупција на локално ниво во Македонија

Bryane Michael — Mon, 20 Apr 2009 06:43:39 PDT

Општините во Република Македонија треба да усвојат прописи за спречување на корупција со цел да ја намалат корупцијата. Овој труд ги разгледува правните прашања поврзани со изработката на такви прописи и обезбедува правен совет за советите на општините за правна и економска анализа потреба за решавање на некои од потешките и подетални прашања. Најважното прашање произлегува од креирањето на модел на пропис кој општините во Македонија (или Заедницата на единиците на локалната самоуправа на Република Македонија) можат да го усвојат со цел воспоставување и работа на тела за спречување на корупција на локално ниво. Анализирана е локацијата на таквите тела, како и нивните надлежности (помеѓу другото, следење на судир на интереси, мониторинг на анкетните листови, спроведување на ревизии за ризици од корупција). Исто така трудот дава и правно толкување на легислативата во Македонија и нејзиното влијание врз дизајнирањето на прописи од страна на советите на општините од областа на спречување на корупцијата – обезбедувајќи законска основа за позитивен административен молк, поделба на набавките на општините и (најконтроверзно) qui tam наградите на општинско ниво. Кратката анализа на регулаторното влијание на прописот покажува добивка во вредност од €162,900 во општествена корист доколку таква програма се воведе во Македонија.

Mutual Legal Assistance for Accession and ENP Countries

Bryane Michael — Mon, 20 Apr 2009 06:37:21 PDT

This presentation provides a strategy for adopting the provisions related to mutual legal assistance in ETS 182 for accession and ENP countries.

When EU Law meets Arabic Law: Assessment of Anti-Corruption Law in Morocco and Some Proposed Amendments

Bryane Michael et al. — Fri, 27 Feb 2009 20:44:56 PST

This article reviews the present state of the adoption of anti-corruption legal provisions usually adopted in EU (or candidate) countries in Morocco. Morocco lags behind many countries in its adoption of anti-corruption legislation and the recently established Central Agency of the Prevention of Corruption is unlikely to succeed in speeding up the adoption of these measures. English language translations of a number of Moroccan anti-corruption legal instruments are presented and amendments to these legal instruments are recommended (based on international best practice) in order to increase the likely effectiveness of Moroccan law enforcement institutions in fighting corruption.

Organic Regulation Establishing an Internal Affairs Unit in Customs

Bryane Michael — Fri, 23 Jan 2009 04:46:43 PST

The following regulation served as a model for establishing several elements of the work of an Internal Affairs (or Internal Security) unit in several countries. Naturally, prosecutorial functions are not covered due to the complexities of criminal procedures codes in each country.