Bryan H. Druzin

The Criminalization of Lying: Under what Circumstances, if any, should Lies be made Criminal?

Bryan H. Druzin et al. — Mon, 09 Aug 2010 18:56:34 PDT

This paper argues that lying should be a crime. In doing so we propose the creation of a wholly new category of crime, which we term “egregious lying causing serious harm.” The paper has two broad objectives: the first is to make the case why such a crime should even exist, and the second is to flesh out how this crime might be constructed. The main contribution of the paper lies in the radical nature of its stated aim: the outright criminalization of certain kinds of lies. To our knowledge, such a proposal has not previously been made. The analysis also contributes to a broader discussion regarding the issue of overcriminalization. We conclude that while criminalizing certain forms of lies might at first blush appear fanciful, the case for doing so is not only plausible, it is indeed necessary.

Buying Commercial Law: Choice of Forum, Choice of Law, and Network Effect

Bryan H. Druzin — Fri, 12 Feb 2010 19:00:24 PST

This paper applies network effect theory to transnational commercial law, arguing that commercial parties selecting law through choice of law and choice of forum clauses can be likened to consumers selecting a product, and thus equally susceptible to the effects of network externalities. The number of “consumers” who subscribe to the same legal norms is analogous to the number of consumers who use a product. As the number of “consumers” increases, so too does the inherent value of selecting that jurisdiction, inducing even more parties to “purchase” that body of law. This is a network effect. I argue that transnational commercial law is ideally calibrated so as to generate a network effect. This stems from the inherent nature of commerce. The discussion distinguishes between two kinds of externalities, direct and indirect network externalities, concluding that network systems that possess both kinds of network externalities (as is the case with law-selection decisions in commercial contracts), are the best candidates to produce a robust network effect. I then examine how the twin ingredients of fluid interaction and frequent choice present in commerce precipitate a network effect; expansive interaction places a higher premium on the need for synchronization, and frequent opportunities to select law in the contracts of fresh commercial relationships allow for an incremental drift towards a specific jurisdiction. The paper ultimately concludes that, as a result, network externalities indeed play an influential role in the ascension of particular jurisdictions over others in law-selection decisions, an important conclusion as it points to an unrecognized influence underpinning the current development of transnational commercial law.

Finding Footing in a Postmodern Conception of Law

Bryan H. Druzin — Sun, 31 Jan 2010 11:05:36 PST

The following jurisprudence paper examines the implications of postmodern thought upon our conception of law. In this paper I argue that, despite the absolute, all-consuming moral relativism towards which postmodernism seems to lead in its most extreme form, its acceptance in fact in no way undermines the possibility of finding solid ground for our legal principles. This paper contends that moral objectivity can be found in the individual experience of suffering generated by these very subjective concoctions. Subjective concoctions or not, they are real in that they imbue a sense of value into conditions, and may thus serve as foundational principles for law. While our value systems are stripped of all claim to objective authority, ultimately, all postmodernism does is force us to set aside our larger concepts of “justice,” and instead root our legal conceptions at this far more fundamental level of human experience.

Law Without the State: The Theory Of High Engagement and the Emergence of Spontaneous Legal Order within Commercial Systems

Bryan H. Druzin — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 03:57:28 PDT

This paper examines the idea that commercial law has the capacity to evolve spontaneously in the absence of a clear state authority because of its unique nature. I argue that the manner of interaction implied by commerce plays a crucial role in this ability as it involves a high degree of overall engagement. This I term “high engagement,” which I divide into two elements: repetition and the creation of clear cycles of interaction. Together they produce identifiable legal norms and subsequent compliance. Game theorists have long recognized the importance of repeated interaction in inducing cooperation; however, how the manner of commercial interaction itself facilitates this process has been left largely unexamined. Part I presents a brief overview of the concept of reciprocity and spontaneous law theory. In Part II, a more detailed explanation of the notion of high engagement is offered. Here I set out exactly how high engagement is instrumental in the emergence of legal norms. Finally, the paper concludes that the element of high engagement indeed plays a decisive role in commercial law’s ability to evolve and function in a decentralized, spontaneous fashion—an important insight in terms of the future international development of the modern law merchant as it emerges in the absence of a single legislative authority.