The Predecessor Attack: An Analysis of a Threat to Anonymous Communications Systems
This paper was harvested from CiteSeer
There have been a number of protocols proposed for anonymous network communication. In this paper we investigate attacks by corrupt group members that degrade the anonymity of each protocol over time. We prove that when a particular initiator continues communication with a particular responder across path reformations, existing protocols are subject to the attack. We use this result to place an upper bound on how long existing protocols, including Crowds, Onion Routing, Hordes, Web Mixes, and DC-Net, can maintain anonymity in the face of the attacks described. This provides a basis for comparing these protocols against each other. Our results show that fully-connected DC-Net is the most resilient to these attacks, but it suffers from scalability issues that keep anonymity group sizes small. We also show through simulation that the underlying topography of the DC-Net has affects the resilience of the protocol: as the number of neighbors a node has increases both the communications overhead and the strength of the protocol increase.
Matthew K. Wright, Micah Adler, Brian Neil Levine, and Clay Sheilds. "The Predecessor Attack: An Analysis of a Threat to Anonymous Communications Systems" 2002
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/brian_levine/8