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<title>Brian Lai</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2009  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/brian_lai</link>
<description>Recent documents in Brian Lai</description>
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<lastBuildDate>Sun, 31 May 2009 04:04:07 PDT</lastBuildDate>
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<title>Reducing the Effects of Moral Hazard: Institutional Designs Within International Alliances</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/brian_lai/30</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 09 Jan 2009 10:00:50 PST</pubDate>
<description>What explains the level of commitment within an international military alliance? Specifically, when do alliances choose to adopt active military support for offensive uses of force versus lower levels of commitment? Drawing on the rational design of international institutions literature, this paper argues that the choice of commitment is a conscious effort to address two competing problems. The first is the potential for entrapment. Allies worry that commitments may lead other member states to act in a risky fashion, creating unnecessary conflict. The other problem is the need to demonstrate commitment in order to maximize the bargaining power of the member states. The former problem leads allies to choose lower levels of commitment like defense pacts in order to signal to alliance members what types of behaviors are acceptable. Conversely, the latter problem encourages states to make broader obligations about when they will use force. Empirically, concern for moral hazard should be more likely when there are power disparities amongst members within an alliance. Greater levels of threat facing alliance members should lead states to favor maximizing their commitments. These two arguments are tested empirically on all alliances from 1816-1992 with results supporting both conjectures.</description>

<author>Brian Lai</author>


<category>Cooperation</category>

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<item>
<title>Reputation and Reliability: Upholding Commitments for the Future</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/brian_lai/29</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 30 Dec 2008 07:58:27 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Brian Lai</author>


<category>Cooperation</category>

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<item>
<title>Reducing the Effects of Moral Hazard: Institutional Designs Within International Alliances</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/brian_lai/28</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 30 Dec 2008 07:56:00 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Brian Lai</author>


<category>Cooperation</category>

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<item>
<title>Examining the Escalation of Terrorist Violence to Civil War</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/brian_lai/27</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 30 Dec 2008 07:39:22 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Brian Lai</author>


<category>Internal Conflict</category>

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<item>
<title>Testing Theories of Democratic Development, 1950-1992</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/brian_lai/26</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 05 Dec 2008 15:02:43 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Brian Lai</author>


<category>Democratization</category>

</item>


<item>
<title>Military Mobilization and International Crises</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/brian_lai/25</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 05 Dec 2008 15:01:42 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Brian Lai</author>


<category>International Crises</category>

</item>


<item>
<title>The Effects and Causes of Secret Mobilization</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/brian_lai/24</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 05 Dec 2008 15:00:52 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Brian Lai</author>


<category>International Crises</category>

</item>


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<title>Empirically Modeling International Crises with a Heteroskedastic Probit Model</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/brian_lai/23</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 05 Dec 2008 15:00:11 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Brian Lai</author>


<category>International Crises</category>

</item>


<item>
<title>Liberalism, Realism, and United Nations Voting: An Empirical Test of Contending Theories</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/brian_lai/22</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 05 Dec 2008 14:58:42 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Brian Lai</author>


<category>Cooperation</category>

</item>


<item>
<title>The Conflict Behavior of Authoritarian States</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/brian_lai/21</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 04 Dec 2008 09:57:25 PST</pubDate>
<description></description>

<author>Brian Lai</author>


<category>Domestic Politics and Conflict</category>

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