<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
<rss version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Bret Asbury</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2011  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/bret_asbury</link>
<description>Recent documents in Bret Asbury</description>
<language>en-us</language>
<lastBuildDate>Wed, 28 Sep 2011 14:06:52 PDT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>3600</ttl>








<item>
<title>Anti-Snitching Norms and Loyalty</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/bret_asbury/3</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/bret_asbury/3</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 07 Sep 2010 00:01:01 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>In recent years a troubling trend has emerged within a number of poor, black communities. Termed “Stop Snitching,” it has manifested itself in the form community members’ refusing to cooperate with police investigations of community crimes. The result of this widespread refusal to cooperate has been a reduced number of crimes solved within these communities; without cooperating witnesses, it has proven exceedingly difficult for police to make criminal cases.</p>
<p>Reactions to Stop Snitching have taken two predominant forms, both of which are mistaken. The first, most often attributed to law enforcement officers, is contempt. To them, community members who do not assist in criminal investigations are violating the ethical obligation all citizens have to aid in the arrest and prosecution of criminal actors. The second reaction to Stop Snitching, most often coming from citizens largely isolated from poor, black communities, is confusion. Assuming the police to be allies of the citizenry, they wonder why anyone would even entertain the notion of refusing to help the police solve community crimes.</p>
<p>This Article suggests a different understanding of Stop Snitching, arguing that poor, black community members’ refusal to cooperate with police investigations should be viewed as neither ethically condemnable nor inexplicable, but rather as a natural extension of the innate human aspiration to be loyal. It does so by situating Stop Snitching within the existing literature on loyalty and asserting that the refusal to cooperate with police represents a privileging of community loyalty over loyalty to the state. Throughout the various strata of contemporary society, such privileging of the familiar over the remote is common, and Stop Snitching is neither puzzling nor reprehensible when viewed as a manifestation of this manner of prioritization.</p>
<p>Once Stop Snitching is understood as a reflection of the weak loyalty bonds that exist between police officers and the poor, black communities they serve, it becomes clear that it can only be curtailed and ultimately eliminated through police efforts aimed at strengthening these bonds. This Article closes with a discussion of the steps police should take in order to succeed in this regard.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Bret Asbury</author>


<category>General Law</category>

<category>Law Enforcement and Corrections</category>

<category>Criminal Law and Procedure</category>

<category>Law and Society</category>

<category>Jurisprudence</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Anti-Snitching Norms and Loyalty</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/bret_asbury/2</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/bret_asbury/2</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2009 12:36:04 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>In recent years, the so-called “Stop Snitching”  phenomenon has gained increasing attention in both the national media and legal scholarship. Broadly speaking, Stop Snitching describes a perceived cultural norm whereby members of poor, minority communities refuse to cooperate with law enforcement officers seeking to solve crimes. This refusal to cooperate has been roundly condemned as an aberrant, self-defeating violation of the social contract. Commentators accordingly seem both puzzled and deeply troubled by what motivates these citizens to withhold information that could result in the removal of criminals from their neighborhoods.</p>
<p>In this Article, I endeavor to contextualize Stop Snitching in order to show that the refusal to cooperate with law enforcement officers need not be viewed as aberrant or irrational, but rather as a natural extension of the innate human value of loyalty. To do so, I draw first on George Fletcher’s Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships to show that loyalty has historically been among the most cherished of attributes and that the violation of loyalty - betrayal - has long been consistently and sharply condemned across cultures.</p>
<p>I then describe the continuing importance of loyalty in contemporary society. Children are taught not to be a tattletale before they are able to read or write. Police, physicians, and even lawyers work under social norms whereby telling on another member of the profession who has violated his or her duty is deemed worthy of contempt, notwithstanding professional rules of conduct that encourage or require these professionals to do so. And corporate whistle-blowers, though often lauded outside of their organizations, frequently become subject to retaliation and harsh treatment from within. Each of these instances evidences a widespread cultural norm of loyalty and underscores the pervasiveness of its accepted value in contemporary society.</p>
<p>Viewed in this context, Stop Snitching begins to look far less puzzling to outside observers. To the extent the criminals sought are considered members of the potential witnesses’ community, and the law enforcement officers investigating them are not, the desire not to tell can be viewed as an act of loyalty rather than an act of civil disobedience. My argument is that Stop Snitching is not the sui generis aberration it has been portrayed to be, but rather a predictable, rational mode of behavior given the continuing importance of loyalty in modern society and racial and economic segregation that remains pervasive throughout America.</p>
<p>Having thus contextualized Stop Snitching, I explore some of the reasons why it has been singled out for condemnation and offer suggestions for how to diminish its prevalence.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Bret D. Asbury</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Law as Palimpsest: Conceptualizing Contingency in Judicial Opinions (forthcoming 2009)</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/bret_asbury/1</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://works.bepress.com/bret_asbury/1</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2009 12:32:33 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Metaphors create conceptualizations, and for decades  legal academics have employed metaphors to shape understandings of legal problems. But no metaphor in current use successfully conceptualizes the contingency of judicial opinions and the complexity of the relationship between opinions and precedent. This Article seeks to fill this void by introducing a new metaphor, the palimpsest, into the realm of legal analysis.</p>
<p>A palimpsest is a writing surface that can be cleared away for reuse, like a personal blackboard. What distinguishes a palimpsest from other writing surfaces is that its removed contents do not disappear, but remain, obscured yet recoverable: A writing on a palimpsest never goes away.</p>
<p>This Article argues that thinking of judicial opinions as being part of a shared, ever-evolving palimpsest underscores the fact that they are ultimately contingent and serves as a reminder of the multiple levels of  interconnectedness between them and the cases they cite. Precedents—like the underlayers of a palimpsest—never go away, and they inform and shape the application of opinions in ways far more significant than simply serving as points of reference. A palimpsestic approach to understanding judicial decisionmaking also helps to explain why even the oldest, most reviled cases remain part of our national psyche—like underlayers of a palimpsest, they can never truly disappear, and their continued presence forces us to grapple with their existence. Finally, considering judicial opinions as part of a shared palimpsest reminds us that even the most troubling opinion is ultimately contingent, its application subject to reexamination and revision by future courts and future generations. Just as such an opinion replaces its precedents, it too will one day be replaced, like each of a palimpsest’s layers.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Bret D. Asbury</author>


</item>





</channel>
</rss>

