Reason Curve, Jury Competence and the English Criminal Justice System

Bethel G.A Erastus-Obilo, University of Atlanta, Atlanta, GA. USA

Abstract

The philosophical question raised by this paper is this: what kind of jury system do we want — one that reflects its past, one that remains what it is or one that can be what it can be? The moral question is equally potent: to what extent is a trial fair when the reason for a verdict is absent? Even more fundamentally, should our criminal trial system attempt to balance the contrasting demands of fairness, accountability and procedure taking into account our cultural heritage? Furthermore, can the judge’s commentary after a verdict be taken to sufficiently approximate a jury’s reason as to render it unnecessary? All these questions have a direct effect on the finality of a trial or perception of it. I make no claims to provide infallible answers to these questions. However, the paper is about the place of the explained verdict in the English Criminal Justice System. It is not about the pursuit of certainty, moral or otherwise although it argues that in the absence of the qualifying virtues, a modern jury’s verdict, given the prevailing demands, lacks legitimacy and undermines the principle of certainty. It recognises the elusive nature of legal certainty and the exhausting but largely non-descriptive nature of that pursuit. Indeed, a criminal trial is not, avowedly, an exercise in the pursuit of certainty anymore than a Sunday service in a Church is a testament to a divine certainty. The philosophers of the past, from Hume to Bentham, Mill to Webb did not argue for the singular pursuit of certainty. They, instead, argued for a platform for pursuing an alternative approach to certainty and presented an intellectual argument in which the subject, though demonstrably elusive, remains a potent and legitimate curiosity whose goal may be approximated through the pursuit of justifiable coherence. This coherence, in our context, refers to the transparency of the jury’s role in the form of an explained verdict. While this may not lead to the desired certainty with regards to the outcome, it nonetheless provides a measure of articulation and clarity upon which any future research or reformation could be based. Ultimately driven by moral preoccupations, the concept of transparency and fairness rather than metaphysical convictions, I adopt a practical approach to the challenges of truth seeking.