of Law, the authors participated in a panel discussing strategies for teaching controversial topics,

which focused on teaching reproductive rights and related gender issues. This essay collects

some of the strategies discussed at the conference. First we address what constitutes a

“controversial” legal topic, outlining the several different ways in which a topic might be or

become controversial within the context of a particular class. Next, we discuss the importance of

laying the groundwork, throughout the semester, for the anticipated—and unanticipated—

discussions surrounding controversial topics and techniques for laying that groundwork. Finally,

we outline specific classroom techniques and resources to aid professors at the time controversial

topics in the classroom are confronted.

Nearly one year before The New York Times in its article “The Opt-Out Revolution” showcased highly educated, upwardly mobile women opting out of paid work for the lure of staying at home, Fortune magazine had already reported that some men, which it coined “trophy husbands,” had been doing the same. “Trophy husbands” were presented as leaving paid work by choice, like their later opt-out counterparts.

Opt-out moms and trophy husbands—as described in these two germinal stories—have much in common. While, on the surface, the actions of these mothers and fathers may have been voluntary or even altruistic, at their core, their actions reinforce Joan Williams’ assertions that deep problems pervade the legal regime surrounding families and employment. This essay builds on Williams’s groundbreaking work by using “Trophy Husbands,” to examine how fathers fit into the opt-out conversation. Whether “Trophy Husband” or “Opt-Opt” mother, the formerly paid worker at issue may actually have been pushed out of paid employment. Thus, both stories demonstrate that by focusing on the “choice” to stay home, we may neglect the important work of addressing work-life balance law reform.

First, judges regularly—and often inaccurately—cite the theoretical availability of alternative reproductive health services as proof that women’s health will not suffer even if a law curtailing reproductive rights is upheld. I label this the “availability tool.” Second, when alternatives are not available, judges may blame women for the lack of available services or procedures. I call this the “culpability tool.” Although the availability and culpability tools can be applied in a manner that appropriately considers women’s health, often they are not. Thus, the availability and culpability tools contribute to the undervaluing of women’s health in reproductive health jurisprudence.