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<title>Bernadette B. Genetin</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2009  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_genetin</link>
<description>Recent documents in Bernadette B. Genetin</description>
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<title>Expressly Repudiating Implied Repeals Analysis: A New Framework for Resolving Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_genetin/2</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 29 Nov 2007 06:55:29 PST</pubDate>
<description>Part I of this Article provides a framework for understanding the core issues of interbranch power implicated in statute-Rule conflicts by discussing the constitutional foundations of procedural rulemaking authority, Congress' statutory delegation of rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court in the Rules Enabling Act, and the experience of Court and congressional involvement in procedural rulemaking.Part II examines the predominant method of analyzing apparent statute-Rule conflicts - use of canon of statutory interpretation disfavoring implied repeals.  Part II demonstrates that the Supreme Court has used this implied repeals analysis, but has never discussed directly or comprehensively the appropriate methodology for resolving statute-Rule conflicts.  Part II also emphasizes how use of an unmodified implied repeals analysis fails to address paramount issues of power and also encourages courts to ignore, omit, or subordinate such issues.Part III proposes an alternative framework for resolving conflicts between statutes enacted by Congress and Federal Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act process that accords primacy to the allocation of rulemaking power between the Court and Congress.  This proposed method of analysis is referred to as the "rulemaking authority" framework to distinguish it from the implied repeals framework that accords primacy to principles of statutory interpretation.</description>

<author>Bernadette B. Genetin</author>


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<title>Powers that be: A Reexamination of the Federal Courts&apos; Rulemaking and Adjudicatory Powers in the Context of a Clash of a Congressional Statute and a Supreme Court Rule</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_genetin/1</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 29 Nov 2007 06:42:55 PST</pubDate>
<description>This Article examines the long-standing conflict between Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which was promulgated by the Supreme Court, and a federal statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).  The Article emphasizes that, when a Federal Rule incorporates state law, many federal courts have applied and inappropriate analysis to conflicts between congressional statutes and Supreme Court Rules; these courts focus on a clash of federal-state authority, rather than recognizing that the conflict presents a horizontal clash of federal authority.The Article has three goals.  First, the Article identifies the flaw in current statute-Rule conflict analysis when a federal statute conflicts with a Federal Rule that incorporates state law.  The Article recognizes that these statute-Rule conflicts present potential power conflicts between Congress's and the Supreme Court's authority to create procedure for the federal courts, rather than conflicts of federal and state law.  Second, the Article provides a resolution of the apparent conflict between the CERCLA statute and Rule 17(b).  Third, the Article highlights the narrowing power of federal courts in construing federal statutes or filling the interstices in federal statutes with federal common law under current Supreme Court jurisprudence.  The Article also compares the courts' narrowed adjudicatory authority in creating federal common law with the federal courts' broader authority when interpreting a federal statute for the purpose of determining if the statute preempts state law.  Given the increasingly narrow power of federal courts in statutory construction and creating federal common law, this Article suggests that the Supreme Court's statutorily (and constitutionally) circumscribed procedural rulemaking authority may be broader in many instances than the federal courts' principal authority of adjudicating cases and controversies, at least when the case involves construction of a federal statute.</description>

<author>Bernadette B. Genetin</author>


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