Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene Recent documents in Bernadette Atuahene en-us Tue, 03 Nov 2009 11:34:37 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/16 http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/16 Fri, 30 Oct 2009 08:52:20 PDT Bernadette Atuahene General Works http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/15 http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/15 Fri, 30 Oct 2009 08:50:24 PDT Bernadette Atuahene Property-Personal and Real http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/13 http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/13 Mon, 13 Jul 2009 11:19:06 PDT Bernadette Atuahene Property-Personal and Real http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/11 http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/11 Wed, 13 Aug 2008 14:59:24 PDT In many states, past property theft is a volatile political issue that threatens to destabilize nascent democracies. How does a state avoid instability when past property theft causes a significant number of people to believe that the property distribution is illegitimate? To explore this question, I first define legitimacy relying on an empirical understanding of the concept. Second, I establish the relationship between inequality, illegitimate property distribution, and instability. Third, I describe the three ways a state can achieve stability when faced with an illegitimate property distribution: by using its coercive powers, by attempting to change people's beliefs about the legitimacy of the property distribution, or by enacting a Legitimacy Enhancing Compensation Program (LECP), which strengthens the average citizen's belief that she ought to comply with the law. Fourth, I develop the concept of a legitimacy disequilibrium, which is a decision-making framework that helps states decide if they should provide compensation to avoid instability. The framework requires states to weigh the cost of compensation against the cost of illegitimacy so I give a detailed description of what these costs entail. To best promote long-term stability, I argue that states should enact a LECP when the cost of illegitimacy outweighs the cost of compensation. Lastly, I outline the process a state should use to weigh the costs and decide whether to provide compensation for past theft to prevent things from falling apart. Bernadette Atuahene Property-Personal and Real International Law Comparative Law Law and Society Public Law and Legal Theory http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/10 http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/10 Wed, 19 Dec 2007 08:18:02 PST Bernadette Atuahene Property-Personal and Real http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/9 http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/9 Wed, 19 Dec 2007 08:17:18 PST Bernadette Atuahene Property-Personal and Real http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/7 http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/7 Mon, 21 May 2007 10:27:05 PDT Abstract: How does a democratic state legitimize strong property rights when property arrangements are widely perceived to be defined by past theft? The answer, I argue, is through restorative justice measures that redistribute wealth based on past dispossession. This answer, however, leads to two more complex questions: Who gets priority in the restorative process given limited resources and how should the process unfold? The concise answers to these two ancillary questions are: First, instances of what I call property-induced invisibility should be prioritized as a baseline for achieving legitimacy. When property is confiscated in this manner people are removed from the social contract and made invisible. Widespread invisibility is of particular concern because it can lead to chaos and instability and places the legitimacy of existing property arrangements in serious doubt. Consequently, states must, at minimum, rectify property-induced invisibility in the restorative process. Second, societies must change the focus from restoration of the physical property confiscated to the larger project of restoring an individual's relationship to society. This will happen if those subject to property-induced invisibility are included in the social contract through a bottom-up process that provides the dispossessed with asset-based choices. The process of allowing people to choose how they are made whole will do a substantial amount of work towards correcting property-induced invisibility and thereby increasing the legitimacy of existing property arrangements. I use a South African case study to test the practical effect of my theories of invisibility and restoration. Keywords: Reparation, restorative justice, restoration, restitution, invisibility, social contract, property, legitimacy, historical injustice, theft, distributive justice, past theft, apartheid, south africa, land reform, land restitution JEL Classifications: H53, I30, I31, O10 Working Paper Series Bernadette Atuahene Property-Personal and Real http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/5 http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/5 Thu, 22 Feb 2007 11:22:30 PST Bernadette Atuahene General Works http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/4 http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/4 Thu, 22 Feb 2007 11:21:55 PST Bernadette Atuahene General Works http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/3 http://works.bepress.com/bernadette_atuahene/3 Thu, 22 Feb 2007 11:20:43 PST The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act (Helms-Burton Act) is the latest appendage to the Cuban embargo. Title III has caused an international uproar because it gives U.S. victims of Cuban expropriation a right of action within U.S. courts against third parties who traffic in confiscated property. For example, a U.S. citizen can sue a Canadian Mining company doing business in Cuba if they are operating on or using expropriated property. The Helms-Burton Act (HBA) targets U.S. allies who continue to trade and invest in Cuba regardless of pending U.S. claims of expropriation. In response to the HBA, Cuba, Canada, Mexico, and the European Union (EU) created antidote legislation to protect their domestic interests against the allegedly illegitimate extension of U.S. jurisdiction. This Article investigates the interesting relationship between the economic and political power of a country and its ability to curtail the domestic effects of the HBA. Part II provides a brief background of the HBA and evaluates the virtues and vices of each of its four titles. Part III argues that the United States is using Title III as a bargaining device to force U.S. allies to adjust their policy towards Cuba and to discourage foreign corporations from investing in the island. Given the United State's acutely unequal level of political and economic power in the world, the mere threat to enforce Title III has had severe implications for Cuba and its trading partners. Part IV presents the legislative offensive launched by Cuba, Canada, Mexico, and the EU to protect their domestic interests in the face of this Title III threat. More importantly, this section explores how power asymmetries limit the ability of foreign governments to block the application of U.S. law within its jurisdiction. Part V explores the utility and efficacy of using antidote legislation as a diplomatic tool. Bernadette Atuahene International Trade