Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros Recent documents in Benjamin Barros en-us Wed, 04 Nov 2009 23:18:38 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/14 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/14 Tue, 03 Nov 2009 10:09:57 PST The American law of estates and future interests is tremendously complex. This complexity is unjustifiable because it serves no modern purpose. Many of the distinctions between types of interests in the current system of ownership are vestiges of ancient English feudal concepts and owe their place in the law solely to historical accident. This article develops a proposed model law designed to simplify and modernize the basic property ownership system. The proposals made here differ substantially from prior suggestions for legislative reform, and reflect issues of enactability and retroactivity that previously have been neglected in the literature. The article both builds on and critiques the recently-released preliminary draft of Division VII of the Restatement Third, Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers), and explains why a model law will be more effective than a Restatement in achieving modernization and reform of the estates and future interests system. Benjamin Barros Property-Personal and Real http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/13 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/13 Wed, 05 Aug 2009 08:57:24 PDT Benjamin Barros General Law http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/12 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/12 Wed, 05 Aug 2009 08:56:18 PDT Benjamin Barros General Law http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/11 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/11 Tue, 14 Apr 2009 11:29:23 PDT Skipper and Millstein (2005) argued that existing conceptions of mechanisms failed to "get at" natural selection but left open the possibility that a refined conception of mechanisms could resolve the problems that they identified. I respond to Skipper and Millstein, and argue that while many of their points have merit, their objections can be overcome and that natural selection can be characterized as a mechanism. In making this argument, I discuss the role of regularity in mechanisms, and develop an account of stochastic (i.e., probabilistic) mechanisms. Explaining the phenomenon of adaptation through the mechanism of natural selection illustrates the power and flexibility of using mechanistic strategies to explain natural phenomena. Benjamin Barros Natural Selection http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/10 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/10 Thu, 02 Apr 2009 12:13:28 PDT Benjamin Barros Property-Personal and Real http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/9 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/9 Thu, 02 Apr 2009 12:11:53 PDT Benjamin Barros Property-Personal and Real http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/8 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/8 Thu, 02 Apr 2009 12:10:40 PDT Benjamin Barros Property-Personal and Real http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/7 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/7 Thu, 02 Apr 2009 12:09:43 PDT This short essay discusses the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lingle v. Chevron and its potential long-term impact on the Court's regulatory takings doctrine. Lingle involved a narrow (though important) issue of takings law, and on the surface it appears to be a relatively modest case. A deeper look, however, reveals that in its separation of substantive due process and regulatory takings, Lingle has tremendous potential to clarify regulatory takings doctrine. If this potential is fulfilled, Lingle is likely to be far more significant in the long term than Kelo v. City of New London, which has dominated the commentary about the Court's recent takings decisions. Lingle may also have the counter-intuitive effect of helping property-rights advocates (who were the putative losers in the case) by undercutting the precedential value of cases that help the government in takings battles. Benjamin Barros Property-Personal and Real http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/6 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/6 Thu, 02 Apr 2009 12:08:10 PDT This article, which is the first comprehensive discussion of the American legal concept of home, makes two major contributions. First, the article systematically examines how homes are treated more favorably than other types of property in a wide range of legal contexts, including criminal law and procedure, torts, privacy, landlord-tenant, debtor-creditor, family law, and income taxation. Second, the article considers the normative issue of whether this favorable treatment is justified. The article draws from material on the psychological concept of home and the cultural history of home throughout this analysis, providing insight into the interests at stake in various legal issues involving the home.The article concludes that homes are different from other types of property and give rise to legal interests deserving of special legal protection, but that these interests can be outweighed by competing interests in particular legal contexts. The result is that in many contexts special legal treatment of homes is justified. In other contexts, for example residential rent control, the strength of competing interests means that the law overprotects the home. In still other contexts, for example eminent domain law as embodied by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kelo v. New London, the law tends to underprotect the home. Benjamin Barros Property-Personal and Real http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/5 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_barros/5 Thu, 02 Apr 2009 12:07:04 PDT Benjamin Barros Property-Personal and Real