Copyright (c) 2008 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar Recent documents in Benjamin Alamar Ph.D. en-us Wed, 02 Apr 2008 20:41:05 PDT 3600 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/10 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/10 Mon, 04 Dec 2006 15:12:03 PST Aaron Schatz Football http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/9 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/9 Mon, 04 Dec 2006 13:21:05 PST This paper combines an estimated expected run value equation with a probability model on the outcome of batted balls to isolate the game within a game. Using linear regression we were then able to determine the percentage of the outcome of an at bat that is controlled by a pitcher and the percentage that is controlled by the batter. Benjamin Alamar Ph.D. Baseball http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/8 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/8 Mon, 04 Dec 2006 13:21:04 PST The passing premium puzzle is the existence of a balance between the number of passing and running plays, even though there is a greater expected return in passing plays. The puzzle is documented using both historical trends of aggregate numbers and play by play data from the 2005 NFL season. Benjamin C. Alamar Football http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/7 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/7 Mon, 04 Dec 2006 13:21:04 PST Objective: To determine the effect of the Delaware smoke-free law on gaming revenue. Methods: Linear regression of gaming revenue and average revenue per machine on a public policy variable, time, while controlling for economic activity and seasonal effects. Results: The linear regression showed that the smoke-free law was associated with no effect on total revenue or average revenue per machine. Conclusion: Smoke-free laws are associated with no change in gaming revenue. Lev L. Mandel MSc. Tobacco Economics http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/6 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/6 Mon, 04 Dec 2006 13:21:03 PST The dominant model of addictive consumption in economics is the theory of rational addiction. The addict in this model chooses how much they are going to consume based upon their level of addiction (past consumption), the current benefits and all future costs. Several empirical studies of cigarette sales and price data have found a correlation between future prices and consumption and current consumption. These studies have argued that the correlation validates the rational addiction model and invalidates any model in which future consumption is not considered. An alternative to the rational addiction model is one in which addiction spreads through a population as if it were an infectious disease, as supported by the large body of empirical research of addictive behaviors. In this model an individual's probability of becoming addicted to a substance is linked to the behavior of their parents, friends and society. In the infectious disease model current consumption is based only on the level of addiction and current costs. Price and consumption data from a simulation of the infectious disease model showed a qualitative match to the results of the rational addiction model. The infectious disease model can explain all of the theoretical results of the rational addiction model with the addition of explaining initial consumption of the addictive good. Benjamin Alamar Tobacco Economics http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/5 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/5 Mon, 04 Dec 2006 13:21:02 PST Governor Gray Davis has proposed a $1.10 increase in the cigarette tax and Assembly Speaker Herb Wesson has proposed a $2.13 increase in the cigarette tax. The state's Tobacco Education and Research Oversight Committee has noted that the California Tobacco Control Program has ceased to be competitive with the tobacco industry and recommended that $200 million from any tobacco tax increase be used to reinvigorate the Program; doing so would require 20 cents per pack to be allocated to the Program. Previous experience from California (and elsewhere) indicates that doing so would substantially reduce tobacco consumption. There is strong public support for increasing the tobacco tax; with 74% approval, the highest of any option considered. Allocating a portion of any cigarette tax increase to the Tobacco Control Program so it could assist smokers in quitting and prevent young people from starting would address the "fairness issue," that the tobacco industry and its allies have often used successfully to argue against tobacco tax increases. The only loser from a tobacco tax increase and reinvigorated Tobacco Control Program would be the tobacco industry: a $1.10 tax would cost the tobacco industry $667 million in lost sales annually; a $2.13 tax would cost the tobacco industry $1.05 billion in lost sales annually The Tobacco Securitization Bonds will not affect the general fund, even if smoking decreases. These bonds have been collateralized entirely by payments from the Master Settlement Agreement and the bondholders have no claim on the general fund or any other state revenue. A tobacco tax (after allocating 20 cents for Tobacco Control) would generate substantial revenues for the state General Fund through a combination of increased excise and sales taxes: a $1.10 tax would net $806 million; a $2.13 tax would net $1.59 billion Implementing either tax proposal will increase sales tax revenues for local government: a $1.10 tax would net $47 million for local government; a $2.13 tax would net $92 million for local government The combined effects of the price increase and reinvigorated Tobacco Control Program would have substantial benefits for California smokers: with a $1.10 tax, 555,000 smokers would quit; with a $2.13 tax, 818,000 smokers would quit There would be immediate benefits (in the first year) in terms of reduced heart attacks, low birth weight infants, childhood asthma, and sudden infant death: 475 heart attacks, including 145 deaths would be prevented with a $1.10 tax (700 and 215 with a $2.10 tax); 380 low birth weight births would be prevented with a $1.10 tax (560 with a $2.10 tax); 500 new cases of childhood asthma would be prevented (745 with a $2.10 tax); 20 cases of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome would be prevented (30 with a $2.10 tax); about $29 million would be saved in direct medical costs ($43 million with a $2.10 tax) Over the longer term, risks for other diseases - such as cancer - would fall and risks of heart disease would continue to fall. The health and economic benefits at steady state would be: 1,500 cancer deaths would be prevented annually with a $1.10 tax (2,200 with a $2.10 tax); 1,400 cardiovascular deaths would be prevented annually with a $1.10 tax (2,000 with a $2.10 tax); 1,000 lung disease deaths would be prevented annually with a $1.10 tax (1,600 with a $2.10 tax); 5,800 smoking-related deaths would be prevented annually with a $1.10 tax (8,500 with a $2.10 tax); about $2.27 billion would be saved in total medical costs with a $1.10 tax ($3.34 billion with a $2.10 tax) It is unlikely that increased smuggling, internet, or other nontaxed sales would substantially affect these revenue estimates. These estimates are based on price elasticity values derived from taxable sales, which already account for any smuggling When cigarette prices went up by $1.20 in 1999 (because of a combination of Proposition 10 and price increases by the tobacco industry to pay for the Master Settlement Agreement), there was not a substantial amount of smokers obtaining cigarettes from illegal sources. An increase in smuggling or nontaxable sales large enough to offset the increased revenues would have to amount to around half all the cigarettes smoked in California, 483 million packs for a $1.10 tax and 573 million packs for a $2.13 tax. Smuggling 483 million packs would require enough mobile homes to reach 135 miles, from Sacramento to Reno, Nevada if parked end-to-end; smuggling 573 million packs would require mobile homes stretching 169 miles, from Sacramento to 4 miles past Fernley, Nevada. The Tobacco Securitization Bonds will not affect the general fund, even if smoking decreases. These bonds have been collateralized entirely by payments from the Master Settlement Agreement and the bondholders have no claim on the general fund or any other state revenue. Even with a $2.13 increase in the cigarette excise tax, Californians still would be subsidizing smoking through the medical system at $5 per pack. Michael Ong MD, Ph.D. Tobacco Economics http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/4 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/4 Mon, 04 Dec 2006 13:21:01 PST Taxes on cigarettes have long been used to help reduce cigarette consumption. Social factors also affect cigarette consumption, but this impact has not been quantified. We computed a social unacceptability index based on individuals' responses to questions regarding locations where smoking should be allowed. A regression analysis showed that the social unacceptability index and price had similar elasticities and that their effects were independent of each other. If, through an active tobacco control campaign, the average individual's views on the social unacceptability of smoking changed to more closely resemble the views of California residents, there would be a 15% drop in cigarette consumption, equivalent to a 1.17 dollars increase in the excise tax on cigarettes. Benjamin Alamar Tobacco Economics http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/2 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/2 Mon, 04 Dec 2006 13:21:00 PST Benjamin Alamar Ph.D. Tobacco Economics http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/3 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/3 Mon, 04 Dec 2006 13:21:00 PST The tobacco industry fights increases in cigarette excise taxes with inflated claims of smuggling and its associated crime. The tobacco industry makes public statements regarding its commitment to stopping smuggling and the negative effects it has on their business, despite their internal knowledge that smuggling does not have a negative impact on the cigarette companies. The tobacco industry acts cooperatively to create the impression that there is grassroots level opposition to increased tobacco taxes. Once tax increases are implemented, the tobacco industry, contrary to its rhetoric, uses the tax increase to mask wholesale price increases. On average, the tobacco industry increases wholesale prices by 150% of any tax increase. Additionally, the tobacco industry appears to have increased cigarette prices by 605% of the first year cost of the Master Settlement Agreement. Previously published studies that analyzed data from various time periods between 1950 and 2000 have estimated that 2% to 6% of cigarettes are smuggled within the United States. The economic motivations for smuggling cigarettes in California are substantially lower in 2003 than they were in the early 1970s. Our new estimate of smuggling in California shows that 1% to 4.2% ($7 million to $45 million annually in lost tax revenue compared to $1.1 billion in cigarette taxes actually collected by the state) of cigarettes smoked in California are smuggled. The methods and results are consistent with the previously published literature. The California Board of Equalization differs from previous scientific studies and has estimated that smuggling is California 12% to 27% of cigarettes smoked, 5-10 times what all other authorities have estimated. The Board of Equalization uses unconventional and unreliable methods. The first BOE report (1999) utilizes an estimate of the level of smuggling based on national experience during the 1980s. It ignores the effect of California's large and effective tobacco control program on cigarette consumption; it implicitly assumes that any drop in cigarette tax-paid sales in California beyond the drop expected from price increases was a result of increased smuggling rather than smokers cutting down or quitting as a result of the California Tobacco Control Program. The second BOE report (2003) is based on a biased sample of small retail outlets where one would expect illicit sales to be most likely. Stores such as Walmart, Sam's Club and Costco are assumed to sell smuggled cigarettes to the same extent as the small retail outlets. For these reasons, the BOE estimates should not be used as a basis for making public policy. Even if one accepts the BOE's very high estimates of smuggling, increasing the cigarette tax will increase state revenues. Benjamin Alamar Ph.D. Tobacco Economics http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/1 http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_alamar/1 Mon, 04 Dec 2006 13:20:59 PST A letter from the editor regarding the inaugural issue of the Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports. Benjamin Alamar Ph.D. General Sports