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<title>Ben Kriechel</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2011  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel</link>
<description>Recent documents in Ben Kriechel</description>
<language>en-us</language>
<lastBuildDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2011 02:18:43 PDT</lastBuildDate>
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<item>
<title>Occupational sorting of school leavers: The role of economic preferences</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/17</link>
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<pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 07:30:54 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>We measure economic preferences (risk attitudes and patience) of young individuals in a large representative survey of school leavers around the time that they start their labour market career and relate these preferences  to the earnings risk and the steepness of the earnings profiles of the occupations they choose to work in. We find that the measures for risk and time preferences are systematically and significantly related to the riskiness and timing of earnings of occupations, which we derive from a large administrative data set: Young entrants who are risk seekers are significantly more likely to start their careers in  occupations that are characterized by high earnings risk, a high mid-career earnings risk, a high level of cyclical sensitivity, and a high risk of unemployment. Likewise, patient individuals are significantly more likely to choose for occupations with a steep earnings profile. We also show that individuals who are badly sorted according to their preferences and the characteristics of their initial occupation are more likely to change to an occupation  that better matches their economic preferences.</p>

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</description>

<author>Didier Fouarge et al.</author>


<category>Occupations</category>

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<title>Judgement and learning of jury judges</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/16</link>
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<pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 07:27:17 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>It has been observed that in sequential tournaments performing early can reduce an individual’s probability of winning even when the order of performance has been randomly assigned. We offer an explanation of this which doesn’t depend on extra assumptions about the psychological make-up of judges but depends only on judges’ having some uncertainty about their assessment, and that they learn. A suggestion for contest design is also made.</p>

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</description>

<author>Ben Kriechel et al.</author>


<category>Personnel Economics</category>

<category>Other</category>

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<title>Works councils, collective bargaining and apprenticeship training</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/15</link>
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<pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 07:24:28 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>We investigate the effects of works councils on apprenticeship training. The German law attributes works councils substantial information and co-determination rights on training-related issues. Thus, works councils may also have an impact on the cost-benefit relation of workplace training. Using detailed firm-level data containing information on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training in Germany, we apply econometric matching methods to identify works council effects. We find that firms with works councils make a significantly higher net investment in apprenticeship training compared to firms without such an institution. However, we also find that the fraction of workers still employed with the same firm five years after training is significantly higher in the presence of works councils, enabling firms to recoup training investments over a longer time horizon. All works council effects, however, are much more pronounced for firms covered by collective bargaining agreements.</p>

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</description>

<author>Ben Kriechel et al.</author>


<category>Personnel Economics</category>

<category>VET</category>

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<title>High and steady or low and rising? Vocational versus general education in life-cycle earnings</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/14</link>
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<pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 07:20:20 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>In this paper, we compare experience-earnings profiles of employees with vocational and general education background in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, three countries with fundamentally different education systems. Using Mixed-Effects  Linear Regression Models we show that earnings of vocationally educated employees are higher in the initial phase of their career. However, those with a general education background catch up over time in the labor market. Life-cycle differences in earnings are  more pronounced in Germany than in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.</p>

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</description>

<author>Frank Cörvers et al.</author>


<category>VET</category>

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<title>Workforce Reorganization and the Worker</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/13</link>
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<pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 07:13:37 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>In this paper we study the joint decision process of changing the structure of jobs and laying off individual workers in a firm that downsizes its workforce. A hierarchical decision model is proposed and estimated using personnel data from a firm in demise comparing the characteristics of the individual workers and the structure of the firm’s labour force before and after its reorganization. Our results show that workers in jobs in the top levels of each skill  group’s hierarchy are better protected against downsizing due to larger productivity shocks and larger firing costs.</p>

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</description>

<author>Ben Kriechel et al.</author>


<category>Personnel Economics</category>

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<title>Displaced Workers , Unemployed and Vocational Education and Training</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/12</link>
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<pubDate>Sat, 29 May 2010 04:06:21 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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<author>Ben Kriechel</author>


<category>Worker Displacement</category>

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<title>Labor</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/10</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2009 08:10:12 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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<author>Ben Kriechel</author>


<category>Other</category>

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<title>Regional Labour Market Forecasts in the Netherlands</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/9</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2009 07:52:42 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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</description>

<author>Ben Kriechel et al.</author>


<category>Labor Market Forecasting</category>

</item>






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<title>Taxation and Technology Adoption: A Hotelling Approach</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/8</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 02 Oct 2007 00:48:44 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Environmental regulation and competitiveness are issues that seem to be at odds. However, the `Porter Hypothesis' states that firms can actually gain in competitiveness if they are subject to stricter environmental regulation. We show in a simple model the basic setting of the problem to apply it then to a Hotelling framework. A non-adoption tax (adoption subsidy) is shown to destroy a non-adoption equilibrium in a closed economy model. We show that taxes not directly targeting the non-adoption problem may fail to have an adoption incentive on the firms. In an open economy model the Porter Hypothesis is shown to hold if (i) non-adoption taxes are higher than adoption costs for one country and lower for the other, and (ii) the returns of second adoption are insufficient to cover the net adoption costs.</p>

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</description>

<author>Ben Kriechel et al.</author>


<category>International Trade</category>

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<title>The Environmental Porter Hypothesis: Theory, Evidence and a Model of Timing of Adoption</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/7</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 02 Oct 2007 00:45:28 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>The Porter Hypothesis postulates that the costs of compliance with environmental standards may be offset by adoption of innovations they trigger. We model this hypothesis using a game of timing of technology adoption. We will show that times of adoption will be earlier if the the non-adoption tax is higher. The environmental tax will turn the preemption game with low profits into a game with credible precommitment generating higher profits (pro-Porter). If there is a precommitment game without environmental taxes, the introduction of a tax will lead to lower profits (anti-Porter). An evaluation of the empirical literature indicates that the Porter hypothesis will hold even for profit-maximizing firms under multiple market imperfections such as imperfect competititon, X-inefficiency, and agency costs. These are more likely to be present in sectors with large firms. In many case studies that we have evaluated, though, we detected an element of explicit or implicit subsidies for environmentally friendly behaviour, which is in line with Pigovian policies.</p>

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</description>

<author>Ben Kriechel et al.</author>


<category>International Trade</category>

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<item>
<title>Wage structure and labor mobility in the Netherlands 1999-2003</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/6</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 04 Jul 2007 07:55:25 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>In this paper we document the wage structure and labor mobility in the Netherlands in the period 1999-2003. We explain the importance of wage-setting institutions in the Netherlands and the main actors. The analyses are based on administrative sources allowing for comparisons between and within firms, and in which workers can be followed over time. In the period investigated the Netherlands experienced an increase in wage inequality. Despite the centralized system of wage negotiations in the Netherlands, our findings suggest that market forces were the main determinant of wage growth. Workers with similar wages experienced similar wage increases in firms of different sizes. Wages increases were larger for low-skilled workers in industries with large increases in demand than in other industries. Variation in wage growth was mainly at the individual level. Firm-level wage increases accounted for only 12 % of the total variation.</p>

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</description>

<author>Lex Borghans et al.</author>


<category>Personnel Economics</category>

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<item>
<title>Heterogeneity among Displaced Workers</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/5</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 04 Jul 2007 07:50:23 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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</description>

<author>Ben Kriechel</author>


<category>Worker Displacement</category>

<category>Personnel Economics</category>

</item>






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<title>Forecasting in regional labour market monitoring</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/4</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 04 Jul 2007 07:48:19 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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<author>Ben Kriechel</author>


<category>Labor Market Forecasting</category>

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<item>
<title>The role of specific and general human capital after displacement</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/3</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 04 Jul 2007 07:45:03 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Displaced workers experience significant and long-lasting wage losses. However, the average wage losses hide the tremendous differences among workers. So far, the differences are explained by differences in accumulated on-the-job experience, education level, age, and so on, but a large variation among similar workers remain. In this paper we investigate the effect of general and specific human capital on the unemployment duration and wage losses during the first three years following displacement. Information on the specificity of a job or function allows us to quantify the impact on the wage losses. We are able to rank positions in terms of the specificity of accumulated human capital.</p>

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</description>

<author>Ben Kriechel et al.</author>


<category>Worker Displacement</category>

</item>






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<title>Monkey bars and ladders: The importance of lateral and vertical job mobility in internal labor market careers</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/2</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 04 Jul 2007 07:36:44 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>This paper compares results from the empirical literature on internal labor markets with outcomes from analyzing personnel data of the Dutch aircraft manufacturer Fokker. It sheds light on differences in the functioning of internal labor markets between periods of workforce growth and decline. Despite substantial variation in individual wages, careers are important as wages are strongly related to job levels. Promotion rates fall and demotion rates rise when the firm enters the stage of demise. Vertical and lateral job mobility are important in internal labor market careers as they stimulate wage growth and reduce the lay-off risk.</p>

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</description>

<author>Thomas Johannes Dohmen et al.</author>


<category>Personnel Economics</category>

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<title>Learning to update your reservation wage while looking for a new job</title>
<link>http://works.bepress.com/ben_kriechel/1</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 04 Jul 2007 07:32:41 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>We combine post-displacement survey data with information from personnel files of a displacing firm in order to reveal sources of worker heterogeneity in search time and wage losses. The Fokker Personnel Files and Survey are described in detail. We develop a dynamic reservation wage with updating. The method of updating is based on the simple idea that job seekers are informed about successful matches of their former colleagues similar to them. The data offer empirical support for the updating model.</p>

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</description>

<author>Ben Kriechel et al.</author>


<category>Worker Displacement</category>

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