This paper investigates competition between firms whose choices of how much “green effort” to devote

to building their reputations as socially responsible producers are determined in the contexts of

simultaneous-move and hybrid simultaneous/sequential-move Bertrand equilibria. We derive conditions

under which (1) the inter-temporal, green-effort reaction function of the firm with the less-aggressive

green strategy is non-monotonic, (2) the level of green effort chosen by the firm with the more-aggressive

green strategy increases when it views itself as the leader in a hybrid game rather than moving concurrently

in a simultaneous-choice game, and (3) the establishment of a resale market by the more aggressive

firm acts as a substitute for its choice of green-effort level. The sufficiency conditions underlying these

results impose qualitative restrictions on the more-aggressive firm’s lagged (i.e., reputational) and contemporaneous cross effects of its green effort on demand for the less-aggressive firm’s product, as well

as on the less-aggressive firm’s price markup and marginal cost associated with its production and green effort

choices, respectively.