Article
Sequestration and the Engagement of Developing Economies in a Global Carbon Market
Resource and Energy Economics
(2017)
Abstract
We develop a differential game within a general equilibrium framework of carbon sequestration
with and without international trade. We characterize the game's equilibrium
and demonstrate how a global carbon permit market can be structured to induce
the participation of developing countries through the harnessing of their potential to
sequester carbon. We show that a permit market with carbon sequestration is mutually
welfare improving for developed and developing nations, and that international trade
in fi nished goods and carbon permits lowers the stock of global pollution.
Keywords
- Environment and trade,
- sequestration,
- carbon permits,
- di erential games
Disciplines
Publication Date
Winter December 5, 2017
Citation Information
Arthur Caplan, Reza Oladi and John Gilbert. "Sequestration and the Engagement of Developing Economies in a Global Carbon Market" Resource and Energy Economics (2017) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/arthur_caplan/122/