Article
Substance and the primary sense of being in Aristotle
The Review of Metaphysics
(2015)
Abstract
Aristotle’s notion of substance and its relation to his investigation of the question of being qua being in the Metaphysics is one of the most important, enduring, and intriguing problems in scholarship focused on Aristotle and the tradition of metaphysics. This article explores some of the more recent developments in this area of scholarship, especially the trend toward more dynamic interpretations of Aristotle’s conception of substance, as a way of renewing the question of what Aristotle really means by being. On this basis, the article reinterprets Aristotle’s investigation of substance as the primary sense of being in the Metaphysics. It argues that there are two primary ways substance may be considered; with respect to the principles of intelligibility of substance and with regard to the causal framework of the real unity and determinacy of substance. The primary principles of the intelligibility of substance, it is argued, are end and fulfilment (telos and entelechy). The causal framework of the real unity and determinacy of substances, on the other hand, can be understood via the notion of act and activity (energeia).
Keywords
- metaphysics,
- Aristotle,
- substance
Disciplines
Publication Date
March, 2015
Citation Information
Brook, A. (2015). Substance and the primary sense of being in Aristotle. The Review of Metaphysics: a philosophical quarterly, 68(3), 521-544