Copyright (c) 2009 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman Recent documents in Andrew T Guzman en-us Sun, 04 Jan 2009 04:29:51 PST 3600 http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/38 http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/38 Thu, 11 Dec 2008 17:04:26 PST The benefits of overseas outsourcing have come at a cost. Americans enjoy unprecedented levels of safety and security in the domestically-produced goods they use, food and drugs they ingest, and services they employ. Yet as U.S. firms offer better price-quality combinations by contracting with foreign companies, the mix of economic, legal, and societal forces that serve to protect consumers changes. Though international trade in goods and services provides clear economic benefits, it can also frustrate consumer protection efforts. This article provides a conceptual framework for understanding the mix of regulatory elements that govern domestic production of goods and services, and the ways in which international trade changes that mix. It distinguishes between two types of domestic regulation--the first targeting the process by which goods are produced and services provided, and the second mandating particular outcomes. Foreign production disables the first type of regulation and weakens the second. Protecting domestic consumers in a globalized market, then, will frequently require the development of "substitutes"-- including regulation by foreign governments and private regulators--for domestic forms of governance that are ineffective abroad. To address the threat posed by foreign production, we propose that the best "substitute" for domestic regulation will often be oversight of safety issues by U.S. partners in global trade. To provide incentives to domestic firms, U.S. regulators should make those firms legally accountable for harmful products that make it to the United States. Furthermore, regulators should impose higher penalties for violations of safety norms when production has taken place abroad. Andrew T. Guzman C. International Economic Law http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/37 http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/37 Fri, 12 Sep 2008 16:17:40 PDT Rising legalization in the international community has lead to greater use of international tribunals and soft law. This paper explores the intersection of these instruments. The decision of an international tribunal interprets binding legal obligations but is not itself legally binding except, in some instances, as between the parties. The broader, and often more important function of a tribunal's decision - its influence on state behavior beyond the particular case and its impact on perceptions regarding legal obligations - is best characterized as a form of soft law. Despite its inability to bind states, a tribunal can influence state behavior by implicating a state's reputation for compliance with international law, by bolstering the reciprocity underlying an agreement, or by triggering retaliation. In this sense the rulings of a tribunal influences states through the same mechanisms as does binding international law. Because tribunal rulings are soft law, however, they avoid the need for unanimity among states, thereby making it easier for the legal system (including the non-binding aspects of that system) to adapt to changing circumstances and conditions.By establishing a tribunal to interpret legal obligations in a way that gives rise to a soft law jurisprudence, therefore, states are able to expand the tribunal's influence beyond those states that submit to the tribunal's jurisdiction. In effect, all states subject to the underlying legal obligation come to be subject to the soft law impact of the tribunal, regardless of whether they have formally submitted to the tribunal's jurisdiction. In this way tribunals create what can be called an international common law able to evolve without formal agreement from states. Andrew T. Guzman B. Work in Progress F. Public International Law http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/36 http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/36 Thu, 24 Apr 2008 10:24:15 PDT Andrew T. Guzman H.Other Topics http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/35 http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/35 Thu, 24 Apr 2008 10:21:16 PDT Andrew T. Guzman C. International Economic Law http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/34 http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/34 Thu, 24 Apr 2008 10:19:47 PDT Andrew T. Guzman C. International Economic Law http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/33 http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/33 Mon, 21 Apr 2008 17:37:24 PDT Andrew T. Guzman C. International Economic Law H.Other Topics http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/32 http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/32 Mon, 21 Apr 2008 16:59:15 PDT Andrew T. Guzman C. International Economic Law http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/31 http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/31 Mon, 21 Apr 2008 16:57:14 PDT Andrew T. Guzman H.Other Topics http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/30 http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/30 Mon, 21 Apr 2008 16:49:05 PDT Andrew T. Guzman C. International Economic Law http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/29 http://works.bepress.com/andrew_guzman/29 Mon, 21 Apr 2008 16:43:19 PDT Andrew T. Guzman C. International Economic Law E. International Trade