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<title>Andrea D. Lyon</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2009  All rights reserved.</copyright>
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<description>Recent documents in Andrea D. Lyon</description>
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<title>Naming the Dragon: Litigating Race Issues During a Death Penalty Trial</title>
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<pubDate>Wed, 06 Aug 2008 14:21:34 PDT</pubDate>
<description>The issue of racial disparity in the administration of the death penalty is a persistent theme in modern capital jurisprudence. Starting with Furman v. Georgia and continuing on to McCleskey v. Zant courts have struggled to come to grips with this issue.  This article does not attempt to explore all of the legal ramifications of race and the death penalty, nor does it speak to its political import. Rather, it tackles some of the practical problems facing a capital defense attorney in the courtroom by providing a brief overview of motions practice in this arena by using a federal capital case the author recently tried as an example.   The article will focus on two important areas of trial; voir dire and development of the theory of the case.</description>

<author>Andrea D. Lyon</author>


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<title>Defending the Life or Death Case</title>
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<pubDate>Wed, 06 Aug 2008 14:08:44 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Over thirteen years ago I wrote an article about defending a death penalty case (&quot;Defending the Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different?&quot;  Mercer Law Review, Volume 42, Number 2, Winter 1991).  The article was written in part to describe what is involved in taking on an endeavor of this magnitude and in part as an exhortation to my brothers and sisters defending these cases to work hard for their clients. Then, late in 2004, the United States Supreme Court relied on that same article as part of its reasoning to deny relief to a death row inmate whose defense attorney had conceded his guilt at trial without his permission. (Florida v. Nixon, - U.S. -, 125 S. Ct. 551, 562 (2004)). 	In many ways, this is endemic of what it means to represent someone charged with a capital crime--things get turned upside down</description>

<author>Andrea D. Lyon</author>


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