I like the view that the fundamental facts are logically simple, not complex. However, some universal generalizations and negations may ...

Plausibly, how much is at stake in some salient practical task can affect how generously people ascribe knowledge of task-relevant ...

This paper explains what’s wrong with a Hume-inspired argument for skepticism about induction. Hume’s argument takes as a premise that ...

Rampant non-factualism is the view that all non-fundamental matters are non-factual, in a sense inspired by Kit Fine (2001). The ...

Arguments from “easy knowledge” are meant to refute a class of epistemological views, including foundationalism about perceptual knowledge. I present ...

This paper compares two ‘relativist’ theories about deliciousness: truth-relativism, and Kit Fine’s non-factualism about a subject-matter. Contemporary truth-relativism is presented ...

A sensible epistemologist may not see how she could know that she is not a Brain In a Vat (BIV); ...

This paper distinguishes two ways to 'put knowledge first'. One way affirms a knowledge norm. For example, Williamson [2000] argues ...

One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when ...

The ideology of relative truth is inflexible in two ways. Firstly, what's true-for-J is closed under entailment. This is a ...

Penelope Maddy's book inaugurates OUP's publication of the annual Romanell Lectures, aimed at a general readership. Maddy takes on the ...

The A-theory of time is plagued by certain standard armchair problems: the presentism–eternalism dilemma, the problem of truth-makers, the alleged ...