Copyright (c) 2008 All rights reserved. http://works.bepress.com/alemanno Recent documents in Alberto Alemanno en-us Wed, 02 Apr 2008 18:02:37 PDT 3600 http://works.bepress.com/alemanno/3 http://works.bepress.com/alemanno/3 Wed, 20 Feb 2008 01:32:50 PST The establishment of the much-awaited European Food Safety Authority is the most prominent innovation introduced by the recently reformed European regulation of food . Yet, the Authority merely represents one of the components of an entirely new strategy adopted by the European Union in relation to food safety . Although pivotal to the functioning of the new food safety regime, the EFSA has not been vested with any regulatory power in the matter, which remains with the Commission and the Member States. However, although EFSA opinions have not been granted a direct regulatory authority and, accordingly, do not prime over national advice, they are likely to acquire a de facto legally binding value for both the EC and the Member states authorities when passing legislation. After briefly examining EFSA“s institutional architecture, this article will provide a detailed analysis of EFSA's origins, of its institutional structure and powers by looking into its first five years of existence. alberto alemanno Trade Regulation http://works.bepress.com/alemanno/2 http://works.bepress.com/alemanno/2 Wed, 20 Feb 2008 01:26:54 PST This chapter examines the (non) role that private business operators play in the implementation of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports. More precisely, by analysing the legal status of these decisions in national and regional law, it looks at what individuals are entitled to obtain when a WTO Member ignores the results of a Dispute Settlement Body's ruling. As private business operators bear most of the economic costs of non-compliance, there is an increasing pressure for a more direct involvement of these parties in the Dispute Settlement System mechanisms. The challenge is therefore to find a way to accommodate their interests within the current settlement system, without reducing the discretion WTO Members enjoy in the implementation of the reports. By building upon the EC case law, it is argued that allowing individuals to seek compensation of damages deriving from non-compliance by the losing Member might be a valuable solution to strike a more fair balance between the interests of the WTO actors: its Members and their private business operators. alberto alemanno http://works.bepress.com/alemanno/1 http://works.bepress.com/alemanno/1 Wed, 16 Jan 2008 00:31:12 PST This paper examines the (non) role that private business operators play in the implementation of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports. More precisely, by analysing the legal status of these decisions in national and regional law, it looks at what individuals are entitled to obtain when a WTO Member ignores the results of a Dispute Settlement Body's proceedings. As private business operators bear most of the economic costs of non-compliance, there is an increasing pressure for a more direct involvement of these parties in the Dispute Settlement System mechanims. The challenge is therefore to find a way to accommodate their interests within the current settlement system, without reducing the discretion WTO Members enjoy in the implementation of the reports. An answer to this problem is even more needed as uncertainties surrounding the results of the WTO dispute settlement procedure will be exacerbated as soon as non-violation cases expand into the newly-emerging areas, such as investments and competition policies.The recent attempt made by a French company to recover damages incurred as result of the EC non-compliance with the Hormones decision before the European Courts (CFI/ECJ) is provided, throughout the paper, as an example of private parties' involvement in the implementation phase. In this paper, I argue that private parties should be allowed to invoke settlement disputes decisions before the courts of the losing WTO Member to seek compensation for the damages incurred after the expiration of the given reasonable period of time to comply with the report. After reviewing most of the underlying arguments for and against this solution, I will demonstrate that looking at the status of DSB's reports exclusively through the lens of direct effect might be misleading. I will conclude by arguing that granting the right of individuals to invoke a DSB's ruling could improve the relationship that private business operators have with the multilateral trading by striking a more fair balance between the interests of all the WTO relevant actors. Alberto Alemanno Dispute Resolution Trade Regulation