1. The argument employs “social capital” as a placeholder for more developed specific claims. For elaboration, see Michael Woolcock and Deepa Narayan; “Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research and Policy”. The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Aug 2000), pp. 225-249. Oxford University Press.

2. For data behind such a choice, see: http://www.ibtimes.com/incarcerated-america-why-are-so-many-people-us-prisons-charts-1562451. And: http://www.prb.org/Topics/Education.aspx. And: http://www.communityindicators.net/projects.

3- “Public wisdom” refers to the norms of good civic conduct that are informally promulgated in public life. Such informal norms support a variety of formal institutions.

4- The argument presumes that better personal mentoring can cause better public outcomes. It is indifferent concerning the reverse, i.e., that change in crime levels can cause changes in mentoring. The argument also allows that factors other than personal mentoring can cause changes in crime levels.

5- For discussion of retributive justice, see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/punishment/; see especially Sections 1 and 3.

6- For recidivism data, see: http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=17

7- For discussion of the moral relevance of institutional impact on life prospects, see Paul Gomberg’s “Dilemmas of Rawlsian Opportunity”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 40, Number 1, March 2010, pp. 1-24.

8- See Doug Husak’s Why Punish the Deserving? (Nous, 26:4 1992): 447-464.

9- For examination of the relationship between social capital and the economy see: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/ EXTTSOCIALCAPITAL/0,,contentMDK:20185164~menuPK:418217~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:401015,00.html

10- See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-norms/; especially Sections 6 and 7.

11- The argument does not provide or require a deep theory of moral character. For example, we leave aside whether character is merely a habitual disposition or an intentional consideration of right reasons. Minimally the argument requires that one feature of good moral character is recognizing the obligation to play tit-for-tat in social games.

12- The argument does not elaborate on the institutional nature of the expert award board, other

than noting that its composition and motivations are relevant considerations.

13- One possibility, not developed here, is that instead of a board of experts setting $C, a prior

futures market could set it. Thus, one market would set each contract’s face value, and a

separate market could then determine the contract’s ongoing price.

14- General information about futures markets abounds. For example:

marketshttp://www.investopedia.com/university/futures/

15- To compensate for the risk of failure, payouts of success must be proportionately greater than

the costs of failure. A payout with a 25% chance of success for example must (presumptuously)

be twice the size of a similar payout with a 50% chance of success.

16- The argument neither presents nor requires particular views of consequentialism, Kantianism

and virtue theory. Any uncontroversial interpretation of these familiar approaches to moral

justification will suffice argumentatively.

17- For a defense of the normative priority of crime prevention, see Section IV of Husak.

18- Adding a new investment asset class is a purely efficient development. For elaboration see:

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/modernportfoliotheory.asp

19- The familiar exemplar statement of this view is Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom,

(University Chicago Press, 1982).

20- For a summary of the Rawlsian statement on ideal theory, see:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/#IdeNonIdeThe. The utopian objection is that theoretical

claims cannot be realized in principle, not that they are logically possible but not satisfied by

present and nearby practices.

21- See: users.nber.org/~jwolfers/Press/Mentions/PlaceYourBets.pdf

22- Jeremy Caplan, “Beyond the Blue Chips”, Time (February 13, 2006): 96.

23- A possibly fatal concern for the proposal is that it is morally troubling to present one’s own

case for being an especially at-risk candidate. Consider candidates resorting to discriminatory

“self-profiling” and to violating family and other privacies and trusts.

24- Self-approval of one’s own wrongful gains reflects my view of at-risk communities

applauding and habituating personal defection on cooperative opportunities.

25- See for example https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/centersinitiatives/

csi/defining-social-innovation.

26- As noted in footnote 16, no particular theory of Kantian objectification is presented. Any

uncontroversial interpretation of the familiar idea of being treated as a mere means suffices

argumentatively.

27- For a summary, see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/

28- The 1971 Stanley Kubrick film, Clockwork Orange. For relevant analysis of the point, see

http://flavorwire.com/294348/anthony-burgess-explains-the-meaning-of-a-clockwork-orange-inthis-

weeks-new-yorker.

29- The alert reader will catch this section’s mixing of objectification and virtue considerations.

As the paper’s aim is not to deeply theorize how this kind of incorporation should go, we leave

this concern aside. Two links between these two kinds of moral considerations may be fruitful however. First, - persons objectify themselves when they willfully deceive others. Second, it is non-virtuous

to objectify one’s minions by not mentoring their moral judgment.

30- See p. 18, Andrew Altman, Arguing About Law, (Wadsworth Publishing Co., 2001).

31- For relevant discussion, see p. 75 of George Sher, Desert (Princeton University Press, 1987).