Corruption is a primary descriptor of politics, and of course corruption is bad on its merits. But what is wrong about the practice it is the lack of an adequate response. Assume then that corruption persists, not primarily because of bad moral character on the part of officers, but because of poor constitutional design.

It is curious however that contemporary constitutional theory resists innovation. This paper takes up the challenge by proposing a new, fourth constitutional branch and office: a “corruption cop”. A corruption cop possesses the exclusive authority to remove corrupt officers from public office.

The authority to remove officers is not a legal exercise: it is an exercise of constitutional stewardship. Stewardship is a normative practice that is prior to law and election. While a high court is the institutional means to protect constitutional rights, the corruption cop would be the institutional means to protect constitutional culture. The standard that legitimates the removal authority is an officer’s violation of their oath. All officers must pledge to not abuse the office that belongs to the polity and not to them as an individual.

The paper examines the objection that a corruption cop would merely centralize corruption rather than resolve it.