Antitrust and Industrial Organization

OpenURL

Bundled Discounts, Leverage Theory, and Downstream Competition (with John Simpson), American Law and Economics Review (2007)
Under plausible circumstances, a monopolist in one market can use its control of prices in...
 

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Naked Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition (with John Simpson), American Economic Review (2007)
Previous papers by Eric B. Rasmusen et. al. (1991) and Ilya R. Segal and Michael...
 

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The Effect of Exit on Entry Deterrence Strategies, Games and Economic Behavior (2006)
Recent analyses of entry deterrence strategies have required an incumbent’s post-entry output or pricing strategy...
 

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Managerial Incentives and the Price Effects of Mergers, Journal of Industrial Economics (2005)
Most analysis of market power assumes that managers are perfect agents for shareholders. This paper...
 

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The State of Critical Loss Analysis: A Reply to Scheffman and Simons (with Daniel P. O'Brien), Antitrust Source (2004)
 

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Innovation, Market Structure, and the Holdup Problem: Investment Incentives and Coordination, International Journal of Industrial Organization (2004)
I analyze the innovation incentives under monopoly and duopoly provision of horizontally differentiated products purchased...
 

OpenURL

A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis (with Daniel P. O'Brien), Antitrust Law Journal (2003)
Critical loss analysis is often used to argue that firms with large margins have more...
 

Contract Theory

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Government and the Reverse-Holdup Problem, Journal of Public Economic Theory (2007)
When the government bargains with a private firm, the firm cares about only its own...
 

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The Limitations of Buyer-Option Contracts in Solving the Hold-up Problem, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (2007)
In a recent paper, Lyon and Rasmusen (2004) argue that buyer-option contracts are more effective...
 

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The Inefficiency of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (2006)
The prevailing view in the law and economics literature is that preventing firms and consumers...
 

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Damages for Breach of Contract: Should the Government Get Special Treatment?, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (2001)
Contracts that involve the government differ from contracts between two private parties in that the...
 

Criminal Law and Economics

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Bayesian Jurors and the Limits to Deterrence (with Ezra Friedman), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (2006)
We consider a model of crime with rational Bayesian Jurors. We find that if jurors...
 

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Justifying Imprisonment: On the Optimality of Excessively Costly Punishment, American Law and Economics Review (2003)
The criminal punishment literature has focused on justifying non-maximal punishments and the use of non-monetary...
 

Family Law and Economics

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Why Divorce Laws Matter: Incentives for Non-Contractible Marital Investments under Unilateral and Consent Divorce, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (2009)
The Coase Theorem suggests that married couples will divorce if and only if doing so...
 

Other Law and Economics

A Right to Silence for Civil Defendants?, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (2010)
The Fifth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to silence, blocking the court from drawing...
 

OpenURL

Affirmative Action: More Efficient than Color Blindness, Texas Journal on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights (2005)
One of the most compelling reasons against affirmative action is the principle of color blindness,...
 

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Comment on ‘Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients’, American Law and Economics Review (2004)
Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2003) propose a novel system for eliminating the conflict of interest between...
 

Settlement

Advantage Defendant: Why Sinking Litigation Costs Makes Negative Expected Value Defenses, but not Negative Expected Value Suits Credible (with Warren F. Schwartz), Journal of Legal Studies (2009)
We revisit Lucian Bebchuk’s (1996) claim that plaintiff’s can use the sequential nature of litigation...
 

No Free Lunch: How Settlement Can Reduce the Legal System’s Ability to Induce Efficient Behavior (with Ezra Friedman), SMU Law Review (2008)
The belief that it is better for cases to settle than go to trial is...
 

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A Model of Welfare-Reducing Settlement, Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy (2004)
While it is typically taken for granted that settlement of lawsuits increases social welfare, this...